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1 General introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Si vis pacem, cole justiciam 
(If you desire peace, cultivate justice) 
The above words were carved into the foundation stone of the first headquarters of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). They reflect the shared vision of the ILO’s founders, 
as laid down in the Preamble to the ILO’s Constitution, that “universal and lasting peace can 
be established only if it is based upon social justice”. Work plays an important role in achieving 
social justice: it provides us with the means to meet our material needs. In fact, for the largest 
part of the society, it is essential for survival. But work goes beyond material needs alone: it 
also gives people an identity and fosters social inclusion and cohesion. The workplace itself is 
a place for socializing with others – something one tends to forget until the workplace is no 
longer available or accessible. Work also equips us with the capabilities we need to expand 
our choices in life. 
However, work can also contribute to social injustice. Some jobs are poorly paid and thus do 
not allow workers to lift themselves above the poverty line. Some workers are forced into 
labour and deprived of their fundamental principles and rights at work1. Workplaces can be 
exclusive and restrictive; sometimes, they can even be places of harassment. Work can be 
hazardous and make people ill or leave them with a disability. It can also kill, whether as a 
result of a fatal accident or simply through being overworked – a phenomenon known as 
karōshi in Japan. 
What sets good work that promotes social justice apart from bad work that threatens the 
achievement of social justice is captured by the concept of decent work. In the absence of a 
clear-cut definition, the concept can be described in the following terms:  
Decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for 
work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection 
                                                     
1 Adopted in 1998, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work sets out principles and 
rights in four categories: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, 
the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination 
in respect of employment and occupation. 
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for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people 
to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and 
equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. (ILO 2020d)  
The concept and the importance of decent work have been acknowledged by the international 
community, and the four pillars of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda – employment promotion, 
social protection, fundamental rights at work and social dialogue – have become integral 
elements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNGA 2015). The notion of decent 
work features in several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), most prominently in 
Goal 8, which calls for the promotion of “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all” (ibid.). 
It is difficult to find the positive side of the COVID-19 pandemic: its impact on people’s lives 
and livelihoods is just so devastating. However, two possible avenues for recovering from the 
crisis are open to us: either we try to return to our “old” lives and continue with business as 
usual, or we try to do things differently and have the courage to pursue more of a “business 
as unusual” approach. History has shown that previous crises and economic shocks have 
actually exacerbated rather than reduced social inequality; we allowed social justice to slip 
further off into the distance. It is in our hands to ensure that we do not waste this opportunity 
again: we must see this crisis as an opportunity to rethink our current development path. This 
is our chance to rebuild our economies on a more sustainable foundation. This is our chance 
to revitalize multilateralism and global solidarity. This is our chance to reinvigorate the social 
contract and put people back at the centre of economic and social policymaking. In short: this 
could be our chance to create fairer and more equal societies and to make a giant leap towards 
achieving social justice. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows: the next sub-chapter (1.2) sets the 
scene for the dissertation and provides an overview of key labour market trends in emerging 
and developing countries. It elaborates on different aspects and dimensions of labour market 
participation and labour income, and touches on trends that are expected to become 
increasingly important in the future. The issues identified in this overview are then addressed 
in the subsequent chapters. Sub-chapter 1.3 contains a summary of the four stand-alone 
articles of this thesis, introduces their respective research questions and demonstrates how 
the articles are interconnected and build on each other: Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual 
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considerations for measuring decent and productive work and proposes a set of indicators. 
Chapter 3 takes up the notion of productive work and analyses the impact of large-scale 
agricultural investments on rural labour markets in low and middle income countries. 
Measuring economic dependency is the focus of chapter 4, which analyses global 
demographic trends and their impact on future labour markets. The last article of this 
dissertation (chapter 5) brings us back to the here and now and looks at the long-term 
consequences of economic crises for youth. Each article concludes with a summary of the key 
findings and indicates further areas for research. 
1.2 Key labour market trends in developing and emerging countries 
The following chapter provides an overview of important labour market trends in developing 
and emerging economies. The country groupings applied in this overview have been defined 
in accordance with the World Bank’s country income classifications, which are based on gross 
national income (GNI) per capita (in current US$) in 2019. Accordingly, developing countries 
are classified as low income countries with a GNI per capita of less than US$1,026. Emerging 
countries are comprised of lower-middle (US$1,026 to US$3,995) and upper-middle income 
(US$3,996 to US$12,375) countries (World Bank 2019). Unless otherwise stated, all data 
presented in this section is extracted from the modelled estimates and projection series of the 
ILO’s statistical database (ILOSTAT) (ILO 2020b; 2017a). Wherever applicable, data is presented 
for youth (aged 15 to 24 years) and adults (25 years and over) and disaggregated by sex. The 
aim of this assessment is not only to identify current challenges but also to highlight the 
tremendous progress that has been made over the past two decades. 
One of the most frequently consulted indicators for assessing developments in the labour 
market is the unemployment rate. In developing countries, the share of the unemployed in 
the total labour force declined by around 5 per cent between 2000 and 2019, and currently 
stands at around 3 per cent for adults and 6.5 per cent for youth. This decline was more 
significant for men than for women. In emerging countries, an opposing trend was observed, 
with rising unemployment rates for both adults and youth. Although this increase was slightly 
more pronounced for adults (16 per cent) than for youth (14 per cent) in lower-middle income 
countries, it was considerably stronger for youth (26 per cent) in upper-middle income 
countries than for adults (12 per cent). Generally speaking, youth are disproportionately 
affected by unemployment: in upper-middle income countries, the unemployment rate for 
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youth is around three times higher than it is for adults; in lower-middle income countries, it is 
more than five times higher. Turnham and Eröcal (1990) argue that lower unemployment rates 
in developing countries reflect the reality that poorer workers cannot afford to be without a 
job; as a result, unemployment is a reflection of the search for better paid jobs by those who 
can afford the associated job-search costs. This may be particularly true when one considers 
the low rates of coverage of social protection systems in developing countries, which all but 
eliminates joblessness as an option. In fact, only 45 per cent of the global population is 
effectively covered by at least one form of social protection benefit, and the rate is much lower 
in low and middle income countries (ILO 2017b). During times of economic crisis, in particular, 
the lack of social protection coverage for those who lose their income owing to sickness or 
unemployment poses a serious threat to people’s livelihoods (ILO 2020e).  
The youth–adult differentials in unemployment can be traced back to young people’s 
comparably low levels of work-related skills and competences and their lack of work 
experience (Pastore 2018; Verick 2009), but also their lower ability to access finance in order to 
start their own business (O’Higgins 2001).  
Despite the progress made in bringing more people into employment, the unemployment rate 
for youth is stagnating at a high level. The adverse effects of unemployment on a young 
person’s future employment trajectory include a lower probability of finding a job in the future 
(Petreski, Mojsoska-Blazevski, and Bergolo 2016), a higher likelihood of dropping out of the labour 
force (Helbling and Sacchi 2014), and a lower future labour income level (ibid). 
A second indicator for the analysis of labour markets is the labour force participation rate 
(LFPR). Over the past 20 years, the LFPR has declined in both developing and emerging 
countries. This decline has been much more pronounced for youth than for adults: in 
developing countries, the rate has dropped by 9 per cent for youth and by 3 per cent for adults; 
whereas, in emerging countries, it has decreased by 24 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. 
While the overall reduction in the rate is similar within the group of emerging countries, the 
current LFPR for persons aged 15 years and over differs by some 10 percentage points in 
lower-middle (55 per cent) and upper-middle income countries (65 per cent). Men have an 
overall higher LFPR compared to women, but the LFPR of women is declining stronger. This 
difference is more pronounced in emerging countries.  
Business cycles are often identified as the cause of short-term fluctuations in the LFPR. 
However, a deep recession coupled with a slow labour market recovery can turn into a 
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hysteresis and create persistent structural problems (Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers 2015; 
Aaronson et al. 2006). Discouraged by long-term unemployment and poor employment 
prospects, workers may drop out of the labour force and become economically inactive 
(Krause and Sawhill 2017). While these factors are assumed to be driving the changes in the LFPR 
for adult workers, there are additional determinants for youth, such as increasing educational 
attainment. Indeed, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS 2020), the gross 
enrolment ratio in tertiary education, for instance, doubled in low- and lower-middle income 
countries and even tripled in upper-middle income countries between 2000 and 2018. This is 
a very positive development since it implies that the current lower LFPR should lead to a higher 
skilled labour force of the future.  
In addition to the higher educational attainment, there seems to be another driver behind the 
comparably lower youth LFPR: the proportion of youth not in employment, education or 
training (NEET). Around one in five young persons in low and upper-middle income countries, 
and more than three out of every four youth in lower-middle income countries, are classified 
as NEETs. Despite the fact that the international community agreed, in target 8.6 of the SDGs, 
to substantially reduce the NEET rate by the year 2020, little progress has been made (ILO 
2019c). Between 2005 and 2018, the total NEET rate fell by less than 2 percentage points in 
developing and emerging countries. Although the gender gap in the NEET rate closed slightly 
over the same period, women remain disproportionately affected and are on average twice 
as likely to experience NEET spells than their male counterparts. While unemployment is the 
main reason behind the male NEET rate, family responsibilities, such as household chores and 
care responsibilities, are often why women become NEETs (Elder 2015). The disappointing pace 
of reducing the share of NEETs is particularly problematic because NEETs are, by definition, 
neither acquiring work experience nor enhancing their skills. Just one of these factors, never 
mind both in combination, represents a significant obstacle to a young person’s transition into 
the labour market and impairs their future employment and income prospects (Helbling and 
Sacchi 2014; Samoilenko and Carter 2015; Crawford et al. 2011).   
Beyond the social imperative to ensure equal opportunities for women and men in the labour 
market, several studies have also demonstrated the economic imperative: unlocking the 
potential of women’s increased LFPR has a clear and positive impact on economic growth 
(Klasen and Lamanna 2009; Verick 2014; Tsani et al. 2013). 
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A common feature of labour markets in developing and emerging countries is the stark 
prevalence of informal sector employment. Developing and emerging countries account for 
around 83 per cent of total global employment but for 93 per cent of all informal sector 
employment (ILO 2018c). Almost 7 in 10 workers in developing and emerging countries are 
employed in the informal economy, mostly as own-account or contributing family workers. 
The age distribution is u-shaped and shows a high incidence of informality among young 
workers (86 per cent), lower rates of around 68 per cent for prime-age workers, and elevated 
rates again of up to 89 per cent for older workers (ibid.). While men (63 per cent) are generally 
more likely than women (58 per cent) to be engaged in the informal economy, this trend is 
reversed in the higher age brackets (ibid.). In addition to criticism about the definition of and 
methodology used to derive informal employment figures, especially regarding the dualistic 
labour market approach and the assumed homogeneity of the informal sector (c.f. Fields 2007; 
Melamed, Hartwig, and Grant 2011; Chen and Vanek 2013), there is also a debate about voluntary 
and involuntary informal sector employment (see, for instance, Günther and Launov 2012 for an 
overview). Employees in the informal economy are thought to be more vulnerable and to face 
restrictions on the exercise of their fundamental principles and rights at work. For instance, 
they are less protected against exploitative working conditions; experience lower levels of 
social protection, if any; and have less access to redress (ILO 2018c; 2013b; Schlyter 2002). 
However, entering into informal work can also be a choice made voluntarily in order to 
maximize personal utility, gain an individual competitive advantage or even as a last resort to 
escape involuntary unemployment (Rosenzweig 1988; Maloney 2004). The self-employed in the 
informal economy, on the other hand, often lack access to finance, are excluded from public 
transfer and support schemes and face fewer opportunities for contract enforcement 
(Slonimczyk 2014). At the same time, operating in the informal economy allows them to reduce 
their administrative costs and avoid tax payments (Araujo and Rodrigues 2016). This links back 
to the burden of informal employment that is carried by the wider society: in addition to an 
oftentimes inefficient allocation of goods and services caused by corruption, the loss of tax 
revenues puts a further strain on the already limited fiscal space in developing and emerging 
countries (Joshi, Prichard, and Heady 2014; O’Hare and Curtis 2017). 
The adverse consequences for (involuntary) informal workers and for society require that 
action is be taken. Facilitating the transition of workers from the informal into the formal 
economy represents a great challenge. However, several studies have shown that it is an 
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endeavour that could pay off. Tightening up regulatory frameworks, for instance, could 
increase wages, total output and welfare (Meghir, Narita, and Robin 2015); it could even 
decrease unemployment (Kolm and Larsen 2003). 
The share of informal employment tends to decrease with economic development (Schneider 
and Enste 2000; Loayza, Oviedo, and Serven 2005; Loayza 2016). One of the drivers behind this 
decrease is the change in the sectoral composition of economies during their development. 
Two decades ago, the agricultural sector employed the largest share of workers in low, lower-
middle and upper-middle income countries, at 70.8 per cent, 53.8 per cent and 40.6 per cent 
respectively. The modernization of the agricultural sector and the further expansion of the 
industry and services sectors led this share to decrease, while other sectors gained in 
importance in terms of the distribution of workers. Between 2000 and 2019, the share of the 
population working in agriculture decreased by around 15 per cent in low income countries 
and by around 30 per cent and 50 per cent in lower- and upper-middle income countries 
respectively. Low income and upper-middle income counties seemed to leapfrog the 
industrial sector and gained more employment directly in the services sector, while lower-
middle income countries experienced the strongest increase in the industry sectors (Blimpo et 
al. 2017). 
One strategy for modernizing the agricultural sector, as observed in many low- and middle 
income countries, is by means of the inflow of foreign direct investment in farming, which 
mostly comes from high income countries (Lay and Nolte 2018; Giger et al. 2019). These large-
scale agricultural investments often bring about an upgrade in technology and knowledge, 
which can lead to human labour being largely substituted by technology and, hence, the 
mostly small-scale farmers being squeezed out of the market. Considering the large number 
of agricultural workers in low and middle income countries, this can have a significant impact 
on the labour market, particularly if the industries upstream and downstream are not able to 
absorb the excess labour supply. 
Participation in the labour market is only part of the picture: employment quality also matters. 
One dimension of decent work is labour income. Although data on real wages is scarce, we 
can get an idea of how incomes are changing by looking at the Group of 20 (G20) countries. 
Emerging G20 countries2 have experienced strong wage growth in recent decades: between 
                                                     
2 Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa and Turkey. 
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1999 and 2017, real wages almost tripled in emerging G20 countries, whereas they grew 
moderately by around 9 per cent in advanced G20 countries (ILO 2018b). However, not 
everybody seems to be benefiting equally from the growth in wages: the gender pay gap in 
emerging G20 countries currently stands at 21.7 per cent, which represents an increase of 
around 4.5 per cent between 2010 and 2016 (ILO 2019a). However, the nine emerging G20 
countries are not representative of all emerging countries and certainly not of developing 
countries. In the absence of observed wage data, the share of workers earning an income 
considered insufficient to lift themselves and their dependants above the poverty line 
(otherwise known as working poverty) could provide further insight. Today, around 38 per 
cent of workers in developing countries are living in extreme poverty – that is to say, they are 
living in a household with a daily per capita consumption or income of less than US$1.90 in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). This rate drops to 10 per cent in lower-middle income 
countries and to less than 1 per cent in upper-middle income countries. Two decades ago, the 
situation was very different: in the year 2000, the working poverty rate was around 37 per 
cent higher in developing countries, 71 per cent higher in lower-middle income countries and 
even 97 per cent higher in upper-middle income countries (ILO 2020b). Across these country 
groupings, we find considerably larger working poverty rates for youth than for adults. In 
terms of gender discrepancies, adult women in low income and in upper-middle income 
countries experience a slightly higher incidence of working poverty, while this holds true for 
both female youth and female adults in lower-middle income countries (ibid.).    
The overall picture alters considerably if we apply the moderate poverty line and look at 
workers living on an income of between US$1.90 and US$3.20 per day (PPP). Although we can 
still observe a decline in both lower- and upper-middle income countries (-20 and -80 per cent 
respectively), we note an increase of around 27 per cent in low income countries (ILO 2019e). 
The slower reduction rates and the increase in low income countries point to a “bunching up” 
of workers just above the extreme poverty line, as identified by Chen and Ravallion (2008). 
Most of the decline can be attributed to China, which managed to translate its high economic 
growth rates into poverty alleviation3. However, we also note that the pace of the annual rate 
of poverty reduction has slowed considerably, from around 14 per cent in 2013 to less than 2 
per cent in 2019 (ILO 2019b). 
                                                     
3 See ILO (2019e) and Liu (2017) for a detailed discussion on China’s role in decreasing working poverty. 
9 
 
Low-income jobs are the most obvious cause of working poverty (Feder and Yu 2020). Several 
studies demonstrate the adverse consequences of low-income jobs, such as lower future 
employment and earning prospects (Stewart 2007; Schnabel 2016) and limited upward social 
mobility (Grimshaw 2011), which may push workers into poverty and trap them there. Low-
paid jobs are mostly located in developing countries, and the further “slicing up of global value 
chains” (M. P. Timmer et al. 2014) in favour of more advanced countries will only increase 
competition for the already scarce supply of decent jobs. This situation is expected to be 
further exacerbated as large numbers of young people enter the labour market in low and 
middle income countries in the coming years. If the creation of decent work opportunities 
cannot keep pace with this development, the likelihood of achieving SDG Goal 1, on ending 
poverty in all its forms everywhere, fades into the distance – despite the remarkable progress 
so far made in reducing working poverty.  
While most advanced countries are confronted with rapid population ageing, low and middle 
income countries have populations that are still characterized by a large share of youth. As 
discussed earlier, the policies that are pursued will dictate whether this youthfulness becomes 
a dividend or a burden. Even so, it has already been determined that this upsurge in the youth 
population will disappear over time, and that low and middle income countries will join the 
rest of the world in the demographic ageing process. In fact, in most middle income countries 
this process is already in motion: today, persons aged 65 years and over account for 3.3 per 
cent in low income countries, and for 5.9 per cent and 10.8 per cent in lower- and upper-
middle income countries. These shares are projected to double in all country groupings by the 
year 2050 (UNDESA 2019b). The ageing process will directly translate into a growing number of 
older workers in the labour force.   
In conclusion, an increasing number of new entrants is creating pressure at one end of the 
labour market; while, at the other end, the rising share of older workers who are remaining 
economically active for longer is only adding to that pressure. The ongoing demographic shift 
from youthful to ageing societies could therefore threaten the financial sustainability of the 
often already beleaguered social protection systems, especially with regard to healthcare and 
pension systems (ILO 2018a; Behrendt and Nguyen 2018). In other words, a decreasing number 
of economically active persons will have to provide for an increasing number of beneficiaries 
of social protection. This is captured by measures of economic dependency. 
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This section outlined current labour market trends in developing and emerging economies. 
Admittedly, it provides only a snapshot: there are certainly many more labour market 
challenges and success stories to be told. It is clear, however, that the real test lies in not only 
creating enough new jobs but creating jobs of good quality. This would, in turn, lead to a fairer 
and more equal society and bring us closer to the goal of social justice. 
1.3 Research questions and approaches 
This dissertation is comprised of four stand-alone research articles, which are presented in 
chapters 2 to 5. While all four contributions can be read and understood individually, they are 
all connected thematically and each article builds on the previous ones. The following section 
briefly introduces each contribution, states the respective research questions covered and 
outlines the analytical approaches taken. 
Chapter 2 
The first article discusses the conceptual considerations for measuring decent work and 
proposes a set of empirically tested indicators. The article was written in 2015, just as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were coming to a close and the debate about a 
potential post-2015 Development Agenda was in full swing. This potential post-2015 agenda 
became the current 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
Among the MDGs was Target 1.B, on achieving full and productive employment and decent 
work for all, including women and young people, which consisted of four quantitative 
indicators for assessing progress towards MDG Goal 1, on eradicating extreme poverty and 
hunger. Another employment-related indicator was located under MDG Goal 3, which was 
aimed at promoting gender equality and empowering women.  
The first part of the article discusses the conceptual foundation of decent work by analysing 
the individual components of Target 1.B. The second part evaluates each of the five 
employment-related MDG indicators based on the SMART criteria.4 This evaluation concludes 
that all of the assessed indicators suffer from major shortcomings, such as ambiguous 
interpretability, the inappropriate use of aggregate statistics, and measurement problems. 
One major concern that is identified relates to the fact that these indicators contain a number 
                                                     
4 SMART is an acronym that stands for specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely/time-bound. 
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of strong assumptions that lack any firm empirical basis and hence often do not hold true in 
the context of developing countries. This critique is followed by a proposal for alternative 
indicators that overcome most of the weaknesses of the employment-related MDG indicators. 
The conceptual validity of the proposed indicators is checked against the SMART criteria, and 
their derivation is guided by the elements of Target 1.B and amended by an equity dimension. 
The proposed indicators are: (i) the growth of labour value added per worker, (ii) the working 
poverty rate, and (iii) the share of workers receiving (a) less than an absolute labour income 
and (b) less than 60 per cent of the median labour income. Each proposed indicator is tested 
in an empirical illustration, using national household survey data from Uganda and Peru. 
The main research questions that chapter 2 seeks to address are: 
 What are the key components of decent work? 
 Which dimensions of decent work can be quantified in an internationally 
comparable way? 
Although our proposal was not directly incorporated into the indicator framework of the SDGs, 
our article made an important contribution to the general discourse about how to measure 
decent work. Furthermore, the empirical illustration revealed substantial decent-work deficits 
in low and middle income countries that are often related to structural problems. In strongly 
agriculture-based economies, such structural problems include a high incidence of informality 
among smallholders and a low labour productivity rate due to outdated production methods 
in the agricultural sector.  
Chapter 3 
Building on the findings of the previous chapter, the second article analyses the impact of 
large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs). As detailed in sub-chapter 1.2, LSAIs are 
considered as a means to initiate the modernization of the agricultural sector.  
The article begins with a description of the nature of LSAIs, then discusses the concepts of 
labour productivity and intensity in the context of rural labour markets. It notes that 
smallholders and family farmers account for the largest share of farmers in low and middle 
income countries. Their production methods are somewhat labour intensive. Large-scale 
farmers, on the other hand, have the ability to replace labour with capital – and often do so. 
The next section then explains the direct labour market effects that occur when a large-scale 
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farm has been set up. Three key determinants are identified as being decisive to the 
employment creation potential of LSAIs: (i) the previous land-use type, (ii) the crop cultivated, 
and (iii) the production model applied. These determinants build the conceptual framework, 
illustrated in a transition matrix, which is used for the empirical analysis. This analysis is carried 
out in three steps: first, the labour-intensity differential between small- and large-scale 
farmers is assessed; second, different scenarios are developed, based on the transition matrix; 
and third, data is added to the model and estimates of the net employment effect are derived 
for LSAIs on former smallholder land in selected countries. 
The main research questions that chapter 3 seeks to address are: 
 What effects does the establishment of a large-scale farm have on the rural labour 
market in low and middle income countries? 
 Do large-scale agricultural investments create or destroy employment?  
The article concludes that LSAIs can indeed result in small-scale farmers being squeezed out 
of the market, and the estimated net employment effect identified in the empirical application 
demonstrates the magnitude of this effect. It can be inferred that a considerable number of 
these farmers – particularly those who are older in years – will drop out of the labour force 
because their skills may not (or no longer) match the demand in the non-agricultural labour 
market. Even if they remain in the labour force, the odds of them obtaining decent 
employment may be low due to the increasing number of jobseekers in the immediate 
surrounding of the newly established large-scale farm. The capacity of the rural labour 
markets to absorb these squeezed-out farmers will therefore dictate whether they become 
dependent upon the support of others.     
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 begins where the previous chapter left off and looks at the changing relationship 
between economically dependent and independent persons. Economic dependency can occur 
as a result of joblessness, as explained in chapter 3, or because of a lack of decent and 
productive employment, as demonstrated in chapter 2. The article in chapter 4, however, 
begins with a different form of dependence: demographic dependence.  
As discussed in chapter 1.2, as a consequence of demographic changes the labour markets in 
low and middle income countries are subject to pressure on two sides. Due to the inability of 
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many low and middle income economies to provide a sufficient number of decent jobs, many 
jobseekers end up in lower-productivity jobs or even drop out of the labour force altogether. 
As a result, they become part of the economically dependent group of persons.  
To begin with, the article assesses the most commonly used measure of economic 
dependency: the demographic dependency ratio. It then introduces several alternative 
indicators, of which two are based on employment status and another three are based on full-
potential and productive employment. The functioning of each indicator is illustrated 
empirically, followed by a discussion of the indicator’s validity.  
The main research questions that chapter 4 seeks to address are: 
 What impact does an ageing society have on the labour markets? 
 How can economic dependency be measured?  
The assessment of the alternative measures reveals that each indicator has advantages over 
the others, but that no one indicator alone is able to fully capture all the dimensions of 
economic dependence; and hence of decent work deficits. Instead, they form a toolbox of 
measures that allows for a deeper analysis of economic dependence in different contexts.   
Chapter 5 
The last article of this thesis returns to the notion of decent work and addresses two of its 
main components: employment prospects and stability, and labour income. More precisely, it 
shows how the employment prospects and labour incomes of young labour market entrants 
are impacted by an economic crisis. The transition from school to work is a crucial step in a 
young person’s life. While some youth are able to transition almost seamlessly into a first job, 
others have a tougher time of it. Tensions and greater competition in the labour market, as 
described in sub-chapter 1.2, can impede or even block this transition. Entering the labour 
market during an economic recession is thought to make this transition even more difficult.    
The article in chapter 5 begins with an introduction of the school-to-work transition concept 
and its connection to scarring effects. Based on a literature review of employment and income 





The main research questions that chapter 5 seeks to address are: 
 Does an economic crisis such as the global financial crisis affect the school-to-work 
transition time of a young person (employment scar)? If so, which youth are most 
affected? 
 Does an economic crisis affect future labour incomes (income scar)? If so, who is 
most affected and how persistent are these effects?   
The results show that a crisis can leave both employment and income scars on the fledgling 
careers of young labour market entrants. This highlights the need for large-scale policy 
responses to prevent long-term damage in terms of future labour market prospects for youth.  
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The MDG employment indicators suffer from major shortcomings, including measurement 
problems, inappropriate use of aggregate statistics, ambiguous interpretability, and 
assumptions that do not apply to developing countries. Based on this critique, the authors 
propose a new set of four indicators for productive employment and decent work, namely: 
the growth of labour value added per worker, the working poverty rate, the share of workers 
receiving less than an absolute minimum labour income, and the share of workers receiving 
less than 60 per cent of the median labour income. They demonstrate the empirical 





Employment is the main determinant of living standards (World Bank 2012). It is also of 
paramount importance for economic development. Quantitative analyses confirm that rising 
labour earnings are the largest contributor to poverty reduction (Azevedo et al. 2013). Beyond 
its fundamental and immediate contribution to household income, employment also affects 
other dimensions of individual and societal well-being, including self-esteem, mental and 
physical health, and social cohesion. 
Recognizing that decent and productive work is central to human and economic development, 
a new employment target was incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in 2008 (Target 1.B). Four quantitative indicators were developed to measure progress 
towards this target. A fifth employment-related indicator relates to Target 3.A, on the 
promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment. With the MDG deadline 
approaching, the international community has been intensively discussing the structure and 
content of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which will build upon the MDGs and 
converge with the post-2015 development agenda (ECOSOC 2014). For the purposes of this 
article, the most relevant SDG proposal is the one made by the United Nations Open Working 
Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014), whose Goal 8 aims to “promote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work 
for all”. Besides the Open Working Group, several other institutions and development 
practitioners have formulated proposals for employment-related targets and indicators in a 
post-2015 development agenda (see, for example, Bates-Earner et al. 2012; ILO 2012; 2013; 
Martins and Takeuchi 2013). 
This article contributes to the debate by proposing indicators for the measurement of 
employment outcomes in a post-2015 framework. To this end, it discusses the conceptual 
foundations of decent work and critically reflects on the current MDG indicators related to 
employment (ILO 2009; Sparreboom 2011). Measurement problems, the inappropriate use of 
aggregate statistics, ambiguous interpretability, and assumptions which often do not hold true 
in the context of developing countries are identified as major shortcomings of the MDG 
indicators. In particular, we argue that the discrimination against self-employment and family 
employment, implicit in the ILO’s definition of vulnerable employment and in the MDG 
indicators, is misplaced and not based on firm empirical grounds. This is also one of the 
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reasons why social protection would be better dealt with as a separate goal focusing on 
population coverage by basic social security benefits. Although social protection is one of the 
pillars of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda, it does not necessarily have to be considered in the 
context of employment. 
Our critique is followed by a proposal for a new employment-related target and corresponding 
indicators for the post-2015 development agenda. Such a target should focus on the quality 
of employment and include an equity component. It should be operationalized through 
indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. The proposed 
four indicators are (i) the growth of labour value added per worker, (ii) the working poverty 
rate and (iii) the share of workers receiving less than (a) an absolute and (b) a relative 
minimum labour income. Their empirical application is illustrated using the country cases of 
Uganda and Peru. 
2.2 Conceptual considerations 
This section relates the MDG employment targets to some of the main dimensions of 
employment and decent work, as understood by the ILO. Our discussion highlights different 
properties of employment that should ideally be captured by indicators. Particular attention 
is paid to the definition of vulnerable employment and the possibilities of linking employment 
with social protection in the post-2015 development agenda. We then present a set of 
technical requirements for formulating conceptually valid and feasible indicators. 
2.2.1 Foundations and challenges of employment-related development targets 
Under MDG 1, Target 1.B seeks to “achieve full and productive employment and decent work 
for all, including women and young people” (UNSTATS 2008). This target incorporates three 
aspects of employment: 
 quantity of employment: full employment for all, 
 quality of employment: productive employment and decent work, and 
 equity of employment opportunities: including women and young people (Martins and 
Takeuchi 2013). 
Full employment is a standard economic concept which requires that all people who are 
available, capable and willing to work are able to do so. Yet, the quantity aspect of 
employment also refers to participation in the labour market: some people, particularly 
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women, may not even be actively seeking work – the prerequisite for being considered 
unemployed and thus participating – despite being available, capable and willing to work. In 
general, the importance of both of these quantitative dimensions of employment – i.e. labour 
force participation and unemployment – depends on a country’s level of development and 
country-specific labour market conditions.5 
The quality of employment is described by the attributes “productive” and “decent”. 
Productive employment can be defined as “employment yielding sufficient returns to labour 
to permit the worker and her/his dependents a level of consumption above the poverty line” 
(ILO 2012, 3). Thus, the productive employment deficit is comprised of the unemployed and 
the working poor, who are unable to attain a minimum consumption level despite being 
employed. Decent work is a more comprehensive concept and is understood as “productive 
work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate income, with adequate 
social protection” (ILO 1999, 13). Under social protection the ILO subsumes the coverage and 
effectiveness of social security schemes, and labour protection “which comprises decent 
conditions of work, including wages, working time and occupational safety and health” (ILO 
2014, 1). 
Finally, the MDG employment target considers equity aspects, stressing the exclusion of 
specific groups – here women and the young – from full and productive work. While this is 
doubtless relevant, the focus on the inequality of opportunities rather than outcomes is too 
narrow. Indeed, feedback mechanisms from outcomes to opportunities – e.g. low wages that 
cause little investment in human capital – require that an employment target should also take 
account of the distribution of outcomes, such as equality of labour earnings. 
2.2.2 The relationship between employment and social protection 
Non-decent employment conditions can place people at economic and personal risk. Thus, 
there is a rationale for linking employment and social protection in the post-2015 
development agenda, and many proposals do indeed incorporate measures of social 
                                                     
5 This article uses the definitions of work and employment adopted by the 19th International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians in 2013 (ILO 2013a). In previous statistical practice (applied when the MDGs were drafted), 
persons engaged in the production of economic goods and services for own and household consumption were 
considered to be in self-employment and, therefore, employed, whereas persons (notably women) doing 
household work were considered not to be in the labour force. Under the current rules, both groups are defined 
as outside the labour force, but in the “potential labour force”. 
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protection. Yet, from a conceptual point of view, including social security (e.g. coverage by 
health, old-age and/or un- employment benefits) under an employment goal is appropriate 
only if related measures provide direct information about the decency of work. This is the case 
if social security benefits are directly tied to the employment relationship. However, this 
typically applies only to workers in wage employment. Another, more practical problem is the 
diverse and context-specific nature of social protection systems and working arrangements. 
2.2.3 SMART indicators 
The challenge in measuring decent work is to find indicators that can meaningfully capture all 
three dimensions of the employment target by combining relevance in terms of decent work 
with practical realism (particularly in terms of actually collecting and managing the required 
data). A widely used and internationally recognized set of formal requirements to assess the 
quality of indicators is the so-called SMART criteria. These are presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. The SMART criteria 
Specific The indicator must ensure a clear and unambiguous interpretation and should be a 
true translation of the target so that the changes measured by the indicator 
genuinely express the targeted improvement.  
Measurable The indicator must be (easily) measurable and deliver reliable (hence replicable) 
data, no matter who conducts the measurement. It should rely on common data 
already collected within the scope of the country’s statistical strategy (e.g. national 
household surveys or labour force surveys). For inter-temporal and cross-country 
comparability it is essential that the data sources, collection and preparation 
methods, and the final analysis comply with international standards. Moreover, 
definitions and methodologies have to be consistent over time. 
Achievable The set aspiration level of the indicator must be achievable. Unduly low target 
values can suggest evident results but are not useful for measuring the effectiveness 
of the project, programme or policy.  
Relevant The information provided by the indicator must deliver important information for 
decision-makers. In the case of employment-related indicators, this refers primarily 
to national governments, but also to the international community and individual 





The indicator must specify a deadline or time frame.  
Source: authors’ compilation after European Commission (2004) and UNDP (2009). 
2.3 A critical review of the employment-related MDG indicators 
2.3.1 The growth rate of labour productivity 
The first employment-related indicator of the MDGs addresses the creation of productive 
employment by measuring the annual growth rate of GDP per person employed.6 The 
rationale for including labour productivity in the set of MDG indicators is its close and positive 
relationship with wages. According to neo-classical theory, wages equal marginal labour 
productivity. Empirical studies confirm a close – albeit far from perfect – relationship between 
wages and labour productivity (Luebker 2011). 
Nevertheless, labour productivity growth presents several drawbacks that limit its validity as 
a measure of productive employment. Most importantly, in a significant number of developing 
economies, other production factors – particularly natural resources and land – generate a 
considerable share of value added, with factor income being earned by their respective 
owners. In more developed economies with high capital-to-labour ratios, gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth may be driven mainly by capital accumulation (not necessarily higher 
returns), and the earned factor incomes then typically accrue to capital owners. This implies 
that levels of labour productivity – not to mention growth rates – can only be meaningfully 
compared across economies that share similar factor endowments and sectoral compositions. 
Furthermore, labour productivity only makes a relevant measure of decent pay if there are no 
large differences in labour productivity and corresponding wages between workers. Many 
poor economies, however, may employ highly productive labour with high wages in some 
sectors (e.g. mining), while a large share of their workforce is engaged in low-productivity and 
low-wage occupations, such as subsistence agriculture and work in the urban informal sector. 
Wide wage differentials may also occur within sectors. In consequence, GDP growth rates may 
                                                     
6 A general problem in linking production and employment is the possible discrepancy between output measured 
by national accounts and people in work (but not employed) who generate output. While housework (unpaid, at 
home) is neither considered as employment nor measured in national accounts, this may be different for the 
self-employed and (part of) their produce. For example, smallholder production – though it may (partially) be for 
household consumption – is within the national accounts production boundary. 
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increase without any improvement of labour productivity and wages across large segments of 
the workforce. 
2.3.2 Employment-to-population ratio 
The employment-to-population ratio (EPR) is the share of a country’s working-age population 
that is actually employed. This indicator measures an economy’s ability to provide 
employment for those people who are able to work, i.e. the extent to which full employment 
is achieved. The ILO (2009) suggests a value range from 50 to 75 per cent. Yet the lack of a 
clear target value or even a guideline for the EPR renders the interpretation of this indicator 
difficult and ambiguous, particularly in the context of developing economies. For example, a 
high EPR may result from a low unemployment rate, which might, in turn, be the sign of a 
well-functioning and rapidly clearing labour market. However, low registered unemployment 
can also be a reflection of the lack of social support systems, let alone unemployment 
insurance, as is the case in many poor economies. People in such circumstances cannot afford 
to be unemployed and have to work for survival. Whether their work is counted as 
“employment” will then depend on the market orientation of what they do for a living, i.e. 
whether it is done in exchange for pay or profit. Similarly, in economies dominated by 
smallholder agriculture, a high rate of labour market participation and, consequently, a high 
EPR do not signal ample labour market opportunities, but rather that all available labour is 
required to operate the household farm. Finally, an EPR may also be low because a substantial 
share of the working-age population is out of the labour force attending school or university. 
Taken together, these ambiguities make the EPR a dubious indicator that can hardly be 
expected to provide reliable information on progress towards full employment. 
2.3.3 Working poverty rate 
The ILO (2009) defines the working poverty rate (WPR) as the proportion of employed people 
living in a household with a per capita income below the nationally defined poverty line (or 
the international poverty lines of Int. $1.25 or 2 per day). The WPR provides a measure of 
productive employment by linking poverty and employment data. It represents the share of 
workers whose jobs do not generate sufficient income to lift them and their families out of 
poverty. Although this indicator explicitly considers only the income dimension of decent 
work, it implicitly provides a broader picture: it is reasonable to assume that jobs which 
provide people with insufficient means to meet their basic needs are unlikely to fulfil other 
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requirements of decent work (ILO 2009). Yet, working poverty may be caused by factors other 
than low pay (e.g. number of dependants), while other sources of income might mask low 
labour earnings (e.g. remittances and government transfers). 
In principle, the WPR can be readily computed from micro data sets that provide information 
on poverty status at the household level and employment at the individual level. In practice, 
however, the WPR has often been calculated using aggregate statistics, as the product of the 
poverty rate and the labour force participation rate (macroeconomic approach). This 
simplification has been justified by a lack of micro data, but entails important drawbacks. The 
neglect of differences in demographic composition and labour force participation rates among 
poor and non-poor households results in biased estimates of the country-level incidence of 
working poverty. Using data for 15 sub-Saharan African countries, Kapsos (2011) finds an 
average difference of 8.6 percentage points between the macro- and the micro-based WPR 
estimates. Finally, this indicator suffers from the general drawbacks of a headcount index in 
that it does not account for intra-household inequality or for the depth of poverty. It is also 
plagued by the problems related to the definition of national and (more so) international 
poverty lines.7 
2.3.4 Vulnerable employment rate  
According to the ILO (2009), the vulnerable employment rate is the proportion of own-account 
and contributing family workers in total employment. Based on their employment status, 
these two categories of workers are termed vulnerable because they are believed to face high 
economic risks. Own-account workers and contributing family workers are assumed to be less 
likely to have formal work arrangements, and thus often to lack elements of decent work, such 
as adequate social security and effective social dialogue mechanisms (Sparreboom 2011). 
Additionally, own-account workers in developing countries are typically perceived to earn a 
low and irregular income since they are mostly subsistence farmers and small-scale 
entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy. Indeed, in many cases, contributing family 
                                                     
7 The literature has identified challenges arising from different consumption patterns across countries/regions, 
the 2005 PPP factors based on 1988–2005 prices and changing basic needs, the strong bias towards African 
countries (only two out of the 15 poorest countries are in Asia), and urban bias because internationally 
comparable services and goods are mainly found in urban areas. For a detailed critique and the implications for 
Asian poverty calculations, see ADB (2014). 
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workers receive neither payment in cash nor remuneration in kind, but benefit indirectly from 
an increased household income. 
However, the assumption that self-employed (family) workers are per se more vulnerable 
than employees is problematic, thus calling into question the specificity and relevance of the 
“vulnerable employment” indicator. Own-account workers and the associated category of 
contributing family members form a very heterogeneous group in developing countries. It 
includes not only those engaged in agricultural and urban informal subsistence activities, but 
also those running productive and profitable micro enterprises. In fact, research has shown 
that self-employment is often – albeit not always, and conditional on context – chosen 
voluntarily (Maloney 2004). Furthermore, in many developing countries wage workers (not to 
mention casual or seasonal workers) are not covered by social protection and do not have 
legally enforceable contracts of employment, which might render their conditions just as 
precarious as those of some own-account and contributing family workers. Thus, vulnerable 
employment would better be defined in terms of employment conditions, rather than 
employment status. 
2.3.5 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector  
This last employment-related indicator of the MDGs is part of the gender equality goal and 
can be found under Target 3.A, which aims to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015”. 
The share of women in paid employment in the non-agricultural sector is expressed as the 
percentage of female workers in total non-agricultural wage employment. 
The ratio of women in wage employment in the manufacturing and service sectors is meant 
to provide an indication of the extent to which female workers have access to the modern 
monetary economy and thus benefit from the structural transition of the economy. The 
underlying assumption is that women in such wage employment enjoy greater autonomy and 
self-reliance in personal development and decision-making (ILO 2009). While there is indeed 
some evidence that wage employment outside agriculture improves the situation of women 
(Kabeer 2005), the general discrimination against self-employment is subject to the same 
criticism as that expressed above in regard to “vulnerable employment”. Furthermore, the 
indicator ignores the value that women may attach to the flexibility afforded by work on a 
household farm or in a household enterprise. Indeed, wage employment may not only bring 
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about positive changes in women’s lives. Since women typically continue to be responsible for 
domestic work and childcare, gender inequalities in work burdens may intensify (ibid.). 
2.4 Proposal for a new employment target and set of indicators  
In general, the multidimensional formulation of both the MDG employment target and the 
Open Working Group’s current proposal is an important strength. It avoids some of the 
criticisms levelled at other MDG targets, such as a lack of focus on quality (e.g. Target 2.A on 
full primary education) and the general absence of (any) equity considerations. Accordingly, a 
future employment target should cover quantity, quality and equity aspects. These 
dimensions can be subsumed into a target to “achieve full and productive employment and 
decent work for all”. The implicit weightings given to the different aspects of this employment 
target will eventually be determined by the chosen indicators. 
While full employment should be explicitly mentioned in the target, our conceptual 
considerations and assessment of the EPR demonstrate that the underlying drivers – 
participation and unemployment – would give rise to ambiguities if quantitative aspiration 
levels were to be formulated. This may preclude the establishment of specific indicators of full 
employment. 
For most qualitative components of decent work, such as wages or occupational safety and 
health, there are no such ambiguities (although decent working time does raise ambiguities 
similar to those surrounding labour force participation). However, more practical problems 
arise when it comes to operationalizing the quality of employment, particularly in regard to 
occupational safety and health, which may be very industry-specific. While good data 
collection practices can be found, say, in the European Union (Burchell et al. 2014), there are 
almost no data available for developing countries. 
In the light of these problems, the indicators proposed below deliberately focus on the income 
component of decent work. We implicitly assume that income is often highly correlated with 
non-monetary dimensions of decent work, particularly with occupational safety and health. 
As regards social protection, we have argued above in favour of setting a separate social 
protection goal rather than including elements of social protection in an employment target. 
The corresponding indicators would then not be directly tied to a person’s employment 
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relationship, but provide information about the total population’s coverage by social security 
schemes. 
Regarding equity, the proposed indicators emphasize relative labour earnings inequality. 
While equal pay for equal work is considered to be important as well, any such indicator would 
need to identify “pairs of equal work” unambiguously, for comparison. While there are 
techniques for doing this, their sophistication implies that such an indicator would hardly be 
suitable for the SDG agenda. 
Our proposed indicators are an attempt to overcome some of the weaknesses of the current 
employment indicators and explicitly to introduce an equity dimension. They are not only 
conceptually valid but also feasible indicators that allow for the quantitative measurement of 
progress (or regress) on specific and important aspects of productive employment and decent 
work. Applying the SMART criteria results in a catalogue of four indicators for our proposed 
target of “achieving full and productive employment and decent work for all”, namely: the 
growth of labour value added per worker, the working poverty rate, the share of workers 
receiving less than an absolute minimum labour income, and the share of workers receiving 
less than 60 per cent of the median labour income. 
All four indicators can be disaggregated by sex, age (for a focus on youth) and other groups of 
interest. Whether other disadvantaged groups – e.g. persons with disabilities or migrants – 
should be explicitly considered under an employment target is also a question of the general 
design of the SDGs. Alternatively, cross-cutting issues of discrimination against specific groups 
could be dealt with under separate targets. This may limit the risk of overloading the 
“thematic” target (in this case employment). Finally, we suggest that target values should be 
set nationally in order adequately to reflect country-specific employment challenges and 
development contexts. 
2.4.1 Indicator 1: Growth of labour value added per worker 
Labour value added is defined as total labour compensation (including income from self-
employment) over total employment. It captures both the productivity of the worker and the 
share of production accruing to labour through factor income earned. The growth of labour 
value added per worker is driven by higher wages, which may, in turn, be the result of higher 
productivity. The indicator reduces the problem of non-labour income being taken as a sign 
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of productive work. Single industries with large shares of income generated by natural 
resources or capital do not bias it. A decline in labour value added per worker unambiguously 
indicates that wages and/or employment creation have not kept pace with economic growth. 
In countries where labour value added is not provided frequently enough by the national 
accounts system, it can be approximated by GDP minus factor payments for capital and land, 
taxes, and tariff revenues. Labour value added can also be calculated from nationally 
representative household data by dividing total labour earnings by total employment. This 
microeconomic approach can be considered to yield an upper bound estimate since it includes 
profits from self-employment under total labour income.8 The proposed indicator would be 
used to increase labour value added by a certain country-specific percentage by 2030.  
2.4.2 Indicator 2: Working poverty rate 
The working poverty rate captures the concept of decent work fairly well in terms of enabling 
workers and their families to earn a decent livelihood. In addition to using national poverty 
lines, it should also be reported by reference to the international poverty lines of Int. $1.25 
and 2 in order to allow for cross-country comparisons. Regarding its operationalization, the 
working poverty rate should be computed by using household or labour force survey data. The 
indicator would be used to reduce the incidence of working poverty by a certain country-
specific percentage by 2030. 
2.4.3 Indicators 3a and 3b: Proportions of workers earning less than an absolute 
and a relative minimum labour income 
These two indicators of decent pay represent the proportions of working-age people receiving 
a labour income below nationally or internationally defined minimum income levels 
(“minimum labour earnings”). These minimum labour income levels should be specified both 
in absolute terms (i.e. by reference to the international or national poverty lines) and in 
relative terms (i.e. 60 per cent of the median labour income). Using an absolute threshold 
allows for an unambiguous interpretation: labour income levels directly affect one’s material 
livelihood; and, ceteris paribus, higher earned income is preferred over lower earned income. 
In addition, defining a relative “decent labour income threshold” as a certain percentage of 
                                                     
8 Note that household survey data are known to produce much lower estimates of income compared to national 
accounts. So while the inclusion of capital income from self-employment induces an upward bias, the very use 
of micro data implies a downward bias. 
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mean or median labour income puts more emphasis on equity since the indicator will not 
respond to labour income increases that do not affect the distribution of labour earnings. 
Conceptually, the mean labour income would be the preferred reference for a relative 
indicator. It is more sensitive than the median to income gains by the richer segments of the 
employed workforce. In practice, however, estimates of mean incomes from household or 
labour force survey data are prone to errors, in particular because of reporting biases in higher 
incomes. This is why the median labour income is the more robust reference, although the 
resulting indicator will not respond to changes in the income distribution above the median. 
We propose to use 60 per cent of the median as the relative threshold; this choice is motivated 
by the fact that the European Union, for example, considers people below this threshold to 
be “at risk of poverty”. Some caution is warranted when interpreting the proposed relative 
indicator, particularly when comparing it across countries, because the meaning of the 
reference income, the median labour income, crucially depends on the shape of the labour 
income distribution in combination with the structural features of each specific economy. In 
a country where the median earner is a subsistence farmer or entrepreneur (e.g. in many sub-
Saharan African economies), the income distribution below the median will be very flat: 
probably only a small fraction of people will earn less than 60 per cent of the median labour 
income because there is little inequality of labour income among a large and fairly poor 
population. Indeed, there may be preferable situations in terms of well-being when inequality 
among those below the median labour income is wider, hence the advisability of the proposed 
combination of absolute and relative indicators. 
For the absolute indicator, established per capita poverty thresholds – i.e. national and 
international poverty lines – can be used as a proxy for minimum labour income thresholds. 
The two indicators would thus be used to reduce the share of workers below the absolute and 
relative thresholds by a country-specific percentage by 2030. 
2.4.4 SMARTer indicators 
Labour value added growth and the working poverty rate lend themselves to clear, 
unambiguous interpretation and straightforward formulation of the corresponding country-
specific aspiration levels. The same goes for the share of workers earning less than a specified 
absolute minimum labour income, but not for the relative, “equity” indicator. Any such 
indicator necessarily entails a value judgement on the weight assigned to the welfare of 
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individuals at different quantiles of the distribution of labour earnings. Since only those 
earning below 60 per cent of the median are taken into account, the implied weight given to 
the distributional distance to earners of very high incomes is zero. 
All of our proposed indicators can be measured using available data (e.g. living standard 
measurement surveys, national household surveys or labour force surveys). It would certainly 
be desirable better to reflect working conditions in the SDG indicators (with regard to health, 
safety and hours of work). Yet, it is not conceivable that the necessary data would be available 
for a sufficient number of countries in the short term. The lack of detailed comparable data 
on working conditions thus also explains our focus on income. 
Finally, the proposed indicators are clearly relevant, as they can deliver important information 
for decision-makers. If based on micro data, all four indicators can be broken down, say, by 
occupation, sector, sex, education, and migration status. This can help to identify groups that 
are particularly affected by non-decent working conditions. Conditional on the overall set-up 
of the SDGs, specific subgroup indicator values could be derived for each indicator. The 
indicators relating to labour income can also inform policy interventions, such as the setting 
of a national minimum wage. 
2.5 Empirical illustration of the proposed indicators 
This section illustrates the application of the proposed indicators using the examples of 
Uganda and Peru. These two cases are indeed well suited to the purpose of illustrating the 
advantages and challenges associated with the proposed indicators in different settings. 
Specifically, some of Uganda’s characteristics make it a suitable representative of the world’s 
low-income economies, particularly in regard to the predominance of the agricultural sector, 
largely informal urban employment, and a high labour force participation rate. Despite an 
impressive growth performance in the past 20 years compared to the African average, Uganda 
is still a low-income country. Income poverty has been reduced considerably, from over 70 
per cent of the population in the early 1990s to about 38 per cent in 2009 (headcount ratio 
applying the PPP poverty line of Int. $1.25) (World Bank 2010). According to our calculations 
based on the Ugandan National Household Survey (UNHS), agricultural and non-agricultural 
self-employment have played an important part in this process, as they account for more than 
two-thirds of the country’s employment. This does not include other contributing household 
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members on and off the farm, which account for a further 20 per cent of the workforce. While 
the share of urban population has been increasing, it was still below 15 per cent in 2010. The 
illustrations given below draw on UNHS data for the years 2005/06 and 2009/10, based on 
survey samples of about 7,400 households with more than 41,200 individuals in 2005/06, and 
6,775 households with more than 36,400 individuals in 2009/10. 
Peru is an upper-middle-income economy. Like Uganda, it has enjoyed a good growth 
performance over the past 15 years, together with a steady decline of its poverty ratio, from 
12.4 per cent in 2000 to 4.9 per cent in 2010 (World Bank 2016). Compared to Uganda, the 
share of self-employment is lower in Peru and has been decreasing slightly since the mid-
2000s, but over 54 per cent of the workforce was still self-employed in 2009. In terms of 
sectoral composition, Peru has a fairly large service sector accommodating more than 55 per 
cent of total employment, while Uganda’s economy is largely dominated by agricultural 
activities (73 per cent). These basic characteristics of the Peruvian labour market are 
comparable not only to those of other Latin American economies with large shares of self-
employment, such as Mexico or Colombia, but also to the labour market characteristics of 
Asian middle-income economies, including Indonesia and Thailand. For Peru, we use 
household data from the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) for the years 2005 and 2009. 
This survey comprised more than 25,600 households (with almost 93,000 individuals) in 2005, 
and 26,600 households (with over 96,000 individuals) in 2009. 
2.5.1 Growth of labour value added per worker 
Labour value added per worker is computed as the sum of all wages and net profits divided 
by the number of persons employed.9 Table 2.2 shows the growth in labour value added per 
worker in Uganda and Peru between 2005 and 2009. The estimates are well in line with the 
overall economic performance of both countries. In Peru, labour value added per worker (in 
constant LCU10) grew by about 9 per cent annually between 2005 and 2009 (from a 2005 
baseline of Int. $3,424 in PPP), while the annual growth rate of gross national income (GNI) 
per capita was 6.3 per cent (World Bank 2016). In Uganda, with a per capita income of only 
Int. $353 in 2005, the estimated annual growth of labour value added per worker (in constant 
                                                     
9 We count all smallholders in both Uganda and Peru as employed. While this may partially conflict with the new 
labour statistics practices, it is in line with the definitions used when the surveys were carried out. Yet, it should 
be noted that – even in Uganda – the majority of smallholders produce for the market. 
10 Local currency units, i.e. Peruvian nuevo soles and, for Uganda, Ugandan shillings. 
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LCU) was 14.1 per cent over the period – considerably higher than the economy’s per capita 
GNI growth rate of only 4.8 per cent (ibid.). Closer inspection of the Ugandan data reveals that 
this strong growth was driven by labour value added in agriculture, while labour value added 
per worker in non-agricultural self-employment actually declined. 
Table 2.2. Labour value added per worker in Uganda and Peru, 2005 and 2009 
Country 2005 2009 Annual growth 
(%) 
Uganda 
      In constant 2005 Int. $ 353 451 6.3 
      In constant LCU 263,009 446,320 14.1 
Peru 
      In constant 2005 Int. $ 3,424 4,504 7.9 
      In constant LCU 5,650 7,656 8.9 
Note: LCU refers to local currency units (Ugandan shillings and Peruvian nuevo soles). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHS 2005/06 and 2009/10 and ENAHO 2005 and 2009. 
Technically, the differences between the PPP-adjusted values and the values in local currency 
for Uganda are noteworthy. The much lower growth rate of labour value added in constant 
Int. $ can be explained by major changes in the PPP conversion factors. While the figures in 
Int. $ are useful for cross-country comparisons, the analysis of within-country changes over 
time should be complemented by indicators measured in local currency. Finally, this exercise 
also illustrates that a meaningful aspiration level for this indicator might be the projected 
growth rate of GNI per capita. 
2.5.2 Working poverty rate 
In the next step, we compute the incidence of working poverty in Uganda and Peru. Table 2.3 
shows the headcount poverty ratios and the WPRs for both countries in 2005 and 2009, using 
different approaches. The results of calculations based on national conventions are contrasted 
with those obtained from the World Bank’s approach to computing the internationally 
comparable poverty rates (applying the 1.25 Int. $/day poverty line to monitor MDG 1). For 
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the purposes of its official national poverty statistics, Uganda uses a consumption aggregate 
per adult equivalent and regional poverty lines that further distinguish between rural and 
urban areas. Peru bases its estimates on consumption per capita and also uses regional 
poverty lines. The regional poverty lines can differ considerably: in Peru, the highest is 52 per 
cent higher than the lowest, and in Uganda it is four times higher. Depending on the context, 
the consideration of equivalence scales and regional price differences is known to matter for 
measuring poverty and, accordingly, working poverty. While these are only two of the 
problems raised by the calculation of internationally comparable (working) poverty rates, a 
more extensive discussion of the issues goes beyond the scope of this article. Yet, we consider 
the advantage of having internationally comparable indicators to outweigh those 
disadvantages. 
Table 2.3. Working poverty rates in Uganda and Peru, 2005 and 2009 (percentages)  
 Uganda Peru 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Poor (headcount – national poverty line) 29.3 24.5 55.6 33.5 
Poor (headcount – Int. $1.25) 44.6 35.7 5.6 2.2 
Poor (headcount – Int. $2) 70.1 64.4 16.8 8.7 
LFPR 77.0 77.7 71.7 76.9 
Total number of persons employed 9,799,816 11,432,223 13,107,577 15,418,822 
WPR (national poverty line) 27.9 22.5 55.7 32.0 
WPR (Int. $1.25) 45.9 29.7 5.5 2.0 
WPR (Int. $2) 73.3 60.2 17.0 8.2 
Note: LFPR and WPR refer to the labour force participation rate and the working poverty rate, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHS 2005/06 and 2009/10 and ENAHO 2005 and 2009. 
Table 2.3 shows that poverty decreased in both countries, and the results illustrate the 
importance of the choice of applied methods and poverty lines. Uganda’s national poverty 
statistics suggest a moderate decline in the headcount ratio between 2005 and 2009. Using 
the international poverty lines, however, the reduction of extreme poverty (less than Int. 
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$1.25 per capita per day) appears to have been much more pronounced than that of poverty 
according to the higher poverty line (less than Int. $2 per capita per day). In Peru, the national 
poverty line is much higher than the international poverty lines. Albeit at different levels, 
however, all of the country’s poverty indicators show a drastic decline over the period under 
consideration. 
Some very interesting patterns emerge with regard to the WPR, illustrating the possible value 
of this indicator as a complement to poverty measures. For Peru, the WPR is very close to the 
headcount ratio, i.e. the share of poor workers among all workers is similar to the share of 
poor people in the overall population. This holds for all indicators and both years, implying 
that progress in poverty reduction correlates with progress in workers’ incomes. In Uganda, 
in contrast, this only applies to 2005; in 2009, the WPR was between two and six percentage 
points lower than the headcount ratio. This means that the working population fared better 
than the non-working population and that income from work enables people to escape 
poverty more effectively than do other sources of income. This is consistent with the above 
finding of a considerable increase in labour value added per worker in Uganda; it is also likely 
to reflect the country’s higher labour force participation rate, with more household members 
contributing to household income with their labour. In general, the fact that overall poverty 
rates in Uganda are higher than the country’s working poverty rates – while being similar in 
Peru – is likely to be related to differences in the composition of household income sources 
between the two countries. In particular, non-labour incomes (e.g. old-age pensions and other 
transfers), which partially sustain households without employed individuals, are more 
common in Peru than in Uganda. In other words, in economies without social support 
programmes people are more dependent on decent labour income. 
2.5.3 Workers earning less than absolute and relative minimum labour incomes 
As explained above, established per capita poverty thresholds – i.e. national and international 
poverty lines – are used as proxies for absolute minimum labour income thresholds. To 
estimate the proportions of employed people earning less than the Int. $1.25 threshold and 
the proposed relative threshold of 60 per cent of median labour income, we first calculate the 
total monthly labour income for each employed person. In a developing country context, this 
poses a number of challenges. One of them is the high incidence of unpaid family workers in 
household firms (and farms), which is an important feature not only of the Ugandan economy 
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but also of many other developing countries. Unfortunately, the intra-household allocation of 
profits accruing from such household-level economic activities is not known. In order to obtain 
income measures for unpaid family workers, we divide household business and farm incomes 
equally among all household members involved in the productive activity. 
Table 2.4 reports both countries’ median monthly labour incomes in 2005 and 2009, as well 
as the shares of workers aged 15 years and above earning less than the respective thresholds. 
In line with our previous observations on changes in labour value added and the incidence of 
working poverty, the figures show that labour earnings increased substantially in both 
countries in the period under review, although Ugandan workers still had low earnings by the 
end of the period. Indeed, Uganda’s monthly median labour income was Int. $25.8 in 2009, 
which implies that more than 57 per cent of workers earned less than the absolute threshold 
of Int. $1.25 per day. This share is down from 64 per cent in 2005, so some progress can also 
be seen in individual labour earnings in this country. This also holds for Peru, where the share 
of workers earning less than Int. $1.25 per day declined from 18 to 11.3 per cent over the 
period. Yet, what is noteworthy in the Peruvian case is that these shares are relatively high 
when compared to the WPR (5.5 and 2 per cent in 2005 and 2009, respectively). This implies 
that employed persons with very low labour earnings live in households that have additional 
sources of income (either other workers with higher labour income or social transfer 
payments). The difference between the working poverty rate and the minimum labour income 










Table 2.4.  Workers earning less than absolute/relative thresholds in Uganda and Peru, 2005 and 2009 
  Uganda Peru 
  2005 2009 2005 2009 
Total monthly labour  
income per employed 
person – median 
Int. $ 19.5 25.8 159 228 
Constant LCU 
(base = 2005) 
14,500 25,492 263 388 
60% of the median 
Int. $ 11.7 15.5 95 137 
Constant LCU 
(base = 2005) 
8,700 15,295 158 233 
Share of workers below…      
…Int. $1.25 (PPP) per day in % 63.9 57.7 18.0 11.3 
…60% of median income in % 37.3 36.4 36.7 36.5 
Note: LCU refers to local currency units. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHS 2005/06 and 2009/10 and ENAHO 2005 and 2009. 
Table 2.4 also reports our estimates of the proportions of workers earning less than 60 per 
cent of the median incomes in both countries. Somewhat surprisingly, the proportions are 
very similar in both countries – about 36 per cent – and remained relatively constant over 
time. In Uganda, however, the relative income threshold was very low – at Int. $11.7 in 2005 
and Int. $15.5 in 2009 – so the fact that more than a third of all workers fell below this 
threshold is striking. Yet, even those with extremely low earnings appear to have benefited 
from general income growth. At least, their relative position is not deteriorating. There is 
nonetheless obvious room for improvement, as more than a third of workers earn less than 
60 per cent of median earnings in countries where the median earner already earns well below 
the average. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This article contributes to the discussion of employment-related targets and indicators for the 
post-2015 development agenda. We propose to measure progress towards a target to 
“achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all” by using four indicators, 
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namely: the growth of labour value added per worker; the working poverty rate; the share of 
workers receiving less than an absolute minimum labour income; and the share of workers 
receiving less than 60 per cent of the median labour income. The suggested target and 
indicators overcome most of the major limitations of the indicators currently in use and put 
special emphasis on equity – an aspect that was largely neglected in the MDG agenda. The 
proposed indicators are conceptually valid according to the SMART criteria and allow for the 
quantitative measurement of progress (or regress) on important aspects of productive 
employment and decent work. Moreover, the setting of targets at the national level and the 
possibility of disaggregating each of our proposed indicators by sex, age and other variables 
of interest to decision-makers allow for the incorporation of additional dimensions of equity 
and inclusion. Nonetheless, the multidimensionality of decent work implies that neither the 
currently applied employment-related indicators nor those proposed by us are able to capture 
all of its facets. 
A major challenge in measuring decent work stems from the quality, scope, coverage, and 
periodicity of data collection, since these factors typically impede cross-country comparisons 
to a large extent. Our proposed indicators are income-focused not because we think that 
income is a perfect proxy for the quality of work, but because data on conditions of work – 
e.g. working time and occupational safety and health – are simply not available for a sufficient 
number of countries. Hence the urgent need to expand the scope of household and labour 
force surveys and to harmonize them internationally as they are the main data source for 





3 Labour Market Effects of Large-Scale Agricultural Investment: 
Conceptual Considerations and Estimated Employment Effects 
Kerstin Nolte & Martin Ostermeier* 
 
This chapter appeared as: 
NOLTE, K. and OSTERMEIER, M. (2017), Labour Market Effects of Large-Scale 
Agricultural Investment: Conceptual Considerations and Estimated Employment 












*We wish to thank Jann Lay, Simone Gobien, Anne Hoss (all GIGA), Martin Petrick (IAMO), and two anonymous 
reviewers for their excellent input. Further, we are grateful for the feedback received by participants of seminars 
within the GIGA Doctoral Programme and at the University of Göttingen, and attendees at the workshop on 
large-scale land transactions at the University of Michigan (2016), the IAMO Forum in Halle (2016), the World 
Bank Conference on Land and Poverty (2016), and the Development Economics Conference at the Göttinger 
Schule, Göttingen (2016). We also thank our colleagues at the Land Matrix Initiative for their constructive and 
close collaboration over the last few years. This work was supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) within the scope of the Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: Data, Patterns, 




Large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) in general and their socio-economic implications 
in particular have been heavily debated in recent years. While some claim that LSAIs are an 
important catalyst for development in neglected rural areas, others caution that they pose a 
risk to rural communities’ livelihoods. The extent to which LSAIs provide benefits for local 
communities is hence still contested.  
This paper sets out to conceptually understand what effects the establishment of a large-scale 
farm has on the rural labour market in low- and middle-income countries. In addition, we 
empirically address the question of whether large-scale farming as recorded in the Land 
Matrix creates or destroys employment. We develop a transition matrix to identify several 
scenarios based on key determinants of the direct employment creation potential of LSAIs, 
namely the former land use, the crop type and the production model. We empirically assess 
the actual importance of these scenarios and the employment creation to be expected from 
this sample of LSAIs based on labour intensities. We further look into the net employment 
effects for land formerly used by smallholder farmers. Our analysis shows that LSAIs massively 
crowd out smallholder farmers, which is only partially mitigated through the cultivation of 
labour intensive crops and the application of contract farming schemes. This holds true for all 
regions targeted by LSAIs, although regional differences are found in terms of magnitude.  
The paper concludes that these effects tend to be large on the local scale (i.e., in the 
immediate surroundings of the investment site) but small in relation to total national 
employment in agriculture. However, indirect employment creation related to LSAIs, which is 
discussed but not empirically addressed in this paper, needs to be taken into account to have 





The demand for land suitable for agricultural production is growing globally (Lambin and 
Meyfroidt 2011). A major driver is the increased demand for food and energy of growing 
populations worldwide (Scheidel and Sorman 2012). In this context the expansion of large-
scale commercial farming is seen as a potential solution11 to satisfy this demand (Deininger 
2013). In the last decade investors have been increasingly acquiring land in developing 
countries for huge farming operations (Nolte, Chamberlain, and Giger 2016). The media have 
coined this phenomenon “land grabbing”; a more neutral term is “large-scale agricultural 
investments” (LSAIs). The term “LSAI”12 is also more precise since it excludes cases of 
speculation and only considers land acquisitions that result in an operational farm. 
Such investments, in general, and the socio-economic implications of these investments, in 
particular, have been heavily debated in recent years (Ali, Deininger, and Harris 2017; 
Baumgartner et al. 2015; Collier and Venables 2012; Cotula 2013; German, Schoneveld, and 
Mwangi 2013; Herrmann 2017; Kleemann and Thiele 2015; Messerli et al. 2014). The 
implications such investments have for target countries’ agricultural sectors and, more 
specifically, for rural employment are still contested. The creation of jobs is one of the most 
important and common pledges investors make to local communities and governments when 
acquiring land; although, the actual realization of this commitment is often debated: while 
some see potential for employment creation (Baumgartner et al. 2015; Kleemann and Thiele 
2015), others fear that the most vulnerable parts of society will lose their means of existence 
(Li 2011). Obviously, whether and to what extent these investments turn out to benefit host 
countries critically hinges on the potential for employment creation, particularly for those who 
lose their land without compensation. Although past experiences with large farms have been 
largely negative, recent changes in the context conditions have given reason to believe that 
large farms may have a future (Deininger and Byerlee 2012) and may actually contribute to 
                                                     
11 Another view is that smallholder farming is still the backbone of global food security in the developing world. 
Tscharntke et al. (2012) therefore suggests that there is a need to link agricultural intensification with biodiversity 
conservation and hunger reduction instead of conventional intensification. 
12 We use the terms LSAIs and large-scale farms interchangeably. We believe that the size of a farm best 
distinguishes the different production models; i.e., large-scale commercial and (often) mechanized farming, and 
less mechanized smallholder farming. We acknowledge that smallholder farmers not only produce for own 
consumption but may also produce commercially for the market (see also footnote 15). 
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increased welfare and poverty reduction due to employment creation (Deininger and Xia 
2016; Herrmann 2017; Van den Broeck, Swinnen, and Maertens 2017). 
Moreover, generating employment is a key component of economic and social development 
and, thus, of poverty alleviation (World Bank 2012) – an issue ranked high on most national 
development agendas. However, development processes typically go hand in hand with 
declining shares of agricultural sectors’ gross domestic product (GDP) contributions and 
decreasing employment in agricultural sectors (Chenery and Syrquin 1975; A. D. Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2007; Kuznets 1957; Üngör 2013). In other words, the shift from agriculture-based 
economies toward industrialized or service oriented economies seems to be a necessary 
precondition for development. In many poor countries, the agricultural sector continues to be 
the backbone of the economy and employs a large share of the population. Development 
processes often focus on urban areas and leave rural populations behind (Headey, Bezemer, 
and Hazell 2010). Against this logic, largescale farms in rural areas could hence shoulder the 
burden of creating agricultural wage employment, for instance, by (i) satisfying labour 
demand by directly employing former land users and (ii) stimulating the local economy and 
creating employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector through sectoral linkages. 
Moreover, establishing a largescale farm might have further implications for the local 
economy, such as lower food prices and greater access to new technologies, to name but a 
few. Depending on the extent to which these effects materialize, they could alleviate poverty 
(Irz et al. 2001; Maertens and Swinnen 2009). 
This paper seeks to conceptually understand the effects the establishment of a large-scale 
farm has on the rural labour market in low- and middle-income countries. Moreover, it 
addresses the question of whether large-scale farming creates or destroys employment when 
compared with the previous activity carried out on the land in question (e.g., smallholder 
farming). To do this, we provide relevant background information on rural labour markets in 
general and the labour productivities and intensities in the agricultural sector in particular in 
section 3.2. In section 3.3 we elaborate on the direct labour market effects that occur once a 
large-scale farm is set up. For these direct effects, we identify and discuss three key 
determinants which are decisive for the employment creation potential of LSAIs: (i) the former 
land-use type, (ii) the crop cultivated, and (iii) the production model applied. Based on these 
determinants, we develop different scenarios and illustrate them in a transition matrix. In 
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section 3.4 we present the data for our empirical application. In section 3.5 we empirically 
assess the employment creation in three steps: First, we assess small-scale and large-scale 
labour intensities based on data from the Land Matrix Global Observatory13 and the FAO 
smallholder data portrait. Second, we assess which scenarios are actually occurring in reality 
and derive implications for the labour market. Third, we estimate the net employment effect 
for LSAIs on former smallholder land in selected countries. In section 3.6 we elaborate on 
further indirect effects and discuss the validity and limitations of our findings, before 
concluding in section 3.7. 
3.2 Rural labour markets and labour productivity 
3.2.1 Rural labour markets 
In rural areas of low- and middle-income countries, agriculture is the main source of 
employment and income (Rosenzweig 1988). In 2010, 24 per cent of the workforce in low and 
middle-income countries was employed in agriculture, while agriculture’s contribution to GDP 
was at 10 per cent (World Bank 2016). In those countries heavily targeted by foreign 
agricultural investments, the share of workers in the agricultural sector is even higher — for 
instance, 73 per cent in Ethiopia and 72 per cent in Uganda in 2013 (World Bank 2016).14 
Over two-thirds of farming activities are performed by self-employed individuals (Gindling and 
Newhouse 2014); wage and salary employees are mainly found in the processing industry. 
Agricultural wage employment opportunities exist predominantly only for casual and seasonal 
workers, which can be explained by the seasonality of agricultural production. For most crops, 
there are clear seasonal peaks (e.g., toward harvest times) during which times labour demand 
is high (Nolte and Subakanya 2016; Rosenzweig 1988). In addition to being limited in terms of 
quantity, those temporary jobs are also limited with regard to quality. Major differences 
                                                     
13 The Land Matrix Global Observatory is a global and independent land monitoring initiative that promotes 
transparency and accountability in decisions regarding land and investment. It records land acquisitions of 200 
hectares and more in low- and middle-income countries that have occurred since the year 2000. Further 
information can be found at http://www.landmatrix.org/. 
14 These figures might even be underestimated since many surveys only focus on the primary occupation of the 
respondent. Agricultural activities, however, are often pursued as secondary or tertiary occupations and 
therefore not captured by survey. Especially on family farms it is common for household members to work on 
the farm in addition to their main job in the industrial or service sectors. Consequently, the importance of farm 
activities might be understated (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2010). 
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between regular and irregular wage employment can be found in the working conditions, 
social protection, and entitlements and benefits for workers (ILO 2003). 
Labour supply in rural areas is considered to be infinite. Even in areas where new labour 
opportunities open up, the supply remains high due to people migrating into these areas 
(Taylor and Martin 2001). A major constraint in rural areas is that the workforce typically lacks 
the training to perform high-skill tasks (Collier and Dercon 2014). 
Jobs created by LSAIs are often earmarked for wage workers. In some cases self-employment 
opportunities are provided through contract farming. A smallholder farmer’s decision on 
whether to switch from self- to wage employment is mainly driven by the social opportunity 
costs of the self-employed (shadow wages). Smallholders will only decide to enter wage 
employment or release family members to work on a largescale farm if the drop in profits is 
compensated by the wage earned on the large-scale farm. More precisely, wages paid on 
large-scale farms have to be equal to or exceed the marginal revenue product of smallholder 
farmers (Barrett, Sherlund, and Adesina 2007). 
Another aspect of wage employment created on large-scale farms is that it contributes to the 
formalization of the agricultural sector, from self-employed smallholder farming to wage 
employment. This in turn increases the fiscal revenue of an economy since larger holdings are 
more likely to be formally registered and hence taxable compared to smallholders (Irz et al. 
2001); this is despite the fact that investors in agriculture enjoy considerable tax benefits in 
many countries (Cotula et al. 2009). 
3.2.2 Agricultural labour productivity and labour intensity 
As countries develop, their agricultural sectors lose importance. This can be illustrated by 
comparing the share of people employed in agriculture and the sector’s contribution to GDP 
in low- and middle-income countries over time. During 2000–10, the share of the workforce 
engaged in agriculture almost halved from 45 to 24 per cent. Within the same period the 
agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP only decreased by 23 per cent (from 13 to 10 per 
cent) (World Bank 2016). The sharp drop in agricultural employment compared with the more 
modest decrease in agriculture’s GDP contribution clearly points to increased labour 
productivity. In other words, less labour input is required to produce the same level of output. 
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Labour productivity measures employment efficiency and is defined as output per unit of 
labour input during a period of time. 
Generally speaking, (agricultural) labour productivity varies largely across countries. In 2015 
the agriculture value added per worker (in constant 2010 USD) in Norway was more than four 
hundred times higher (USD 98,950) than that in Burundi (USD231) (World Bank 2016). These 
differences in agricultural productivity can be explained by a variety of factors: First, policies 
that distort farm size may lead to a misallocation of farmland and impair productivity 
(Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2014). Second, the self-selection of low-skilled workers into the 
agricultural sector in developing countries is considered to decrease agricultural productivity 
(Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh 2014; Lagakos and Waugh 2013). Third different agro-ecological 
conditions (e.g., rainfall and soil quality) determine agricultural productivity and explain 
differences (Gallup and Sachs 2000). And fourth, differences in agricultural productivity are 
particularly stark between countries in diverse states of development. The last point is often 
rooted in contrasting models of agricultural production. For instance, large-scale agriculture 
accounts for the majority of agricultural production in industrialized countries, whereas 
smallholder and family farming15 play an important role in developing countries. Large-scale 
farms and smallholder farms also differ in terms of their capital and labour endowments. 
While smallholders largely depend on labour, large-scale farmers often substitute labour with 
capital. The extent to which such a substitution can take place depends on, inter alia, the crop 
itself. The crop determines the labour intensity, i.e., the amount of labour needed in a 
production process (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). The cropping practice related to these 
different labour and capital intensities of production further affects agricultural productivity 
(Bustos, Caprettini, and Ponticelli 2016). 
In agricultural science it is common to use a labour input measure (labour intensity) instead 
of an output measure (labour productivity). Labour intensity (LI) is defined as the amount of 
                                                     
15 There is no universal definition of “smallholder” or “family farmer” (HLPE 2013). Smallholder farming refers to 
the size of the farms; however, the understanding of what is ‘‘small” depends very much on the context. Most 
commonly, an upper threshold of two hectares is used to identify smallholders. Family farming in turn refers to 
who owns and works the land. Thus, farms that principally rely on a family labour supply are considered family 
farms. While both concepts overlap, they are not the same (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016). We use the term 
smallholder farming in the following to distinguish smaller (often, but not necessarily, family-operated) farms 
from large-scale farming operations; the latter are identified by their size of two hundred hectares or more. 
44 
 
labour needed in a production process and is calculated as the number of workers required to 
cultivate one hectare of a specific crop: 
𝐿𝐼 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒)
  (i) 
Two main crop classes are often distinguished based on their cultivation patterns: annual 
crops and perennial crops. Annual crops (e.g., wheat, corn, and soya beans) perform an entire 
life cycle in one season and have to be replanted every year. Since the process from planting 
to harvest can be largely performed with the aid of machinery, annual crops are considered 
capital intensive. Subsequently, there is a great deal of scope for capital to replace labour. On 
the contrary, perennial crops (e.g., tea, coffee, and bananas) persist for many growing 
seasons. Planting, caring for, and harvesting these (typically tree) crops require more labour 
input. They thus provide less scope to substitute labour for capital and are considered rather 
labour intensive. Therefore, in terms of labour input, there are significant differences between 
crops for which labour can easily be substituted by capital. For instance, Deininger and Byerlee 
(2011) find that oil palm and (manual) sugar cane generate 10-30 times as many jobs 
compared with mechanized grain farming. Hence, for perennials, key operations potentially 
vary little between large-scale and smallholder farms and, accordingly, labour intensities are 
similar. This is not the case for mechanized grain production, where large differences exist 
between smallholder and large-scale farms (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). In these cases a 
hectare under smallholder production is typically thought to employ more people than a 
hectare under mechanized large-scale farming. 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
The establishment of a new large-scale farm implies the transition from a certain former land 
use to large-scale farming. This has far-reaching consequences on the rural labour market. We 
distinguish direct and indirect employment creation: Direct employment creation can be 
directly linked to the operation on the farm. These effects typically become visible 
immediately with the farm establishment. Indirect employment creation, in turn, concerns 
employment creation that is triggered by the farm operation but does not occur on the actual 
farm. These effects can occur immediately but typically occur in the medium- and long-term 
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when sectoral changes become effective (forward- and backward linkages). In our conceptual 
framework and the empirical application we focus on changing labour requirements due to 
direct employment creation and discuss the indirect employment effects in section 3.6.1. 
In order to conceptualize how the establishment of a large-scale farm in a rural context can 
directly affect the labour market, we illustrate different scenarios (1a–5d) in a transition 
matrix (Table 3.1). Accordingly, the direct employment effects depend on three factors: (i) the 
former land-use, as it determines whether and to what extent crowding out of labour takes 
place, (ii) the type of crop cultivated, as labour intensity differs between crops, and (iii) the 
production model, which could mitigate the crowding out of smallholder farmers. The labour 
demands of new farms vary over time. In the initial stages land preparation and infrastructure 
development contribute to employment creation. But once the farm is operational, the crops 
produced and the production model applied are the decisive factors behind further 
employment creation. We are interested in longer-term employment prospectives and thus 
only consider the employment creation of operational farms. 
The former land use determines the loss of employment. A newly established farm leads to a 
change in land use and all former income-generating activities on the land cease to exist. We 
distinguish between investments on farmland already used for large-scale agriculture (1a–1d, 
brownfield) and the establishment of an entirely new farm (greenfield) on land formerly used 
for smallholder agriculture (2a–2d), pastoralism (3a–3d), forestry (4a–4d), or conservation 
(5a–5d). 
Labour requirements for the new large-scale farm largely depend on the crops or, more 
precisely, on the labour and capital intensity of crop production (as discussed in section 3.5.1). 
Accordingly, we differentiate between labour-intensive and capital-intensive crops in our 
transition matrix. 
We further account for different production models in that we distinguish between investors 
who introduce contract farming schemes (CF) and those who do not (no CF). Contract farming 
schemes are thought of as a solution to preserve smallholder employment and achieve 
considerable social benefits for participating farmers (Deininger and Byerlee 2012; Kleemann 
and Thiele 2015). The term “contract farming” refers to agreements between a farmer and a 
firm. Under such an agreement, a farmer is required to provide a certain quantity and quality 
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of commodity that is either produced on the farmer’s own land or on land acquired by the 
investor but worked by the farmer. In turn, the investor provides production support and 
processes the farmer’s produce or puts it on the market (Eaton and Shepherd 2001). 
Regardless of whether leased or non-leased, in both cases jobs are largely maintained and – 
depending on the specific contract arrangements – production conditions might improve, for 
instance, through the provision of credit; agricultural inputs in the form of seeds, fertilizer, 
and pesticides; and training in production methods. Contract farming is a highly debated 
practice in the literature (Baumann 2000; Simmons 2002). On the one hand, such 
arrangements are criticized because of the unequal power relationship between the 
smallholder and the investor, which could lead to the latter exploiting the former. On the 
other hand, it is considered an opportunity to include local farmers in development processes 
in the context of large-scale land investments (De Schutter 2011; Robertson and Pinstrup-
Andersen 2010). 
Table 3.1. Transition matrix 
 
 
                                                 Final land use 
 
 






no CF CF no CF CF 
Brownfield 
investments 
Commercial agriculture 1a 1b 1c 1d 
Greenfield 
investments 
Smallholder agriculture 2a 2b 2c 2d 
Pastoralists 3a 3b 3c 3d 
Forestry 4a 4b 4c 4d 
Conservation 5a 5b 5c 5d 
Source: author’s compilation.  
Note: CF = contract farming. 
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3.3.1 Scenarios for brownfield investments 
For scenarios 1a–1d, we would expect new investments to take over existing farms. In this 
case there would be no crowding out of smallholder agriculture or other income-generating 
activities of local communities; although employees of the previous farm might still be 
released. Therefore, the net employment effect is strongly driven by the labour intensity of 
the cultivated crops and the question of whether contract-farming schemes are applied or 
not. If the investor decides to plant more labour-intensive crops (1a+1b), we would expect a 
more positive employment effect than if the investor were to opt for capital-intensive crops 
(1c+1d) under high mechanization. This positive effect might be further stimulated if the 
investor implements contract-farming schemes, which would offer employment opportunities 
to smallholder farmers in the region. 
3.3.2 Scenarios for greenfield investments 
If new farms are established on land that was not formerly used for large-scale agriculture, 
former land use plays a more pronounced role since jobs connected to the land’s former use 
will be lost. This holds particularly true for investments in scenarios 2a–2d, which target land 
that was formerly used for smallholder agriculture. Accordingly, we expect displacements and 
massive crowding out of smallholder employment. In the scenarios 3a–3d we expect 
pastoralists to be crowded out, while in scenarios 4a–4d we expect labour engaged in forestry 
to be crowded out. Conservation areas often serve various purposes, such as hunting, fishing, 
and gathering of firewood. Therefore, these activities would be expected to cease in scenarios 
5a–5d. Generally speaking, we expect low crowding out of former employment on land 
formerly used for forestry and conservation (scenarios 4a–5d) due to the relatively low labour 
demand for forestry, which ranges between 0.02 and 0.04 workers per hectare (Bustos, 
Caprettini, and Ponticelli 2016; Deininger and Byerlee 2011). 
Similar to brownfield investments, employment is created according to the crops that are 
cultivated and the business model: labour intensive crops (a+b of scenarios 2–5) are more 
likely to preserve existing jobs or even generate additional employment opportunities, which 
could lead to net employment creation. With capital-intensive crops (c+d of scenarios 2–5), 
the newly created employment might not compensate the employment that was crowded out 
in the first place. Some investment projects implement contract-farming schemes (b+d of 
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scenarios 2–5), which could – similarly to labour-intensive crops – mitigate the crowding out 
of employment linked to different former land uses. 
In sum, the net employment effect is driven by the combination of these three aspects in each 
acquisition, ranging from massive crowding out and very few new employment opportunities 
to hardly any crowding out mitigated by contract-farming schemes and many new jobs. The 
negative effects are prone to be strongest for former greenfields which experienced high 
crowding out of former employment – specifically, former smallholder farms. The cultivation 
of labour-intensive crops might mitigate the loss through substantive labour demand, while 
capital-intensive crops are expected to generate only limited employment. If contract-farming 
schemes are implemented, the crowding out of former employment can be reduced and 
smallholder farmers can partake in the development process of the region. 
3.4 Data 
In our empirical analysis we mainly draw on two databases. For LSAIs, we use data from the 
most comprehensive database on large-scale land acquisitions, the Land Matrix (retrieved on 
1 August 2016). We include all concluded agricultural deals (both oral agreement and signed 
contract) above two hundred hectares.16 Our data sample contains 1,346 deals amounting to 
35.2 million hectares. The Land Matrix contains comprehensive information on individual 
large-scale farming projects with exact figures for the acquired area. In particular, it feeds the 
transition matrix with information on the (i) former land use, (ii) the type of crop cultivated 
including its respective current size under production and current number of workers, and (iii) 
the production model by capturing contract-farming schemes (with information on the area 
used for contract farming and the respective number of contract farmers, either inside or 
outside of the land acquired by an investor). 
The land acquired by investors often contains multiple entries for several of these categories. 
If the share of these different entries is not given, we assume equal shares for each entry. For 
those cases of contract farming, where the actual area for contract farming is not given, we 
assume that contract farmers cultivate the entire acquired area. 
                                                     
16 Land Matrix data also record “intended” and “failed” deals and include deals for other purposes, including 
mining and tourism. We hence use a subset of 1,346 deals included in the Land Matrix. We also include deals 
below two hundred hectares if the leased area combined with the area under contract farming amounts to more 
than two hundred hectares. 
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To assess the employment loss from the former land use smallholder farming we draw on the 
FAO’s Smallholder Farmers’ Dataportrait17 – a standardized smallholder-specific database that 
consists of Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) survey data and FAO Rural Income 
Generating Activities (RIGA) data. We use this to estimate the labor intensity of smallholder 
farmers (see section). 
To allow for the assessment of the net employment creation potential (see 3.5.3), we use five 
African low- and middle-income countries covered by the Smallholder Farmers’ Dataportrait: 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. For these countries, Land Matrix and FAO data 
overlap and provide a solid basis for a cross-country comparison. 
3.5 Empirical application 
3.5.1 Labour intensities 
In the first step of our empirical analysis, we derive and compare the labour intensities of 
large-scale and smallholder farmers. This allows us to distinguish labour and capital intensive 
crops which is an important precondition to study actual employment effects. Based on the 
labour intensities, we can estimate the loss of employment from land formerly used for 
smallholder farming as well as the employment creation on now commercially farmed land. 
(i) Smallholder agriculture 
For smallholder agriculture, labour intensity is derived from the number of workers (family 
and hired workers) on a smallholder farm and the size of the farm as reported in FAO’s 
Smallholder Farmers’ Dataportrait. Both measures are median-weighted averages aggregated 
on country level. Because of its level of aggregation, the smallholder data do not account for 
individual crops, former uses, or production models. However, since the data set is derived 
from national labour surveys and household surveys and only addresses smallholder farmers, 
it reflects country-specific cropping patterns – that is, the data capture the typical crops 
cultivated and the respective labour intensity level for each crop. Therefore, the derived 
estimate can be considered – in the country context – a good estimate of smallholder labour 
intensity. 
                                                     




Based on the FAO data, we consider smallholder labour intensities to range between 1.13 and 
3.77 workers per hectare (see also Table 3.3 below in section 3.5.3), with a mean of 1.77 and 
a median of 1.26. 
(ii) Large-scale agriculture 
For our large-scale agriculture labour intensity estimate per crop18, we use Land Matrix data. 
To cater for the differing labour demand under contract farming arrangements, we calculate 
intensities for such cases separately.19 
In the following, we look at the labour intensities of some key crops, determined by their 
frequency in the Land Matrix. We assume that labour intensities are similar across world 
regions. This is a strong supposition given that agro-ecological conditions, such as rainfall and 
soil quality, vary largely across world regions. Our assumption, however, may be justified given 
(i) the highly mechanized mode of production in largescale agriculture, which is comparable 
across the globe, and (ii) the fact that agro-ecological conditions predetermine cropping 
patterns – for example, certain crops are only cultivated if the operation is thought to be 
profitable. We consider the derived estimates to be a valid approximation of differences in 
the labour intensities of various crops but are fully aware that one overall value will not be 
able to precisely reflect labour demands across the world. 
Figure 3.1 shows labour intensities for annual and perennial crops and confirms that indeed 
annual crops have lower intensities. Nevertheless, there is some variance and hence some 
exceptions to this rule. For instance, rice shows a rather high labour demand of over 0.6 
workers per hectare despite being considered a capital-intensive annual crop. However, this 
is not due to the natural characteristic of the plant but rather due to the way it is commercially 
cultivated. Although a perennial crop by nature, rice is usually replanted every year in order 
to generate higher yields. Similarly, cotton is cut down every year to prevent disease and pest 
                                                     
18 Here we explicitly use the labour per area under production and not per acquired area. This takes into account 
that the acquired area (i.e., the area under contract) usually exceeds the area actually used for production since 
investors typically do not immediately enter into the production phase on the entire area acquired. Missing 
values in the size under production are imputed by a simple mean imputation based on the ratio of the size under 
contract and the respective size in production for all cases that have this information. 
19 If the labour intensity of contract farmers was not available, we used large-scale farmers’ intensity. The 
rationale here is that contract farmers’ labour intensity falls somewhere between that of smallholder farmers 
and large-scale farmers, depending on their access to improved technologies. Accordingly, we consider the 
labour demand of a large-scale farmer to be a lower-bound estimate. 
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infestation even though it can survive several growing seasons. We also find heterogeneity in 
terms of labour intensities among perennial crops. Typically, such perennials are commercially 
produced on plantations. Due to their physical characteristics, some of these crops (e.g., tea, 
bananas, and coffee) are indeed quite labour intensive, while others (e.g., rubber, cocoa, and 
palm oil) are less labour intensive (ILO 1994). In the latter group of crops it is easier to 
substitute labour with capital. 
Figure 3.1. Labour intensities for major annual and perennial crops 
  
 
Source: author’s calculation based on the Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016). 
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We check the labour intensities derived from Land Matrix data against reports on labour 
intensity in the literature (see Appendix A, Table A 1). Generally speaking, we find similar 
labour intensities. 
These empirical findings show that the classification of annuals and perennials reflects 
potential labour intensity quite well, although not perfectly. In the following empirical 
applications we hence do not use strict annual versus perennial crops as categories but 
categorize crops as either labour intensive or capital intensive. In general, the labour-intensive 
category consists of perennial crops; however, we also include those annual crops which are 
more labour intensive and exclude those perennial crops which, relatively speaking, are less 
labour intensive. The capital-intensive category typically comprises annual crops, though 
some labour-intensive annuals are excluded, while some perennial crops with low labour 
intensities are included. 
To now distinguish labour-intensive from capital-intensive crops, we feed labour intensities of 
annual and perennial crops derived from the Land Matrix into a non-parametric estimation 
(kernel density). The point of intersection is used to derive the threshold between labour and 
capital intensity. Figure 3.2 shows that this point is at a labour intensity of 0.576 workers per 
hectare. Consequently, we define all crops above 0.576 workers per hectare as labour 
intensive, and all crops below that threshold as capital intensive. 
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Figure 3.2. Frequency and density of labour intensity by crop class 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on the Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016). 
3.5.2 Transition to large-scale farming 
(i) Global overview on different scenarios 
We now address the transition from the former land use to large-scale farming by using the 
transition matrix (introduced in section 3.3) to illustrate how the total acquired area is 
distributed across each of the following three key factors: (i) the former land-use (large-scale 
agriculture, smallholder agriculture, pastoralists, forestry, and conservation); (ii) the labour 
intensity of the crop cultivated (labour intensive, capital intensive; see section 3.5.1); and (iii) 
the production model applied (contract farming, no contract farming). As a result, we can 
estimate the area that is transformed from the respective former land use to large-scale 
farming, taking into account the crops planted and the production models applied. Table 3.2 
shows the transition matrix with the former land-use and the respective final land-use based 
on Land Matrix data. We use the acquired area (expressed as percentage of the total acquired 
area) as a measure; the areas’ sizes in hectares can be found in Appendix A, Table A 2. 
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Table 3.2. Transition matrix – Results as percent of the area acquired (n=1,031) 
                                   Final land use          
 
 
Former land use  
               
Large-scale farm   
Labor intensive Capital intensive   
25% 75%   

















  1a 1b 1c 1d   
Size under 















  2a 2b 2c 2d   
Size under 
contract (%) 12% 1% 16% 4% 34% 
Pastoralists   3a 3b 3c 3d   
  
Size under 
contract (%) 2% 0% 3% 0% 5% 
Forestry   4a 4b 4c 4d   
  
Size under 
contract (%) 6% 0% 6% 1% 13% 
Conservation   5a 5b 5c 5d   
  
Size under 
contract (%) 0% 0% 3% 0% 4% 
    Total (%) 22% 3% 57% 17% 100% 
    Total (#) 183 66 611 171 
            
1,031    
Source: author’s calculation based on the Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016). 
Note: Total can vary due to rounding. 
Relating the derived estimates to the potential employment effect of each key determinant 
reveals that over three-quarters of the land acquired has previously been used for agriculture 
– 44 per cent for large-scale agriculture and another 34 per cent for smallholder agriculture. 
Meanwhile, 13 per cent of the land targeted was formerly used for forestry; 5 per cent, by 
pastoralists; and 4 per cent, for conservation. This global overview on former land use suggests 
that investors do not primarily target “idle” land. Instead, targeted land has usually been used 
for agriculture before suggesting that crowding out of former employment can be expected.20 
Looking at the crop type, we find a clear majority of the area used to cultivate capital-intensive 
crops (75 per cent). This suggests a rather low employment creation potential for most LSAIs 
as capital-intensive crops indicate a highly mechanized production with low labour inputs. 
                                                     
20 This also confirms the findings of Messerli et al. (2014): Based on detailed insights into the geographical 
contexts of land acquisitions, they question the often postulated idea that targeted land is “idle” or “marginal”. 
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In total, LSAIs only implement contract-farming schemes on 2 out of every 10 hectares. This is 
more often the case for capital-intensive crops (17 per cent) compared to labour intensive 
crops (3 per cent). 
We now look into the different scenarios of the transition matrix. For brownfield investments, 
i.e., land formerly used by large-scale farms (1a–1d, 44 per cent), we do not expect a crowding 
out of former employment. The share of capital-intensive crops (40 per cent, with and without 
contract farming) is eight times higher than the share of labour-intensive crops (5 per cent). 
In contrast to other former uses, contract-farming schemes are relatively common and applied 
on almost one-third of the area formerly used for large-scale agriculture (adding up the 
percentages of labour intensive and capital intensive crops, see explanation on within group 
comparisons21), especially for capital-intensive crops. Given that crowding out of former 
employment is considered limited, positive employment effects might occur in this scenario 
even in the dominating case with capital-intensive crops, especially if contract farming 
schemes are applied. 
Over one-third of the land area has previously been used by smallholder farmers (2a–2d), 
implying a potential crowding out of this former employment. This crowding out is only 
partially mitigated through the cultivation of labour-intensive crops (41 per cent) or through 
contract-farming schemes (15 per cent). We hence expect that potential employment losses 
are rather high in the majority of cases where land formerly used by smallholders is targeted. 
This specific scenario will be looked at in greater detail in section 3.5.3. 
On former pastoralist land (3a–3d, 5 per cent) it is likely that pastoralists will be crowded out 
once the land is transferred to a large-scale farmer. According to our findings, capital-intensive 
crops dominate (66 per cent) – which impairs the (new) employment generation – and there 
is almost no evidence of contract farming (4 per cent). Therefore, we expect the majority of 
deals on former pastoralist land to result in employment losses. 
We find capital-intensive crops on more than half of the land (57 per cent) formerly used for 
forestry (4a–4d, 13 per cent). Moreover, only a small share (12 per cent) of former forestry 
land is farmed under contract-farming schemes. However, considering the generally low 
                                                     









labour requirements of the former forestry land, on those areas where labour-intensive crops 
are cultivated (43 per cent) and where contract farming is applied, we expect rather positive 
employment creation potential. 
The same holds for former conservation land (5a–5d, 4 per cent), which is typically 
characterized by a rather low labour intensity and does hence not imply a large crowding out 
of former employment. The predominant cultivation of capital-intensive crops without 
contract farming indicates very limited employment creation, which might however be 
positive if there is indeed no crowding out of former employment. 
(ii) Regional perspective 
In order to provide a more realistic picture, regional differences have to be taken into account. 
Figure 3.3 shows that the three key determinants differ across regions. 
Figure 3.3. Regional perspective according to the key determinants 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on the Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016). 
Note: CF = Contract farming. This figure also includes deals which lack the information of the former use but do 




On the African continent, half of the LSAIs are set up on agricultural land that had been 
primarily used by smallholders (28 per cent) and we also find the largest share of former 
forestry land (39 per cent) compared to other regions. Former pastoralist land and 
conservation areas only constitute 4 and 5 per cent, respectively. LSAIs in Africa have a clear 
preference for capital-intensive crops (66 per cent); however, contract-farming schemes (36 
per cent) are also often applied compared to other regions. The considerable share of labour-
intensive crops (33 per cent) in combination with the frequent occurrence of contract farming 
(36 per cent) has the potential to – at least partly – mitigate the crowding out of smallholders 
and pastoralists in Africa. 
The Asia and Pacific region has the highest share of investments on former smallholder land 
(40 per cent) and hence entails the greatest risk of crowding out. A similar share of the 
acquired area was formerly used for large-scale agriculture. Less labour-intensive forestry and 
conservation activities were each carried out on less than 10 per cent of the area. Pastoralists 
are less common in the region, accounting for only 3 per cent of the land. Similar to Africa, 
though more pronounced, investors in the Asia and Pacific region concentrate on capital-
intensive crops (81 per cent). The high level of crowding out and the low level of labour-
intensive crops point to negative net employment creation in the region; although the 
considerable share of contract farming (26 per cent) might partly mitigate this. 
Two thirds of LSAIs in Eastern Europe target former largescale farms, followed by former 
smallholder land (28 per cent). Similar to patterns in Africa and the Asia and Pacific region, 
capital-intensive crops (79 per cent) are favoured over labour-intensive crops (21 per cent). 
Contract-farming schemes are irrelevant, accounting for only 2 per cent of the acquired area. 
Although most of the investments target large-scale farms, the choice of crops and production 
mode make mitigation of the considerably high crowding out of smallholders unlikely. 
As in Eastern Europe, albeit less pronounced, most investors in Latin America target existing 
large-scale farms (49 per cent). Smallholder land accounts for 29 per cent of LSAIs in the 
region; pastoralists, 14 per cent (the largest share across all regions); forestry, 7 per cent; and 
conservation areas, 1 per cent. The crowding out of smallholders and pastoralists is further 
accelerated by the prevailing cultivation of capital-intensive crops (81 per cent). Contract-
farming schemes, which are in place on about one out of every five hectares, could cushion, 
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without eliminating, the negative effects. Thus, overall net employment is expected to be 
negative. 
This regional analysis shows that crowding out of former smallholder farmers is a serious 
problem across all regions, particularly in the Asia and Pacific region, where as the crowding 
out of pastoralists is most marked in Latin America. The creation of new employment and 
therewith the mitigation of crowding out through cultivating labour-intensive crops are, 
generally speaking, rather low but slightly higher in Africa. Contract farming might be able to 
mitigate crowding out to some degree – especially in Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin 
America and the Asia and Pacific region but not in Eastern Europe. 
Given the preceding empirics of the three determinants in the different world regions, we see 
very little scope for a positive direct employment effect across all regions; rather, we expect 
high crowding out of existing jobs and relatively few new jobs to emerge. 
3.5.3 Estimation of labour creation potential through LSAIs 
Finally, we assess the net employment creation potential for those countries where Land 
Matrix and FAO data overlap. We provide estimates for both smallholder and large-scale 
farmers for each of the five African countries by multiplying the acquired area with the 
previously derived labour intensities (crop-specific in the case of large-scale agriculture and 
country-specific in the case of smallholder agriculture). This estimate is based on the size of 
the acquired area to show the number of jobs potentially created for each recorded LSAI if the 
entire area was cultivated. The difference between the number of jobs created by large-scale 
farmers and the number of jobs formerly required by smallholders is the potential net 
employment effect. We then relate this effect to the total number of people employed in 
agriculture in the respective country. These estimates are meant to give an idea about the 
dimensions of potential employment creation but entail important uncertainties, which we 
discuss in detail in section 3.6.2. To derive the respective net employment effect, we contrast 
the gross employment of large-scale holdings with the former form of employment, only 
looking at land formerly used for smallholder agriculture (i.e., scenarios 2a–2d of the 
transition matrix; see Table 3.1). 
The net employment effect 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑡 is defined as the difference between the number of jobs 
created on a newly established large-scale farm and the number of jobs derived from the 
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former land-use type (here, smallholder agriculture) expressed as a percentage of the former 
use:  
𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑡 =
𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 −  𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑠𝑒
𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑠𝑒
 (ii) 
Table 3.3 shows the estimated net employment effect with respect to the three key 
determinants in the transition matrix, focusing on land formerly used by smallholders. To put 
the total value in specific national contexts, we further report the employment effect as a 
percentage of overall employment in agriculture in the respective country. 
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Table 3.3. Employment creation through LSAIs for selected countries (scenarios 2a–2d) 
   Labor intensive Capital intensive    
Country(a)   
no CF CF no CF CF Total 





creation through new 
large-scale farm 106,775 529 31,445 9,329 148,078 0.48% 
Crowding out of former 
smallholders on acquired 
area 137,000 458 149,034 29,760 316,252 1.03% 




creation through new 
large-scale farm 76,507  7,179  n/a 687  84,373  0.39% 
Crowding out of former 
smallholders on acquired 
area 301,600  16,965  n/a 10,682  329,247  1.53% 




creation through new 
large-scale farm 23,450  28,272  9,870  113,449  175,042  1.18% 
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Crowding out of former 
smallholders on acquired 
area 47,428  50,306  39,087  278,188  415,009  2.80% 




creation through new 
large-scale farm 16,820  16,675  n/a 5,225  38,721  0.29% 
Crowding out of former 
smallholders on acquired 
area 21,672  13,469  n/a 14,616  49,757  0.37% 




creation through new 
large-scale farm 2,133  947  n/a 11,363  14,443  0.15% 
Crowding out of former 
smallholders on acquired 
area 2,837  1,363  n/a 29,821  34,022  0.34% 
Net employment effect -25% -31% n/a -62% -58% -0.20% 
Source: author’s calculation based on the Land Matrix Global Observatory (2016) and ILO (2016). 
Notes: (a) Labor intensities (LI) of smallholder farmers and number of LSAIs (n) per country in parenthesis. 
             (b) The figures on employment in agriculture correspond to the latest available year per country. 
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Across all countries we encounter a strong negative net employment effect if a large-scale 
farm is established on land formerly used for smallholder agriculture, which is due to high 
crowding out. The effect ranges between 22 per cent (Tanzania) and 74 per cent (Kenya). As 
expected, farms cultivating capital-intensive crops suffer greater job losses than do farms 
cultivating labour-intensive crops. Looking into the net employment effects of labour-
intensive crops, the mitigation potential of contract farming is clearly evident. In fact, we even 
identify net employment creation of 16 to 24 per cent for Tanzania and Ethiopia, respectively. 
We also find lower employment losses for farms cultivating capital-intensive crops if contract 
farming is used. 
The last column of Table 3.3 gives an indication on the magnitude of the net employment 
effect in the respective country. The employment losses expressed as a percentage of overall 
agricultural employment through LSAIs are relatively small and range between 0.1 per cent 
(Tanzania) and 1.6 per cent (Nigeria). This shows that on a global and national scale, the 
crowding out of smallholder farmers and the accompanying net employment losses are rather 
small. However, they can be substantial in the immediate proximity of the investment, 
especially if there are no other employment opportunities available in the respective local 
labour markets. 
3.6 Discussion 
Large-scale agricultural investments cause a significant loss of employment on the local level 
considering the direct employment creation only. This is mainly due to the crowding out of 
former employment, which can only be partially mitigated. In this section we also elaborate 
on the indirect employment creation of LSAIs and discuss the validity and limitations of our 
estimates. 
3.6.1 Indirect employment creation 
Establishing a large-scale farm does not only have direct employment effects, as empirically 
assessed in the preceding sections, it also has indirect effects that may result in employment 
creation not directly linked to farming. One such effect is related to the inflow of capital, which 
makes new technologies available (e.g., inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides, and 
machinery). Improved technologies typically increase labour productivity; this is particularly 
the case for agricultural workers on large-scale farms. Depending on the potential of the 
spillover effects, advanced technologies might also reach smallholder farmers, resulting in 
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productivity gains for them, too. Such productivity gains do three things: First, they increase 
the availability of food if food is produced, which in turn reduces the market price. The 
reduction of food prices relative to farm workers’ incomes frees up shares of households’ 
budgets, which can then be used to purchase non-food goods and services. The resulting 
increase in demand for industrial goods and services fosters the growth of these respective 
sectors (Dorward 2013). Second, they release labour from agriculture to other sectors 
(Dorward 2013; C. P. Timmer 1988). In short, capital inflow into agriculture is expected to 
change the sectoral composition from employment in agriculture toward employment in 
industry and services. Third, they result in higher total labour incomes (FAO 2016; Satchi and 
Temple 2009). 
However, empirical studies show that technological changes are not labour saving per se and 
hence do not always trigger a sectoral shift. For example, Bustos et al. (2016) study two 
technological changes in Brazil: the introduction of genetically engineered soy and the 
introduction of a second harvesting season. The former is strongly labour-saving and fosters 
industrialization processes and a shift of employment toward the industry and service sectors 
(as expected). In contrast, a second harvesting season is land-augmenting and can hinder 
industrialization. In this case, technological change did not lead to a shift of employment from 
agriculture toward other sectors. Kouser, Abedullah, and Qaim (2015) examined the 
technological change of introducing insect-resistant bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton in 
Pakistan. They found that rather than reducing agricultural labour demand due to less 
spraying of chemical pesticides, the introduction of Bt cotton resulted in a 55 per cent increase 
in the demand for hired labour mainly due to the need to harvest larger yields. 
Another effect is related to the potential of large-scale farms to build productive relationships 
with other industrial branches over time (Larson and Shaw 2001). A common distinction of 
these relationships is backward and forward linkages. In the agricultural context backward 
linkages describe the interconnection of a large-scale farm with the industrial branch 
supplying it with inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides). The increased demand for such 
inputs – induced by large-scale farms – might trigger the expansion of the upstream industry 
and present new employment opportunities. Forward linkages, on the other hand, comprise 
all downstream industries processing the farms’ output – for instance, the processing, packing, 
and shipping industries. In this case the increased output of large-scale farmers might lead to 
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an expansion of the processing industry – if processing is done in the target country – and 
hence more jobs in the industrial sector. The fact that labour is released from the agricultural 
sector due to productivity gains is conducive to establishing these linkages. 
For backward linkages, there is hardly any causal evidence available in the literature. In cases 
where a newly established farm procures inputs locally, we expect jobs to be created through 
backward linkages. However, with a highly competitive and increasingly concentrated supply 
side for the main agricultural inputs and technologies (for instance, seeds, fertilizer and 
machinery) dominated by a few global players, the establishment of domestic input supply 
industries for agriculture is unlikely. Jobs would hence mainly be created through the (usually 
locally rooted) service sector – for instance, trade intermediaries and logistic and shipping 
companies which facilitate access to agricultural inputs. 
Forward linkages bear potential for the development of the local industry. The growing output 
triggered by higher productivity requires adequate processing facilities. In one out of three 
deals according to Land Matrix data, the produced commodities are exported unprocessed. 
For this one-third of deals hardly any employment creation is expected through forward 
linkages, whereas the opposite might be the case for the remaining two-thirds of deals. A key 
determinant for unlocking the potential of forward linkages lies in the capital intensity of the 
processing industry. This is nicely illustrated by the examples of Brazil and Thailand. In Brazil 
large-scale mechanized farming substituted capital for labour, resulting in low employment 
creation and growing inequalities. In Thailand agricultural commercialization took a different 
turn as off-farm enterprises did not have access to subsidized credit and, therefore, could not 
afford labour-displacing technologies. This consequently generated massive employment, 
especially in the processing industry (World Bank 2009). 
In sum, from a theoretical stance we would clearly expect a change from a smallholder-
dominated labour market to a labour market dominated by industry and service. Empirically, 
the picture is less clear as the literature also reports cases in which technological changes have 
increased the demand for agricultural labour. Employment creation in the industrial sector 
through backward and forward linkages depends on the specific country and sector contexts. 
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3.6.2 Validity and limitations of the estimates 
The validity of our results heavily hinges on the quality of the Land Matrix data. While Land 
Matrix data were criticized when first published (see, for instance, Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; 
Edelman 2013; Oya 2013), the data are now widely used by researchers (see, for instance, 
Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2015; Messerli et al. 2014; Osabuohien 2014). The Land Matrix 
Initiative is transparent about potential biases in the data and does not claim to provide a 
realistic representation of reality (The Land Matrix Global Observatory 2016). In fact, due to 
the opaqueness surrounding many LSAIs, the Land Matrix data are likely to underestimate the 
phenomenon. Accordingly, the acquired areas as reported in the Land Matrix can be 
considered a conservative estimate of the overall phenomenon. Despite certain biases, we 
consider Land Matrix data to be the most accurate information available and well suited to 
highlighting overall global trends. 
The conceptual framework incorporates three key determinants, which require some 
assumptions and simplifications in their empirical application. First, input for the labour 
intensities would ideally be calculated on an individual level or, more precisely, on the basis 
of man-hours per hectare and per crop. Because such disaggregated figures are not available, 
we use the total employment numbers of each holding as reported in the Land Matrix. 
Although the Land Matrix differentiates the type of employment, only one out of five cases 
explicitly state the number of seasonal workers. For the remaining cases, we assume that 
seasonal workers are included in the total employment figures. A conversion factor could be 
used to translate these seasonal-employment figures into full-time equivalents in order to 
account for the fact that seasonal labourers only work part of the year. However, we consider 
such a factor to be too arbitrary to account for the variation in working hours of seasonal 
workers and instead treat seasonal labour as full-time equivalents. In contrast, FAO’s 
Smallholder Farmers’ Dataportrait accounts for the heterogeneity to a certain extent by 
calculating labour input as the total number of person-days divided by the number of 
workdays in a year. However, also person-days per workdays can be only considered as a 
second best solution to address the labour input compared to man-hours. More precisely, it 
lacks the detail to distinguish between part-time and full-time during a workday and therefore 
fails to fully capture time-related underemployment; a reality often found on smallholder 
farms owned by families which would overstate the actual labour input. As a result of these 
different approaches, the labour input and therewith the estimated labour intensities derived 
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from Land Matrix data could be overestimated. Although both overestimations are likely to 
cancel each other out, the gross employment generation estimated in Table 3.3 should be 
considered an upper bound estimate. 
Second, we assume that the whole area acquired by an investor was to be cultivated. This is 
meant to give an idea of how many jobs could potentially be created on the land acquired. In 
reality, investors often lack the capacity to cultivate all the land acquired, and, usually, not all 
of the land acquired is suitable for production; hence, only a fraction of the land will be 
cultivated. This also adds to the overestimation of gross employment generation through 
large-scale farms in Table 3.3. However, we equally pretend the whole area was formerly 
under production and thus overestimate the crowding out of former employment. This is 
particularly important for land formerly used by smallholder farmers. Consequently, the 
estimate for employment losses of former smallholders is also an upper-bound estimate. 
Third, we cannot account for the quality of newly created employment. Employment quality 
plays an important role as there might be a huge difference between a self-employed 
smallholder and a wage employee in terms of decency. One important aspect in this context 
is that self-employed smallholders usually operate in the informal economy and are hence 
excluded from social security systems and lack adequate representation. On the contrary, 
formal wage employees ideally have access to these systems and are also able to express their 
concerns through workers’ organizations. However, the transformation from smallholder 
farming to wage employment can heavily impact the social relations in communities and 
within households. Ethnographic research on Vietnam (Dao 2016) and Indonesia (Julia and 
White 2012) shows that employment on plantations is often perceived as a downgrade. 
Households that have lost agricultural self-employment have the possibility to compensate 
for their lost income by switching into wage employment. Although fewer employment 
opportunities are expected to emerge, overall compensation is still feasible since many low-
pay jobs are replaced by fewer better paid jobs. 
Fourth, in terms of multi-cropping patterns and multiple former land uses, we assume that 
the total area of a holding – and hence the labour input – is equally distributed across each 
former land-use type and crop. As we do not know the real share of an area attributed to 
various former land uses or crops, this is a necessary assumption even though it can potentially 
introduce biases. For instance, cases reporting two different crops are difficult to determine. 
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It could be different plots of land used for each crop or it could be multi-cropping – that is, 
both crops sharing one plot through intercropping or succession planting. In the first case, the 
area could be equally or unequally distributed across the crops, whereas in the case of multi-
cropping the same plot of land is used for both crops, meaning that an equal distribution 
across the two crops is very likely. In both cases labour intensity is increased compared to 
single-cropping, either through higher yields or through an additional growing cycle in one 
season. However, when comparing the labour intensities of single-entry cases with multiple 
entry-cases in our data, there are no major differences. 
Fifth, in terms of production models there is obviously more diversity than just contract 
farming and non-contract farming. Moreover, even contract-farming arrangements exist in 
different forms and context conditions. The effects of contract farming on participating 
farmers are diverse and a source of controversial debate in the literature (Bijman 2008; Minot 
2007). Different contractual arrangements, diverse context conditions, and an unequal power 
balance between the firm and farmers may explain the variance in outcomes. We neglect 
these variances in our analysis and only consider the sheer prevalence of such agreements. 
However, we do use – whenever available – labour intensities for contract-farming 
arrangements and thereby attempt to capture the importance of different production models 
with data based on real contract-farming schemes. 
Sixth, our analysis of net employment effects is limited to land formerly used by smallholders 
as we lack information on the crowding out of former employment for other types of land use. 
On the one hand, the acquisition of former smallholder land is highly relevant as it concerns 
more than a third of the acquired land, which is of major concern to opponents of LSAIs. 
Hence, there certainly is a rationale to focus on former smallholder land. On the other hand, 
we have to bear in mind that we expect the largest degree of crowding out to occur on these 
areas and smaller degrees to happen on land with other uses. Thus, our net employment 
estimates cannot be transferred to other former land-use types. The effects are expected to 
be more positive in the other scenarios due to less destruction of former employment. 
Last, we deliberately choose to focus on employment effects and thus neglect other effects 
associated with establishing a large-scale farm. We do so to understand the very complex 
effects on the labour markets. At the same time, we are aware of the profound and diverse 
effects of large-scale farms on the economic and social spheres of local communities as well 
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as on the environment (for instance, see Oberlack, Tejada, Messerli, Rist, and Giger (2016) for 
a meta-analysis of case studies on livelihood outcomes of large-scale land acquisitions). 
With all of these caveats in mind, the above-described empirical exercise provides an empirical 
assessment of the potential employment effects of LSAIs. We provide a simple but powerful 
tool to assess the direct employment creation of investments by taking three decisive – albeit 
simplified – factors into account. Using Land Matrix data implies that we underestimate the 
overall phenomenon as the area acquired is probably much larger. However, we believe that 
Land Matrix data reveal accurate trends concerning these three factors. Certain assumptions 
(e.g., about land distribution or the complete use of the acquired land) and simplifications of 
complex issues (e.g., contract farming) are necessary, though they lead to an upward bias in 
labour intensities and demand of large-scale farmers. As a result, we tend to overestimate 
large-scale farms’ gross employment creation that we consider to be upper bounds. 
Accordingly, the predicted values for net employment creation might – despite the negative 
values – even be too optimistic. 
We therefore consider these net employment effects for land formerly used by smallholders 
as a conservative estimate of employment losses. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that this is hugely driven by the crowding out of smallholder farmers (for which we also use 
an upper-bound estimate) and that net employment effects are more likely to be positive for 
other land-use types. Although our estimates should not be taken at face value, they indicate 
overall trends of the direct employment effects of the different scenarios in our transition 
matrix. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper debates the employment effects of large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs). It 
contributes to the debate by providing and empirically testing a conceptual framework on 
direct employment effects. To this end, we identified and discussed key determinants of these 
direct employment effects: (i) the former land-use, (ii) the crop cultivated, and (iii) the 
production model applied. We summarize these key determinants in a transition matrix to 
illustrate scenarios that could potentially occur in the course of transitioning from the former 
land use to large-scale farming. 
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In our empirical application, we use Land Matrix data to assess which scenarios actually occur 
in reality and then derive implications for employment creation. The largest generation of 
direct net employment is expected for investments that do not entail massive crowding out 
of former income-generating activities and cultivate labour-intensive crops under contract-
farming schemes. However, Land Matrix data show that this scenario only applies to a very 
small amount of the acquired area. Instead, we find that over a third of land targeted was 
formerly used by smallholder farmers and that contract-farming schemes are only used on 2 
out of every 10 hectares. This implies that crowding out of former smallholder farmers is a 
serious issue. Moreover, capital-intensive crops are clearly dominating, which hints at 
investors focusing on highly mechanized farming with low labour demand. Accordingly, direct 
net employment creation for the great majority of LSAIs is limited, and high hopes for massive 
direct employment creation through LSAIs are clearly misplaced. 
Crowding out of smallholder farmers is a severe problem in all regions, with some nuances. 
For instance, crowding out of smallholders is most pronounced in the Asia and Pacific region 
while pastoralists are particularly affected in Latin America. Only about 20 per cent of land is 
used to cultivate labour-intensive crops, which is generally low; only in Africa is this share 
slightly higher. Africa also reveals the highest amount of mitigation potential through 
contract-farming schemes. 
We then derived the net employment effects for land formerly used by smallholders for 
selected countries. We find a massive loss of employment (ranging between 28 and 75 per 
cent), with the highest losses stemming from the cultivation of capital-intensive crops. 
However, in few cases, we identified a positive net employment effect associated with the 
cultivation of labour- intensive crops in combination with contract farming, suggesting that 
LSAIs may actually be capable of creating net employment if a specific combination of key 
determinants is in place. Although these results hint at large losses for individual farming 
operations, the overall impact on the population employed in agriculture at the national level 
is for our sample below 1.5 per cent and hence relatively small. 
To assess employment creation triggered by large-scale farms, it is essential to look into 
indirect effects, which typically occur in the medium- and long-term. Such effects are usually 
linkages to other sectors, but they also include price and wage effects on local markets. Price 
and wage effects foster growth of the non-agricultural sector, which can absorb the released 
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labour force with a certain time lag. New employment opportunities might also emerge 
through backward and forward linkages. However, these indirect effects cannot be directly 
attributed to the setting-up of large-scale farms and are hence difficult to empirically assess. 
The indirect employment creation would need to be empirically addressed in order to reveal 
the full employment potential of LSAIs. 
Another aspect that deserves further attention is the formalization of the labour market. 
While smallholder farming is, in most cases, informal employment, large-scale farms provide 
wage employment and usually pay taxes. This is linked to the quality of employment. Further 
research is required to assess the quality and decency of the employment opportunities 
created. In particular, to address the question of what extent the wage-employment 
opportunities created are able to compensate for the income lost by self-employed farmers. 
The employment effects of LSAIs depend on the specific project. Looking at the overall picture, 
mechanized largescale farming creates (gross) employment but is unable to absorb all the 
labour released from former income-generating activities, in particular smallholder farmers. 
This requires targeted policy responses in order to reach an inclusive and sustainable 
development process. We recommend three measures. First, it is essential to support 
alternative employment opportunities. Such measure might include creating employment in 
the service and processing industries as well as providing vocational training to released 
labourers in order to smooth their transition into alternative employment. Key to this is 
supporting local industries, for instance the processing industry. In this context, a social safety 
net is crucial to ensure a socially responsible transition. Second, our analysis showed that 
some LSAIs use more inclusive business models and hence increase the potential to include 
local communities in development processes. It is necessary to conduct further research on 
which business models are successful in including local communities and important that there 
is greater political support for such models. Third, in certain contexts, for instance in areas 
with high population densities and smallholder agriculture or pastoralism as key income 
generation strategies, LSAIs are likely to lead to massive employment destruction with little 
or no scope for mitigation. In these cases, governments are well advised not to lease or sell 
land without having well-elaborated active labour market policies and alternative 
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The world’s population is getting older, a phenomenon that has important implications for the 
future of work. Persons aged 55 years and over are expected to outnumber all children aged 
0 to 14 years by 2035 and the entire child and youth population aged 0 to 24 years by 2080. 
As a direct consequence of population ageing, the number of older workers aged 55 to 64 
years is increasing and is set to equal one quarter of the global labour force by 2030. 
This paper examines the projected labour force participation trends of older workers to 2030 
and discusses the future of economic dependency for developing, emerging and developed 
countries. It introduces five alternative measures of economic dependency to account for the 
fact that persons of working age may not be working or may be facing employment conditions 
that compromise their capacity to support themselves and others. Such conditions include 
scenarios where workers are unable to work as many hours as they would like, or where they 
are in situations of vulnerable employment or working poverty. These alternative measures 
therefore not only take into account demographic and quantitative labour market 
characteristics, such as age structure, activity status and unemployment, but also consider 
qualitative dimensions such as underemployment, labour income and vulnerability. 
Using a very rich ILO data set that provides a consistent series of labour market data for all 
countries with forecasts to 2024 and beyond, the paper provides estimates for these new 
dependency measures and makes a number of policy recommendations to address the impact 





The world’s population is getting older, a phenomenon that has important implications for the 
future of work. In 2014, persons aged 55 years and over outnumbered young persons aged 15 
to 24 years, and they are expected to outnumber all children aged 0 to 14 years by 2035 and 
the entire child and youth population aged 0 to 24 years by 2080 (UNDESA 2019b). In this 
context, it is important to analyse the ways in which future demographic shifts will impact the 
labour markets.  
First, smaller cohorts of young persons and larger groups of older persons will call for 
adjustments in the labour market, with consequences for the labour force participation of 
older women and men. With greater numbers of older workers in the labour force, workplaces 
will need to adapt in terms of occupational safety and health, working hours and work 
organization in order to enable the continuing participation of these workers in the labour 
market. Active ageing policies, including targeted retraining, reskilling and upskilling, will 
become necessary in order to retain the employability of older workers.  
Second, there will be an increased need for workers, services and industries to care for the 
elderly population. Large numbers of new jobs and enterprises will be created in sectors such 
as healthcare and long-term care (ILO 2018a), pharmaceuticals and housing adapted to the 
needs of older citizens. These new employment opportunities will require the acquisition of 
new skills, and these types of careers will need to be promoted.  
Third, the public debate places considerable attention on the impact that these demographic 
shifts will have on dependency rates, that is, the ratio of persons who are not of working age 
(0 to 14 years and 65 years and over) to that of the working-age population (15 to 64 years). 
These ratios are expected to rise in countries with ageing societies. As a result, a growing 
number of non-working-age persons will increasingly depend upon a shrinking number of 
persons of working age. This could slow down economic growth, generate lower tax revenues 
and threaten the financial sustainability of social protection systems. However, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that the standard age-based dependency measure does not adequately 
capture the situation. 
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This paper is structured as follows: the first chapter takes a closer look at global population 
ageing and the labour force participation trends of older workers,22 based on the projections 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). In the second chapter, alternative measurements of 
dependency are proposed that take into account the fact that many working-age persons 
either do not participate in the labour market or face employment conditions that 
compromise their economic independence. Such conditions include situations where workers 
are unable to support any dependants or do not contribute through taxes and wealth creation 
to the financing of education, healthcare and social protection. These alternative measures 
are disaggregated by sex and based on age-specific indicators of labour market activity and 
unemployment, as well as on qualitative components of employment, such as income, 
working hours and vulnerability. In a demographic context of an ageing labour force, these 
new measures indicate possible policy directions for avoiding unsustainable dependency 
rates, which would undermine economic and social development. The report concludes with 
a summary of our findings and specific policy options. 
4.2 Population ageing and labour force trends among older age cohorts 
As a population ages, so does the workforce. Globally, the share of older workers aged 55 to 
64 years in the total labour force has been increasing since 2000 and will continue to rise 
significantly until 2030. This trend will be particularly marked in emerging and developed 
countries, where it will reach 13.2 per cent and 17.7 per cent of the workforce respectively, 
compared to 7.9 per cent in developing countries (ILO 2019f). In total, between 2000 and 
2030, the share of older workers in the labour force will have increased by 2.5 per cent in 
developing nations, by 76 per cent in developed economies and by 80 per cent in emerging 
countries. 
We use the ILO 2019 Labour Force Estimates and Projections (LFEP) database to analyse 
ageing trends globally and by broad income groups23 and to assess their impact on labour 
force participation rates for women and men. 
                                                     
22 In this paper, older workers are defined as workers aged 55 years and over. 
23 The income groups utilized in this paper are based on the new ILO classification of countries by level of income, 
where the “developing countries” group corresponds to the World Bank low-income countries classification, the 
“emerging countries” group includes both lower- and upper-middle-income countries, and the “developed 
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4.2.1 The world is getting older: more than three quarters of countries will either 
be ageing or already aged by 2050 
The following figures show the projected proportion of the population aged 65 years and over 
in the total population at country level for the years 2020 (Figure 4.1 (a)), 2030 (Figure 4.1 (b)) 
and 2050 (Figure 4.1 (c)). Drawing from Oizumi et al. (2006), a country is categorized as an 
“aged” society when the share of persons aged 65 years and over reaches 14 per cent or more 
of the total population, as “ageing” when it accounts for between 7 and 14 per cent, and as 
“not aged” when it constitutes less than 7 per cent of the total. 
Figure 4.1. Global ageing status in 2020, 2030 and 2050: share of population aged 65 and over in total population 
(a) Global ageing status in 2020 (share of population aged 65 and over in total population) 
 
(b) Global ageing status in 2030 (share of population aged 65 and over in total population) 
 
                                                     
countries” group corresponds to high-income economies. See details of these income groupings in Appendix B, 
Table B 2. 
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(c) Global ageing status in 2050 (share of population aged 65 and over in total population) 
 
Source: calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospects 2019. 
In 2020, 54 countries are classified as aged societies, most of them developed countries (72 
per cent), while another 42 predominantly emerging countries (79 per cent) are deemed to 
be ageing. By 2030, 51 countries will be ageing and 67 will be aged; in 2050, the ageing 
phenomenon will have progressed further, with 36 ageing and 111 aged societies. As a result, 
the number of countries immediately concerned by population ageing will increase 
significantly from 96 in 2020 to 147 in 2050 – that is, more than three quarters of all countries 
and around 87 per cent of the global population. The 16 most aged countries will have very 
high shares of older persons, who will account for more than 30 per cent of the total 
population. Sub-Saharan Africa will be home to the world’s most youthful populations, since 
more than 85 per cent of the region’s countries will not have begun this demographic 
transition, while Europe and Central Asia will have the oldest populations, as almost 92 per 
cent of countries in the region will have aged (see Appendix B, Table B 1 for a detailed 
overview by region). 
The latest UNDESA (2019b) population projections to 2050 indicate that the global population 
will reach 9.7 billion, with major increases in emerging and developing countries (see Figure 
4.2). Overall, the numbers of women and men are about equal, although the female–male 
ratio is slightly smaller in emerging countries, with around 97 women per 100 men. At older 
ages, women outnumber men owing to their longer average life expectancy (UNDESA 2019a). 
However, the projected rise in life expectancy for men, which reflects improvements in 
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economic and health conditions, will rebalance this situation over time, especially in 
developed countries. 
Figure 4.2. Total population (in billions) and female/male ratio, 2000–50 
 
Source: calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospects 2019. 
The vast majority of persons aged 55 years and over will be located in emerging countries, 
where almost 1.9 billion persons will be over 55 years of age in 2050 (see Figure 4.3). However, 
the strongest increase in the over-55 population is expected to be seen in developing 
countries, where it will almost triple between 2020 and 2050 from a small base in absolute 
numbers. Over the same period, the over-55 age group will double in emerging countries and 
grow by a factor of 1.3 in developed countries. Compared to the total population, the share 
of the older cohort will be highest in developed economies (40 per cent), followed by 
emerging (28 per cent) and developing countries (14 per cent). 
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Figure 4.3. Population aged 55 years and over (in millions), by sex and income group, 2000–30 
 
Source: calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospects 2019. 
4.2.2 The proportion of older workers in the labour force is increasing worldwide 
As a direct consequence of the population ageing process, there will be a growing number of 
older workers in the future labour force. It is common practice to define older workers as the 
share of the labour force aged 55 years and above (Samorodov 1999). Current data and 
projections show increasing trends in these numbers (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4. Composition of the labour force (in billions) and share of older workers, by sex and income group, 2000–30 
 
Source: calculations based on ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
Indeed, the labour force aged 55 years and over will grow consistently, with the highest 
growth rate occurring between 2020 and 2030 in developing countries (40 per cent), followed 
by emerging (28 per cent) and developed countries (14 per cent). 
Emerging countries account for the highest absolute number of older workers: by 2030, some 
half a billion workers will be over the age of 55 years, accounting for around 18 per cent of 
the total labour force. 
Around one quarter of all workers in developed countries will be over 55 years of age in 2030, 
making this the group with the largest share of older workers in the total labour force globally. 
The picture is slightly different for developing countries, where both the absolute numbers 
and the shares of older workers remain modest but are projected to rise steadily over the 
coming years to reach 48.5 million, or 12 per cent of the labour force, by 2030. 
Although there are no major gender differences in the expected increase in the proportion of 
older workers in the total labour force, there is a considerable levelling effect between women 
and men. Despite women making up the majority of the total over-55 age group (see Figure 
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4.2), women’s participation in the labour force will continue to be lower than men’s. This trend 
holds true for developed and emerging countries alike. 
4.2.3 Trend reversal in older workers’ labour force participation rates across 
development level 
Breaking down the labour force participation rates (LFPRs) of older persons by age group 
reveals some interesting patterns. An early study of the LFPRs of older workers in 151 
countries concluded that “countries with high national income per capita tend to have lower 
participation rates for older men and women” (Clark and Anker 1990, 21). As shown in Figure 
4.5, this pattern seems to be changing. While LFPRs are decreasing in developing countries, 
they are strongly increasing in developed countries, where they will overtake the levels seen 
in developing countries by 2030. In emerging countries, these rates are only falling for the 65 
years and over cohort, remaining relatively stable for the other age groups. 
Figure 4.5. Labour force participation rate (in %) and gender gaps (percentage points), by income and age group, 2000–30 
 
Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The decrease in LFPRs in developing countries can be attributed to the advances made in 
terms of pension system coverage and other social transfer systems (ILO 2017b), which gives 
older workers greater choice in deciding whether to remain in the labour market. Even so, the 
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share of older workers in the labour force remains high in these countries: many work in the 
informal economy (ILO 2018c) and are not covered by any social protection benefits that 
would enable them to stop working while still receiving an income. 
The increase in LFPRs in developed countries can be explained by two main factors. First, 
several countries have raised the statutory retirement age in recent decades, a trend that is 
likely to continue (OECD 2017). This translates almost automatically into a longer working life 
(Vogel, Ludwig, and Börsch-Supan 2017). Second, the implementation of employment policies 
that promote active ageing, foster the retention and recruitment of older workers by 
enterprises, and address age discrimination has succeeded in keeping more workers aged 55 
years and over in the labour market. 
Gender gaps in labour force participation rates are high across all levels of development, 
reflecting the persistence of occupational and sectoral gender segregation and the uneven 
distribution of unpaid household and care work, even at older ages (ILO 2016a). 
In developing countries, the gender gap in labour force participation lingers at around 20 
percentage points across all age categories. Emerging economies reveal the highest gaps in 
LFPRs for workers aged 55 to 59 years (around 38 percentage points) and 60 to 64 years 
(around 30 percentage points). The gap is expected to decrease for workers aged 60 years and 
over but will remain high for those aged 55 to 59 years. 
In developed countries, equal access to education, anti-discrimination laws and activation 
policies, such as the provision of childcare and maternity benefits, have enabled and 
encouraged women to participate in the labour market. The consequent narrowing of the gap 
in LFPRs is most significant for the 55 to 59 years age group, where it is expected to drop by 
12 percentage points by 2030, compared to a projected decrease of five percentage points for 
the 60 to 64 years cohort. However, the gap is expected to increase slightly for workers aged 
65 years and over. 
4.3 Alternative economic dependency measures based on employment and 
decent work 
Age dependency ratios provide information about how the demographic structure of a 
country impacts the proportion of non-working and working persons. In this definition of 
dependency, dependents are all persons under the age of 15 years or over the age of 64 years, 
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while the working-age population comprises persons aged 15 to 64 years (Notestein et al. 
1944; cited in Sanderson and Scherbov 2015, 691). Those who work are assumed to contribute 
to the financing of public services, such as education, health and pensions, through taxes and 
social security contributions. Those who do not work or who no longer work still make a 
contribution to the public financing system – through indirect taxes, for example – but are 
thought largely to benefit from the contributions made by the working population. Several 
variations of the age dependency ratio exist, such as the adult dependency ratio, which takes 
prolonged working lives into account by removing the upper threshold and hence defining 
dependency as the proportion of inactive persons (aged 0 to 14 years) compared to active 
persons (aged 15 years and over) in the population (Bussolo, Koettl, and Sinnott 2015). 
The problem is that these standard age dependency ratios disregard the fact that not all 
persons aged 15 to 64 years actually work. Some may still be in education; others may already 
have retired; and still others may be unemployed or may have chosen not to work for various 
reasons, such as those who may have become discouraged after unsuccessfully looking for 
work over a long period of time. Moreover, some children below the age of 15 years and some 
older persons over the age of 64 years may be part of the labour force, while many persons 
of working age may not. To address these limitations, alternative measurements have been 
developed, such as the economic dependency ratio (Wöss and Türk 2011), the labour-market-
adjusted dependency ratio (Zuleeg 2007; Guerzoni and Zuleeg 2011) and the employment-
based dependency ratio (Loichinger et al. 2014). These divide the number of potentially 
dependent persons – such as the unemployed, pensioners (old-age, early retirement, 
disability), homemakers and discouraged persons – by the number of persons in paid 
employment (Eurofound 2012a). 
While these alternative measurements of dependency provide a more accurate picture of the 
relationship between the economically active and inactive populations in quantitative terms, 
they still ignore important factors related to job quality – productivity and income levels, for 
instance – that determine whether a person can actually support dependants. In other words, 
economic dependency not only depends on the effective employment of the working-age 
population, but also on the quality of this employment and its contributive capacity. Informal 
employment that does not contribute to social security, and working poverty or subsistence 
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self-employment that provide very low incomes and do not generate tax revenues, should not 
be considered as work that reduces the dependency burden. 
In this paper, we present five new measures of employment-related dependency that not only 
take into account the demographic structure of the population, but also consider differences 
in the age and gender-specific characteristics of the labour market. Our measures include 
quantitative (activity status and unemployment) and qualitative (labour income, working 
hours and vulnerability) labour market dimensions. In combination with the standard age-
based dependency ratio, these alternative dependency ratios allow us to analyse the causes 
of dependency in greater detail. A critical evaluation of each measure demonstrates that there 
is no single indicator which can fully capture all dimensions of economic dependency. Each 
proposed indicator has advantages over the others but also some limitations. They are 
therefore meant to provide researchers and policy makers with a set of measures, which allow 
for deeper analyses that provide insights into the most relevant policy areas for offsetting the 
effect of ageing on economic dependency in different contexts. 
We use the ILO Labour Force Estimates and Projections (LFEP) database (July 2019 version), 
which provides a consistent series of labour market indicators for all United Nations’ Member 
States, with forecasts to 2030.24 These indicators can be disaggregated by age and sex to 
provide additional information on the characteristics of dependents and non-dependents. It 
also allows us to present results based on the broad income groups of developing, emerging 
and developed economies. 
In line with the work of Loichinger et al. (2014) and Loichinger and Skirbekk (2016), this global 
analysis of demographic, economic and employment-based dependency ratios reveals the 
importance of age- and gender-specific employment levels, as well as their determinants, 
when discussing the challenges associated with population ageing. In this way, the 
consequences of high youth unemployment, low female labour force participation, old-age 
poverty, significant vulnerable employment and the high incidence of working poverty are 
highlighted and provide the basis for policy recommendations aimed at alleviating the 
economic burden of population ageing. 
                                                     
24 See ILO (2017a) for details of the LFEP database and the methodology applied. 
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4.3.1 The demographic dependency ratio 
The demographic dependency ratio is the most commonly used measure of dependency. The 
young-age dependency ratio reveals the number of persons below the age of 15 years 
compared to those aged 15 to 64 years, while the old-age dependency ratio shows the 
proportion of persons aged over 64 years relative to those aged 15 to 64 years. The sum of 
both ratios is the total demographic dependency ratio (DDR). 
𝐷𝐷𝑅 =




working-age population is the number of persons aged 15 to 64 years; 
non-working-age population is the number of persons aged 0 to 14 years and those 
aged 65 years and over. 
This ratio assumes that children and the elderly are economically dependent upon persons 
aged 15 to 64 years. As the ratio increases, there may be an increased burden on the 
population in the labour force in order to maintain the upbringing and pensions of 
economically dependent persons. 
In developing countries, the total demographic dependency ratio decreased from 0.93 in 1991 
to 0.81 in 2020 and is expected to further decrease to 0.72 by 2030 (see Figure 4.6). This is 
due to a significant reduction in the child dependency ratio, although the old-age dependency 
ratio has been increasing slightly over time. 
In emerging countries, the total demographic dependency ratio decreased by one quarter 
from 0.66 in 1991 to 0.50 in 2015 owing to a decline in the share of children in the total 
population. Since 2015, the ratio has remained stable and is expected to stay that way to 2030 
due to a growing older population, which will offset the decrease in child dependency. 
Developed countries experienced a slight decrease in the total dependency ratio – from 0.50 
in 1990 to 0.49 in 2010 – largely driven by a shrinking younger population. Since 2010, the 
total ratio has started to rise again and is poised to grow by one quarter to the year 2030. This 
increase can be almost entirely explained by a rapidly ageing society, with the further 
shrinking of the child dependency ratio playing a minor role. 
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Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The DDR provides a good starting point for forecasting and discussing dependency burdens, 
especially in the context of shrinking youth and growing older populations worldwide. Its 
calculation is straightforward and requires only basic demographic information (i.e. age and 
sex) to be available for almost all countries. Moreover, the composition of the population 
changes slowly. This indicator therefore allows for accurate short- and medium-term 
projections of the data, especially with regard to the population aged 15 years and over. 
However, there is no universal definition of the working-age population. The age thresholds 
usually correspond to societal standards for education and work eligibility and are anchored 
in national legislation. In order to enable international comparability, the ILO usually defines 
the working-age population as all persons aged 15 years and older. Furthermore, the 
demographic dependency ratio ignores the actual economic behaviour of persons aged 
between 15 and 64 years, such as age of entry to and exit from the labour market, 
employment status, and level of labour income. Instead, this ratio simply assumes fixed age 




4.3.2 Dependency measures based on employment 
4.3.2.1 Activity-based dependency ratio 
The first alternative measure of dependency is based on the economic activity status of the 
working-age population. Not everyone of working age is part of the labour force (i.e. working 
or available and seeking work) for a variety of reasons: young people may still be in school; 
adults may have taken early retirement or have chosen to stay at home due to care 
responsibilities, such as childcare or elderly care; while others may not work for reasons of 
disability or long-term illness, or because they simply do not wish to work.25  
This alternative dependency measure, called the activity-based dependency ratio (ABDR), 
restricts the “universe” of persons that support dependents to those that are in the labour 
force, namely all employed and unemployed persons, thus excluding those persons of working 
age who are not covered by these two statuses. As a result, the dependent population for the 
ABDR consists of: (a) children below the age of 15 years, (b) persons aged 15 to 64 years who 
are outside the labour force, and (c) older persons aged 65 years and over. 
𝐴𝐵𝐷𝑅 =




non-working-age is the number of persons aged under 15 years or over 64 years; 
outside the labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is not engaged in 
the labour force, i.e. neither employed (in paid employment or in self-employment) 
nor unemployed; 
labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is engaged in the labour force, 
i.e. either employed or unemployed. 
We divide the ratio into six sub-ratios based on the characteristics of the inactive population: 
a child dependency ratio (under 15 years of age); a sex-disaggregated dependency ratio for 
the youth population (aged 15 to 24 years) outside the labour force; a dependency ratio for 
                                                     
25 This also includes persons outside the labour force who may be involved in forms of work other than paid 
employment (e.g. own-use production work, volunteer work and unpaid traineeships), and therefore contribute 
to national production and to households’ livelihoods and well-being. 
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the adult population (aged 25 to 64 years) outside the labour force, for both women and men; 
and an elderly dependency ratio (aged 65 years and over). This breakdown allows us to gain a 
more detailed picture of those working-age persons who are outside the labour market and 
are therefore likely to be dependent upon the support provided by those who are in the labour 
force. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the activity-based dependency ratio (ABDR) is much higher than the 
total demographic dependency ratio (DDR) for all three income groups. When all those who 
are outside the labour market are included, economic dependency doubles on average in 
developing and developed countries – by a factor of 1.9 and 2.0 respectively – and increases 
by a factor of 2.7 in emerging countries in 2020. This strong divergence between the two 
measures highlights the inaccuracy of the DDR as an indicator of economic dependency. 
The ABDR is highest in developing countries (see Figure 4.7). It remained stable between 1991 
(1.56) and the early 2000s (1.55), at which point it started to fall, with the exception of a slight 
peak in 2010, probably in the aftermath of the 2007–08 global financial crisis. The ABDR for 
developing countries is expected to reach 1.41 in 2030. The main determinant of the ABDR in 
these countries remains the very high child dependency rate, which has been decreasing since 
1991. The elderly dependency ratio is small: many of the countries in this group have not yet 
entered the ageing phase and will only do so in around 2030 (see section 4.2). The other sub-
ratios – youth and adults outside the labour force, disaggregated by sex – are also relatively 
small, illustrating the fact that, in the absence of any form of social protection, all those who 
are capable of working can and do undertake some form of economic activity. When it comes 
to gender, it is interesting to note that the share of adult women outside the labour force is 
on average three times higher than that of men. This could reflect the uneven distribution of 
household and care responsibilities between women and men, including at younger ages. 
The ABDR in emerging countries fell from 1.36 in 1991 to 1.27 in 2005, mainly because of the 
sharp decrease in the child dependency ratio. However, it has been increasing ever since and 
is projected to reach 1.40 in 2030, just above the 1991 rate. While the increasing elderly 
dependency ratio is certainly the strongest driver of this change, the share of persons outside 
the labour market is also on a clear upward trend. This trend is most pronounced for adult 
women who are more likely than adult men to be outside the labour force. 
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Although the ABDRs in emerging and developing countries are expected to converge by 2030, 
the ABDR in emerging countries tends to be slightly lower than in developing countries 
because of a considerably lower child dependency ratio. At the same time, this effect is partly 
offset by higher income levels and better social protection systems, which enable people to 
remain outside the labour market if they so wish. 
In developed economies, the ABDR decreased from 1.14 in 1991 to 1.08 in 2010 and started 
rising again as of 2015 to reach 1.18 in 2030 – slightly higher than the level in 1991. While child 
dependency is declining, the elderly dependency rate has increased sharply since the 1990s, 
overtaking the child dependency ratio around the year 2015. The proportion of women 
outside the labour force has been decreasing significantly since 1991, a trend that is expected 
to continue, albeit at a slower pace. While this increase in the women’s activity rate partly 
explains the fall in the ABDR, it is not sufficient to counterbalance the sharp rise in the elderly 
dependency ratio. 





Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The ABDR provides a finer measure of economic dependency than the demographic 
dependency ratio. By factoring in the effective labour market participation of working-age 
persons, disaggregated by sex and age group, it provides analysts and policymakers with more 
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detailed information about how labour market participation levels influence dependency 
rates. 
Since it is based on basic demographic and labour market information, data is available for a 
large number of countries and enables cross-country comparisons to be made. However, the 
simplicity of the data requirements, and in particular the binary nature of either being inside 
or outside the labour force, comes at a price: the ABDR does not provide any indication of the 
quality of employment for those persons who are in the labour force or any rationale as to 
why other persons are outside the labour force. Furthermore, it counts unemployed persons 
as non-dependents, which is misleading. Even assuming the existence of effective social 
security systems, such as unemployment benefits, unemployed persons are receiving 
transfers from other groups in society. And where such systems do not exist, even when 
unemployed persons draw on personal savings, they usually still depend on family members 
for their basic needs. 
4.3.2.2 Employment-based dependency ratio 
Our second employment-based alternative measure of dependency includes unemployed 
persons as dependents, in addition to persons outside the labour force. It thus assumes that 
those who are unemployed benefit from transfers from those who are employed. Such 
transfers can either be direct – through intrahousehold reallocations, for example – or 
indirect, such as through social security or public redistribution schemes. The denominator of 
the employment-based dependency ratio (EBDR) is limited to the employed population, while 
the numerator, or the dependent population, consists of: (a) children below the age of 15 
years, (b) persons aged 15 to 64 years who are outside the labour force, (c) all unemployed 
persons aged 15 years and over, and (d) older persons aged 65 years and over. 
𝐸𝐵𝐷𝑅 =




non-working-age is the number of persons aged under 15 years or over 64 years; 
outside the labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is not engaged in 
the labour force; 
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unemployed is all persons aged 15 years and over26 who are seeking and are available 
to start working for pay or profit in specified reference periods; 
total employed is all persons aged 15 to 64 years who are in work, either in paid 
employment or in self-employment. 
We divide this ratio into eight sub-ratios based on the characteristics of the inactive 
population and the unemployed: a child dependency ratio; a sex-disaggregated dependency 
ratio for the youth population (aged 15 to 24 years) outside the labour force; a dependency 
ratio for the adult population (aged 25 to 64 years) outside the labour force, for both women 
and men; an unemployed ratio, also for women and men; and an elderly dependency ratio. 
This enables us to see the proportion of employed persons that is providing support to the 
other cohorts. 
As Table 4.1 shows, the employment-based dependency ratio (EBDR) is higher than the 
activity-based dependency ratio (ABDR), although the difference is small. This is mainly a 
reflection of relatively low shares of unemployed persons compared to persons outside the 
labour market, especially in emerging and developed countries. 
In developing countries, the EBDR remained stable at around 1.6 until 2015, when it started 
to decrease and is expected to fall to 1.52 in 2024 (see Figure 4.8). The demographic 
component (child dependency and elderly dependency) clearly drives the dependency ratio, 
especially the child component. The addition of unemployed persons to the group of potential 
dependents plays only a minor role. 
In emerging countries, the EBDR decreased from 1.43 in 1991 to 1.37 in 2010. It has been 
increasing ever since and is expected to reach 1.45 in 2024. The demographic component is 
behind this trend: there has been a strong decline in the child dependency ratio throughout 
the entire period and a marked increase in the elderly dependency ratio since 2005. Hence, 
                                                     
26 It should be noted that the ILO does not apply an upper-age threshold to its unemployment statistics. 
Therefore, persons aged 65 and over could be counted in both the non-working-age and the unemployed 
population groups. This could introduce an upwards bias and lead to an overestimation of the EBDR. However, 
this bias is thought to be rather small, since national legal retirement ages are projected to remain at around 65 
years of age (see OECD 2017, for instance). 
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ageing is and will continue to be an important determinant of dependency in these countries. 
Unemployment also plays a more pronounced role in this group of countries. 
In developed countries, the EBDR has been fluctuating at around 1.22, reaching a low of 1.13 
in around 2020. The latest projections suggest a slight tendency upward between now and 
2024. The demographic component accounts for some three quarters of the dependency 
ratio, with the elderly component increasingly gaining in significance. Unemployment 
constitutes the smallest contributing factor. 















Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The EBDR offers valuable insights into the composition and distribution of potential 
dependents. From a conceptual point of view, it makes sense to include unemployed persons 
in the group of dependents. In addition to the problems discussed in relation to the ABDR in 
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the previous section, however, the EBDR suffers from a major shortcoming in the data: both 
the employment and unemployment rates are influenced by a large variety of factors that 
make it difficult to predict trends accurately, especially for the more distant future.27 While 
the explanatory power of the EBDR decreases for distant future predictions, it may still be an 
adequate indicator for policymakers to assess labour market needs in the nearer future. 
Nevertheless, the EBDR does not give any indication of the job quality of those in employment 
and assumes them to be non-dependents. 
                                                     
27 See ILO (2019e Appendix B) for more information on the ILO Labour Force Estimates and Projections. 
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Table 4.1. Comparison of demographic-, activity-, and employment-based dependency ratios, by income groups, 2000-
2030 
 
Notes: DDR: demographic dependency ratio; ABDR: Activity-based dependency ratio; EBDR: Employment-based 
dependency ratio. Projections of employment and unemployment figures based on econometric models are only 
available to the year 2024. As a result, estimates for the EBDR are not included for all years. 
Interpretation: A ratio of 1.5 of the EBDR, for instance, can be interpreted as meaning that 15 persons not in 
employment (i.e. children below the age of 15 years, persons aged 15 to 64 years outside the labour force, 
unemployed persons aged 15 years and over, and older people aged 65 years and over) are thought to be 
economically dependent upon 10 persons in employment. 
Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
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4.3.3 Dependency measures based on productive employment 
In the following section, we are introducing three indicators based on the notions of full-
potential and productive employment. Full-potential employment reflects the ability of an 
economy to utilize the available human resources to the full extent. Productive employment 
is defined as “employment yielding sufficient returns to labour to permit the worker and 
her/his dependents a level of consumption above the poverty line” (ILO 2012). 
4.3.3.1 Labour underutilization as a proxy for non-productive employment 
Even when workers are in employment, they may find themselves in a situation where they 
wish to work more paid hours; that is, they are time-related underemployed. The income 
generated by such involuntary part-time employment may not be sufficient to cover basic 
needs and may be a cause of in-work poverty (Warren 2015; McBride, Smith, and Mbala 2018). 
Alongside the unemployed and the inactive populations, persons in time-related 
underemployment form the underutilized labour force group. If we define productive 
employment as employment that generates an income sufficient to keep workers and their 
families above the poverty line, then we can use the labour underutilization indicator as a 
proxy for non-productive employment. 
This alternative dependency measure can therefore be defined as the labour underutilization 
dependency ratio (LUDR), where the denominator is those persons who are fully employed – 
all employed persons who are not in time-related underemployment – and the numerator 
comprises the following dependents: (a) children below the age of 15 years, (b) persons aged 
15 to 64 years who are outside the labour force, (c) all unemployed persons aged 15 years and 
over, (d) older persons aged 65 years and over, and (e) time-related underemployed persons 
aged 15 years and over. 
𝐿𝑈𝐷𝑅
=
𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 + 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 + 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑




non-working-age is the number of persons aged under 15 years or over 64 years; 
outside the labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is not engaged in 
the labour force; 
98 
 
unemployed is all persons aged 15 years and over who are seeking and are available to 
start working for pay or profit in specified reference periods; 
underemployed is all persons in employment who want to work additional hours, 
whose working time in all their jobs is below a specified threshold of hours and who 
are available to work additional hours if they are given the opportunity to do so; 
full-potential employment is the total number of employed persons minus the 
underemployed. 
The breakdown of the LUDR follows the same metrics as the EBDR but includes involuntarily 
underemployed women and men. As expected, this increases the dependency ratio across all 
income levels (see Table 4.2), most notably in developing countries, where it is on average 25 
per cent higher than the EBDR. This reflects the reality of many workers in developing 
countries who cannot afford to be without employment and hence accept any kind of work, 
often with piece-rate or daily contracts. 
The LUDR in developing countries is projected to decrease from 2.0 in 2015 to 1.9 in 2024 (see 
Figure 4.9). The contribution of the time-related underemployed to the overall dependency 
ratio remains stable at levels that are much higher than for unemployment. Thus, 
underemployment is a more relevant indicator of dependency than unemployment in 
developing countries. 
The LUDR in emerging countries is increasing and is expected to reach 1.56 in 2024. This 
increase is largely being driven by population ageing, while the underemployment share is 
shrinking. Men seem to be more affected by time-related underemployment than women. 
The LUDR is lowest in developed countries, where it is trending upward and is projected to 
reach 1.23 in 2024. Women are on average a third more likely to be in involuntary part-time 
employment than men. 
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Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
While unemployment and inactivity indicate a lack of available jobs, time-related 
underemployment suggests a lack of available paid hours. The LUDR therefore sheds more 
light on the supply side of the labour market and demonstrates the untapped opportunities 
of the potential labour force, especially regarding women and youth not in employment, 
education or training (NEET). In terms of data, this measure shares the same limitations as the 
EBDR but is further constrained when it comes to historical data points. 
The assumption that involuntary part-time workers are essentially dependents may not hold 
true in all cases. Nevertheless, time-related underemployment is a common feature of in-work 
poverty. The LUDR unites three key dimensions of labour force underutilization, and the 
breakdown and disaggregation by age and sex provides valuable information to enable 
policymakers to formulate targeted responses. Yet, labour underutilization is an imperfect 
proxy for unproductive employment. It doesn’t capture the fact that workers can be employed 
full-time, but earn too little to keep themselves and their families above the poverty line. The 
working poverty rate as well as the rate of vulnerable employment therefore provide 
additional insights that may be useful to inform policy-making. 
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4.3.3.2 Working poverty as a proxy for non-productive employment 
Not all of those who work are productively employed. Some workers in paid employment or 
self-employment may not earn enough to lift themselves and their families above the poverty 
line. In this case, they can be considered as being economically dependent, meaning that they 
rely on social or family transfers to live a decent life and cannot support others through their 
earned income. We define this type of dependency as the working poverty-based dependency 
ratio (WPDR), with the dependent population consisting of: (a) children below the age of 15 
years, (b) persons aged 15 to 64 years who are outside the labour force, (c) all unemployed 
persons aged 15 years and over, (d) older persons aged 65 years and over, and (e) the working 
poor aged 15 years and over. 
𝑊𝑃𝐷𝑅
=





non-working-age is the number of persons aged under 15 years or over 64 years; 
outside the labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is not engaged in 
the labour force; 
unemployed is all persons aged 15 years and over who are seeking and are available to 
start working for pay or profit in specified reference periods; 
working poor is the number of employed persons aged 15 years and over living in 
households with incomes below the international poverty line of US$1.90 per day in 
purchasing power parity (PPP); 
productively employed is the total number of employed persons minus the working 
poor. 
When adding the working poor to the dependency measure, the dependency ratio increases 
substantially in developing and emerging economies compared to previous measures (see 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.10). The largest increase is seen in developing countries, where the 
WPDR is estimated at 2.84 in 2024. Despite the fact that the WPDR has decreased considerably 
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since the year 2000, when it was 5.76, it is on average about 2.7 times higher than the EBDR, 
which only considers persons outside the labour force and the unemployed as dependents. 
In emerging countries, the convergence of the EBDR and the WPDR is much more pronounced, 
although the WPDR is still some 15 per cent higher. This means that the number of working 
poor has decreased in this group of countries28 – mostly in China and India – and, 
consequently, so has its weight on the dependency measure. In emerging countries, the 
contribution of the child dependency ratio and the share of young and adult women outside 
the labour market are currently much higher than those of poverty and unemployment. 
Since the working poverty rate, which is based on the international poverty line of US$1.90 
per day in purchasing power parity (PPP), tends to be zero in developed countries, the 
estimates for WPDR are practically identical to those for the EBDR. 
Figure 4.10. Working poverty-based dependency ratio (WPDR), by income group, 2000–24 
 
                                                     





Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
In developing countries, children will continue to contribute more than 50 per cent to the 
overall dependency rates, while the contribution of older persons remains relatively low at 
around 4.1 per cent (see Figure 4.11). The share of the working poor will continue to decrease; 
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however, persons outside the labour force combined with the unemployed exceeded the 
share of the working poor in 2015 and will continue to gain in significance. 
The picture is very different in emerging economies, where the contribution of older persons 
is strongly increasing, while the share of children is slowly declining. The weight of working 
poverty in total dependency rates has sharply decreased and, although its pace of reduction 
has slowed since 2015, it is the least important contributor to the overall dependency ratio 
since that year. At the same time, the contribution of persons outside the labour market and 
the unemployed, which had been equal to that of working poverty in the early 2000s, has risen 
sharply, to the extent that it overtook the child dependency ratio in 2016. 





Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The working poverty-based dependency ratio adds an important element to the discussion on 
economic dependency by including a group that is very likely in need of support: workers who 
cannot lift themselves and their dependants above the poverty line. 
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Although internationally comparable data is only available from the year 2000 onwards and 
predictions are limited to the near future, an intertemporal and cross-country analysis can be 
carried out for around 73 per cent of countries. However, the WPDR suffers from additional 
limitations similar to those discussed for the EBDR, especially with respect to the working 
poverty rate, which is a product of the poverty and employment rate. The working poverty 
rate is based on the headcount index, which does not take intrahousehold inequality or depth 
of poverty into account. Moreover, different approaches (microeconomic versus 
macroeconomic) are applied for the calculation, reflecting different data availability and 
risking compromise of cross-country comparisons (see ILO (2019b) and section 2.3). However, 
the working poverty-based dependency ratio adds a valuable indication of employment 
quality and is a proxy for a measure of dependency that relates to (un)productive 
employment. 
The analysis shows that having a job is no guarantee of decent living conditions. Too many 
workers – especially women and youth – do not earn enough to lift themselves and their 
family members above the poverty threshold. Targeted policies are needed to further 
accelerate the progress made over recent decades. This includes ensuring adequate earnings, 
sufficient working hours, a certain level of job security and access to social protection. 
4.3.3.3 Vulnerable employment as a proxy for non-productive employment 
Another way to capture work that may not be sufficiently productive to enable those 
performing it to support their dependents is to take account of vulnerable employment. 
According to the ILO definition, vulnerable employment includes contributing family workers 
and own-account workers. In the context of developing countries, own-account workers are 
for the most part engaged in petty trading or farming for own-consumption, mostly in the 
informal economy. This is very different from self-employed workers in high value-added 
services, such as doctors and freelance IT specialists. In developed countries, own-account 
workers would ideally capture all self-employed persons who are performing task-based work 
(including on digital labour platforms), subcontracting to larger firms without an established 
employment relationship, or engaging in casual work; in other words, workers who are in non-
standard and precarious forms of employment (ILO 2016b). However, vulnerable employment 
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so defined does not capture all those in precarious wage employment and involuntary part-
time wage employment.29  
The vulnerable employment dependency ratio (VEDR) integrates vulnerable workers as 
dependents and comprises: (a) children below the age of 15 years, (b) persons aged 15 to 64 
years who are outside the labour force, (c) all unemployed persons aged 15 years and over, 
(d) older persons aged 65 years and over, and (e) vulnerable workers. 
𝑉𝐸𝐷𝑅
=





non-working-age is the number of persons aged under 15 years or over 64 years; 
outside the labour force is the population aged 15 to 64 years that is not engaged in 
the labour force; 
unemployed is all persons aged 15 years or older who are seeking and are available to 
start working for pay or profit in specified reference periods; 
vulnerable employment is the sum of own-account workers (also known as self-
employed workers without employees) and contributing family workers (also known 
as unpaid family workers); 
non-vulnerable employment is the total number of persons in employment minus 
those in vulnerable employment. 
As shown in Table 4.2, dependency increases significantly across all income groups when 
vulnerable employment is taken into account. In developing countries, the VEDR rises sharply 
by a factor of 8.5 compared to the EBDR and is predicted to reach 11.40 in 2024. This means 
that each non-vulnerable worker needs to provide support for more than 11 dependents. The 
total ratio has been decreasing constantly since 1991 (when it was 16.94, see Figure 4.12); 
                                                     
29 Loichinger and Skirbekk (2016) calculate an alternative dependency ratio for European Union countries that is 
based on actual number of hours worked. This measure is very relevant but difficult to compute and less relevant 
for developing countries, where this data is not available and where wage employment is often less than 20 per 
cent of total employment. 
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accordingly, the sub-ratio of vulnerable employment dependency will have more than halved 
by 2024. While men are more often engaged as own-account workers, women are more than 
twice as likely to work as contributing family members. 
In emerging countries, the overall dependency ratio is considerably smaller than in developing 
countries. It will decrease from 5.36 in 1991 to 3.73 in 2024, mainly due to a shrinking child 
dependency ratio, although the share of vulnerable employment also fell by around three 
quarters. Nevertheless, the VEDR is on average three times higher than the EBDR. As with 
developing countries, men are disproportionally represented among own-account workers 
and women among contributing family members. The shares of both activities were shrinking 
for women and men until 2015 and have been stagnating ever since. 
In developed countries, the increase compared to the EBDR is much smaller, since 
comparatively fewer workers are engaged as own-account workers or contributing family 
members. The VEDR is on average 1.2 times higher than the EBDR. While the total VEDR has 
been decreasing over time, it is projected to rise again and reach 1.37 in 2024 as a result of 
population ageing. The distribution of vulnerable employment follows the same gender 
pattern as for developing and emerging countries, although the discrepancy between women 
and men is the highest for contributing family members. 
109 
 






Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
In developing countries, the vulnerable workers component of the total dependency ratio 
(34.4 per cent in 2024) is greater than that of persons outside the labour force and the 
unemployed (19 per cent in 2024) (see Figure 4.13). Clearly, many people have no other choice 
than to engage in non-productive work owing to a lack of more decent employment 
opportunities combined with a lack of social protection. Although the total VEDR is decreasing 
over time, the share of vulnerability in the total dependency ratio is at a persistently high level. 
The proportions of children and older persons remain the same as in the WPDR. 
In emerging countries, persons outside the labour force and the unemployed account for one 
third, and those in vulnerable employment for one quarter, of the VEDR in 2024. The trend 
indicates a decreasing share of vulnerable employment and a strongly increasing share of 
persons outside the labour force and the unemployed between 1991 and 2024. The turning 
point came in 2010, when the latter cohort became the most important component of the 
VEDR. 
In developed countries, the contribution of older persons increased significantly, surpassing 
that of children in 2015. The contribution of persons outside the labour force and the 
unemployed to the overall dependency rate remained at a fairly constant and high level 
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(around 37 per cent) until 2010, when it began falling. Nevertheless, it is still the most 
important factor of the VEDR, although the elderly dependency ratio is expected to draw level 
by 2024. The share of vulnerable employment has always been relatively low and has been 
slowly decreasing from 0.14 in 1991 to 0.09 in 2024. 





Source: calculations based on the ILO LFEP database, July 2019 update. 
The VEDR benefits from excellent data availability both in terms of country coverage and time 
dimension, although projections are limited to the near future. However, the concept of 
vulnerability is based on strong assumptions which call into question the specificity and 
relevance of the indicator. First, own-account workers and contributing family members form 
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a very diverse group, ranging from subsistence farmers to productive and profitable 
enterprises. At the same time, many wage workers are in precarious employment – 
characterized by low levels of pay and employment protection, and by limitations on their 
freedom of association and collective bargaining – but are not captured by this indicator. The 
assumption that own-account workers and contributing family members are intrinsically more 
vulnerable than other persons is as questionable as the assumption that wage workers would 
by definition be less vulnerable. Thus, vulnerable employment could be more accurately 
defined on the basis of employment conditions rather than employment status (see section 
2.3), which would then also allow vulnerable employees to be included. 
Nevertheless, own-account workers and contributing family members represent a large part 
of the workforce – especially in developing and emerging economies – with the vast majority 
of these workers (85 per cent) engaged in the informal economy, which is often characterized 
by a lack of income security, access to labour rights and social protection (ILO 2018c). The 
vulnerable employment dependency ratio therefore adds another important dimension to 
dependency by including workers who are thought to be more vulnerable and hence more 
likely to be in need of support. 
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Table 4.2. Comparison of different dependency ratios, by income group, 2000–30 
 
Notes: DDR: demographic dependency ratio; ABDR: Activity-based dependency ratio; EBDR: Employment-based 
dependency ratio; LUDR: Labour underutilization dependency ratio; WPDR: Working poverty-based dependency 
ratio; VEDR: Vulnerable employment dependency ratio. Projections of employment and unemployment figures 
based on econometric models are only available to the year 2024. Similarly, projections of time-related 
underemployment are only available from 2005. As a result, estimates for the EBDR, LUDR, WPDR and VEDR are 
not included for all years. 





The proportion of persons aged 55 years and over in the total population is set to increase 
significantly in all regions of the world over the coming decades. By 2050, more than three 
quarters of countries will either be ageing or already aged societies. As a direct consequence, 
the workforce will be ageing too. The number of workers aged 55 to 64 years will increase to 
represent between 12 per cent and 25 per cent of the total labour force by 2030. What are 
the implications for the labour market? Will all these persons work, whether by choice or 
necessity? If they do, what conditions will they face? 
This paper shows that, according to the latest forecasts, labour force participation rates 
(LFPRs) for persons aged 55 years and over differ across income levels. In developing 
countries, the progress made in terms of pension system coverage and other social transfers 
is giving older workers greater choice in deciding whether to remain in the labour market. 
Consequently, LFPRs in developing countries are decreasing significantly. In emerging 
countries, LFPRs are generally lower than in developing countries and are decreasing for 
persons aged 65 years or over. The situation is different in developed countries, where social 
protection systems are well developed, but where an ageing population is driving pension 
system reforms and active ageing policies that increase the labour force participation rates of 
older workers. 
The gender gap in labour market participation is highest in emerging countries. As a result of 
targeted policies, it is slowly diminishing with age across all income levels, with the exception 
of workers aged 65 years or over in developed economies. Despite the progress that has been 
made, gaps remain that require decisive action in order to ensure equal opportunities in the 
labour market. 
Clearly, ageing is impacting the labour market the world over. In countries that have already 
aged or are ageing rapidly – mostly developed economies – the contributions of workers to 
pension schemes are needed in order to cater for a growing group of retirees. In the light of a 
shrinking workforce at the lower age band, more women and men will have to work until, and 
most likely beyond, the age of 64 years. In countries that are still to enter their full 
demographic transition, providing decent employment to the young and adult labour force is 
a precondition for ensuring access to social protection by older workers and to education by 
large cohorts of children. These are issues that are commonly referred to in the literature as 
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economic dependencies. Although these are useful indicators, their explanatory powers in 
terms of the functioning of the labour market are seriously limited. This paper therefore 
introduces an additional concept related to decent employment. If those who work are not 
productively employed – that is, engaged in an activity that provides them and their household 
with an income sufficient to be free from poverty – then they cannot contribute effectively to 
the education and retirement of others. 
This paper therefore proposes a set of employment-based dependency ratios that realistically 
reflect the capacity of persons who work to support those who do not, based on different 
proxies for non-productive employment. Three main proxies are used: (i) the labour 
underutilization rate, (ii) the working poverty rate, and (iii) the vulnerable employment rate. 
These new employment-based dependency ratios are useful measures for probing into the 
causes of dependency and informing employment policy choices. They have different 
strengths and can therefore be used selectively for different country contexts, allowing policy 
makers to formulate better targeted and country specific policies. It has been possible to 
calculate them thanks to a very rich data set produced by the ILO that provides a consistent 
series of labour market data for all countries with forecasts to 2024 and beyond. The analysis 
shows the importance of age- and gender-specific employment levels and employment quality 
when discussing the challenges associated with population ageing. Including the employment 
quality dimension reveals important challenges for the future. As ageing becomes a worldwide 
reality, improving the quality of employment will become a necessity in order to avoid a steep 
increase in employment-based dependency ratios. 
Further research is needed with regard to the design of the indicators’ components. First, the 
poverty threshold of US$1.90/day (PPP) does not account for the fact that achieving the same 
set of capabilities may require a different set of goods and services in different countries. In 
addition, it may become unsuited to tracking the evolution of poverty across and within 
countries as they continue to develop. Second, the upper age limit of 64 years for the working-
age population requires further examination since the reality of “retiring” differs significantly 
across the world. Third, the concept of vulnerability is based on strong assumptions and its 
definition would benefit from new empirical evidence. 
The consequences for dependency rates represented by high youth unemployment, low 
female labour force participation, high rates of labour underutilization, significant levels of 
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vulnerable employment and the high incidence of working poverty lead to some key policy 
messages. Overall, absorbing more persons into productive employment should be a priority 
in order to respond to demographic change. Bringing people into productive employment 
removes them from the group of dependents and enables them to provide for those who are 
in need of support. Investing in key economic sectors that have a high employment creation 
potential can significantly transform economies and lead to the creation of millions of decent 
jobs (ILO 2019d). In addition, a number of policy initiatives may be considered: 
Activating the potential labour force: The findings from the different dependency measures 
showed that persons outside the labour force weigh heavily on dependency rates. A large 
proportion of the youth population is not in education, employment or training (NEET); 
moreover, young and adult women, in particular, are disproportionally excluded from the 
labour market, often because of their involvement in family-related care responsibilities (Elder 
and Kring 2016). Setting clear objectives in terms of employment rates and adopting the right 
policies to achieve these targets would aid considerably in decreasing dependency levels in 
rapidly ageing and already aged developed and emerging countries. Transformative care 
policies would yield women’s higher participation in the labour market and thus contribute to 
greater gender equality, better economic outcomes and improved health and care provision 
in a given country. 
Promoting the employment of older workers: The results presented in this paper support a 
targeted policy approach to the challenges posed by ageing societies. Rising life expectancy 
coupled with diminishing fiscal space will require an extension of the working age of older 
workers. To enable the prolonged participation of workers in the labour market, several 
obstacles must be overcome. At the enterprise level, workplaces and the organization of work 
must be adapted to the needs of older workers, such as by providing flexible working 
arrangements and removing physical barriers. Launching public awareness campaigns, 
working closely with employers’ organizations and providing financial incentives to promote 
the hiring or retention of older workers could support such efforts. Public employment 
services should offer training opportunities and career guidance services tailored to the needs 
of older workers. 
Creating better and productive jobs: Simply raising the employment rates of women, youth 
and older workers will not be enough. As the dependency measures based on proxies for 
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productive employment demonstrate, the productivity and quality of these jobs matter, as 
has been shown by the dependency ratios based on labour utilization, working poverty or 
vulnerable employment rates. Moreover, increasing the productive employment rate of those 
most impacted by inactivity, working poverty or vulnerable employment will effectively 
reduce future dependency rates. Policies aimed at ensuring a better match of labour demand 
and supply, decreasing vulnerable employment and working poverty, and creating quality 
employment are urgently needed. 
Investing in training and education throughout the life cycle: Our dependency ratios show 
that it is important to bring more persons into the labour force, in particular youth and 
women, but labour force participation trends also show that it will be critical to retain older 
workers in the labour force. An important element for ensuring the employability of all 
workers is to provide the opportunity for continuous retraining and upskilling. Employers and 
public employment services could provide targeted training to help overcome the potential 
difficulties that older workers face when using new technologies. Moreover, employers could 
promote working in intergenerational teams, which would increase knowledge exchange 
between younger and older workers and also break down prejudices and stereotypes. 
Making social protection systems sustainable: The paper shows that when we only take into 
account the productively employed as those in a position to support others, dependency 
ratios become very high. Unsustainable dependency ratios will make the funding of social 
protection impossible. If there are too few persons of working age, and if too few of those are 
productively employed, fiscal revenues, both direct (through income tax) and indirect 
(through consumption tax), will remain low and below potential. Low fiscal revenues mean 
that governments will not be able to finance public policies to support productive employment 
creation or to finance social protection schemes aimed at those who are inactive (children at 
school, pensioners, persons with disabilities) or who are unemployed, vulnerable or in a 
situation of working poverty (cash transfers, unemployment or sickness benefits, and public 
employment schemes). It is therefore necessary to adapt social protection systems to 
demographic change and enable them to continue to fulfil their key role in preventing and 
reducing poverty, enhancing income security and limiting inequality (Behrendt and Nguyen 
2018). Ultimately, social protection systems will give older workers a real choice about 
whether to remain in employment and will lead to lifelong active societies (Seike 2016). 
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Strengthening labour market information systems: Dependency measures based on 
productive employment should be used for long-term projections in order to inform 
policymakers and influence policy decisions, something that has not been the case before 
now. The paper has highlighted the data needs to produce these indicators and a clear 
methodology to calculate them, which can help all labour market observatories across the 





5 Scarred Youth: School-to-work Transitions and Income Scars in 






It has never been easy for young people to transition from school into the labour market – 
even less so in times of economic recession. Global labour markets have yet to fully recover 
from the global financial crisis of 2007–08 but are already facing a new crisis triggered by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The emerging “lockdown generation” is assumed to be 
disproportionately affected by the economic turmoil, especially when trying to gain a foothold 
in the labour market after finishing their education.  
This paper analyses the scarring effect of an economic crisis. It derives estimates of the impact 
of a crisis on the school-to-work transition duration and on potential future income. It finds 
that youth entering the labour market in times of crisis suffer a significant increase in their 
transition time into their first job and a strong decrease in their labour income. Both effects 







“[I]n medical terms, the virus does not discriminate between its victims in its social and 
economic impact, it discriminates brutally against the poorest and the powerless.” 
Guy Ryder (2020) – Director-General of the International Labour Organization 
5.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007–08 (GFC) triggered a major downturn in the global economy. 
A large number of companies were bankrupted and millions of workers were laid off or faced 
substantial cuts to their working hours, wages or other benefits. Twelve years on and the 
labour markets have yet to fully recover to pre-crisis levels. And now, even as traces of the 
GFC still remain visible, another global crisis has struck: the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
pandemic is, first and foremost, a public health emergency of international concern (WHO 
2020) that poses an immediate threat to people’s health and lives. However, it is also 
disrupting the global economy and threatening the livelihoods and well-being of millions of 
workers.   
Young people30 are particularly prone to suffering the consequences of a crisis. Indeed, past 
economic recessions, including the GFC, have hit youth much harder than adults. Even in times 
of economic prosperity, the unemployment rate is usually higher for youth than it is for adults 
owing to the fact that young people are lacking in skills and work experience (Verick 2011; 
Pastore 2018), but also have less access to finance in order to start their own business (O’Higgins 
2001). However, youth unemployment rates only tell part of the story, as the labour market 
participation rate (LFPR) for youth is also around 25 percentage points lower compared to the 
rate for adults (Figure 5.1).  
                                                     
30 The United Nations standard definition of “youth” suggests an age range of 15 to 24 years. To reflect the fact 
that today’s youth spend more time in education and also face a prolonged transition into the labour market 
(see Ryan 2001), young people are defined in this paper as persons aged 15 to 29 years, unless stated otherwise. 
The terms “youth” and “young people” are therefore used interchangeably. 
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Figure 5.1. Labour force participation rates (LFPR) and female–male ratio by income groups (1998–2018) 
 
Source: ILO modelled estimates, July 2019. 
Globally, only around four in ten young persons are in the labour force, while a similar share 
is either in education or training (40 per cent). The remaining 20 per cent form the group of 
youth not in employment, education or training (NEET) (ILO, 2020a). It would therefore be 
misleading to consider changes in unemployment rates as the sole indicator, since any rate 
variations would affect only a fraction of the youth population (O’Higgins 2010). For instance, 
it would exclude young persons who are not yet part of the labour force and who are still in 
the phase of transitioning from school to work.  
This transition has become increasingly difficult and is exacerbated at times of economic 
turmoil. In general, young workers have yet to make the transition into stable employment 
and, instead, are particularly prone to ending up in non-standard forms of employment or in 
the informal economy (ILO, 2016b). In fact, young persons are on average 1.5 times more likely 
than adults to be in involuntary part-time employment and they account for a 14 per cent 
greater share of employment in the informal sector (ILO, 2020b). Both informal and non-
standard employment provide limited – if indeed any – social protection such as access to 
health care, paid sick leave and unemployment benefits. Following the last-in, first-out 
principle, youth are often the first to face reduced hours or even to be laid off. In addition, 
mass redundancies cause an excess supply of labour. This creates a situation in which young 



















































































































































































Labour force participation rate (%) Female/male ratio
123 
 
number of newly jobless older and more experienced workers for a smaller number of 
vacancies.   
It is too early to assess the full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the situation of youth in 
the world of work. Nevertheless, the first indications are that this crisis may affect young 
people even more severely than the GFC. According to the ILO Monitor (2020f), some first data 
points suggest a massive rise in youth unemployment and a significant decline in their LFPR. 
In the US, for instance, the unemployment rate almost tripled for male youth and even 
quadrupled for female youth between February and April 2020. At the same time, the LFPR 
dropped by 7.5 percentage points. While these point estimates fall short of proving a general 
trend, a sectoral perspective reveals what may lie ahead. More than four in 10 young workers 
– particularly young women – were working in the four economic sectors that are now most 
adversely affected by the crisis, the vast majority of which are located in the informal 
economy. Although the GFC differed both in cause and nature from the crisis resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic, there may be some important parallels that could aid policymakers 
to develop targeted responses. 
This paper seeks to add two main contributions to the academic discourse on the school-to-
work transition (SWT). First, studies on the SWT have largely concentrated on developed 
economies, which have provided important insights but which may not be applicable to low- 
and middle-income countries. This study fills this gap by deriving estimates for the SWT in 
middle-income countries. Second, the paper investigates the scarring effects of an economic 
crisis by analysing its impact on the SWT duration (employment scar) and on the potential 
labour income (income scar).  
The paper is organized as follows: the first chapter discusses the theoretical background, 
clarifies the concepts of employment and income scars, and states the hypothesis. In the 
second part, we introduce the data set, conduct a descriptive analysis, and develop the 
framework for the empirical analysis. This is followed by actual analysis and the presentation 
of the empirical results. The last two chapters discuss the findings and conclude.  
124 
 
5.2 Conceptual framework 
5.2.1 Definition of school-to-work transitions 
The journey from youth to adulthood is often marked by non-linear fluctuations until a stable 
job is found. After leaving the educational system, a young person may experience a change 
in their employment status (employed, unemployed) or employment type (wage worker, self-
employed), take on care responsibilities or household duties, become inactive or even return 
to the educational system. These transition stages are intertwined, and mastering one stage 
successfully may pave the way for the next phase.  
The school-to-work transition (SWT) is a crucial stage in the life of a young person. However, 
there is no uniform definition of the SWT and, indeed, it varies between different countries 
and studies. In some cases, the transition’s end point is reached once a person obtains a job – 
any job –  regardless of its nature or quality (c.f. Dolton, Makepeace, and Treble 1994; Guarcello 
et al. 2005). In other cases, the transition is only concluded if the respective job meets certain 
qualitative criteria, such as the nature or duration of the employment relationship (c.f. Elder 
and Kring 2016; ETF, 2008). The ILO offers a three-stage classification framework for young 
people aged 15 to 29 years (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1. Overview of school-to-work transition stages 
Transition stage Description 
Transition not yet started  Still in school and outside the labour force or 
 Not in school, outside the labour force and no intention of 
looking for a job 
In transition  In school and currently employed or unemployed (i.e. in the 
labour force) or 
 Not in school and unemployed or 
 Not in school and currently employed in a temporary and 
unsatisfactory job or 
 Not in school and not in employment but aiming to be 
employed later 
Transited Not in school and  
 Currently employed in a stable job or  
 In satisfactory self-employment or  
 In a satisfactory temporary job 
Source: author’s compilation based on ILOSTAT Glossary.  
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Accordingly, the transition starts when a person becomes available to the labour market and 
ends when they either obtain a stable job (i.e. not time-bound) or are satisfied with their 
temporary job or entrepreneurial activity. The analysis in this paper is based on the more 
relaxed version of transition and applies the criterion of the ILO’s “in transition” stage.  
Any disruption or blockage of the SWT has severe consequences for both the individual and 
the wider society. Obviously, a prolonged transition due to spells of unemployment or 
inactivity directly results in a loss of personal income. Depending on the welfare regime, this 
could also burden society with direct public expenditure (social transfers and welfare benefits 
for the individual) and indirect resource costs due to missing contributions to the public 
treasury (income and consumption tax revenue) (Eurofound 2012b). However, a prolonged 
transition has further-reaching and longer-lasting consequences for an individual’s future 
employment trajectory beyond the immediate income loss. These consequences have their 
theoretical foundation in human capital theory (Becker 1964) and signalling theory (Spence 
1973). Human capital theory argues that a period of unemployment or inactivity interrupts the 
accumulation of work experience and depreciates any skills already acquired (Pissarides 1992). 
According to signalling theory, both outcomes are signals of lower productivity to a potential 
employer, leading to a lower probability of being hired or a lower wage being offered 
(Arulampalam, Gregg, and Gregory 2001). Moreover, candidates with assumed lower productivity 
may be more likely to obtain jobs of lower quality in terms of earnings, working hours, skills 
utilisation or social protection. From a labour supply perspective, tensions in the labour 
market can prompt youth to lower their personal reservation wage and hence begin their 
professional life at a lower income level (Christensen 2002). Once established, this gap between 
initial reservation wage and actual accepted wage may prove difficult to eliminate. A lack of 
decent wage-work opportunities can also push young people into involuntary self-
employment, sometimes characterized as low quality in terms of income, stability and 
prospects (Hughes 2006; Rissman 2003).  
If the imposed income penalty or the reduced prospects for quality employment turn into 
more permanent features of an individual’s employment history, they are commonly referred 
to as “scars”, a term first coined by Ellwood (1979). More precisely, the income penalty 
imposed by spells of unemployment or inactivity is referred to as an “income scar”, while the 
reduced probability of being re-employed or of obtaining (decent) work is referred to as an 
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“employment scar”. Just like physical scars, both are thought to be long-lasting, and traces 
may even remain throughout an individual’s entire working life.  
5.2.2 Empirical literature review of scarring effects 
The following literature review summarises empirical findings on employment and income 
scars. Although there are considerable differences in the magnitude and persistence of 
employment and income scars, the findings highlight the relevance for analysing the impact 
of an economic crisis. 
In a study of Peruvian youth, Cavero and Ruiz (2016) concluded that young people who had a 
high-quality first job increased their probability of getting a high-quality job later in life by 12 
per cent compared to those who started out in a low-quality job. A factorial survey experiment 
amongst Swiss recruiters revealed that unemployment spells recorder in an applicants’ CV 
decreases the perceived suitability of an applicant for a specific job (Shi et al. 2018). Petreski et 
al. (2016) found that North Macedonian youth who experienced unemployment spells early in 
their careers had a lower probability of finding employment than persons who had no (or 
fewer) unemployment spells. Depending on the number and duration of these periods of 
unemployment, the employment scar ranged from 28.4 per cent to 61.8 per cent. Similar 
results are derived in a study of unemployment, low pay and skills underutilisation in the 
Australian labour market (Mavromaras, Sloane, and Wei 2015). The authors find that skills 
underutilised workers as well as low-paid workers share a higher risk of future unemployment. 
Helbling and Sacchi (2014) demonstrated that an unemployment spell in the early stages of a 
person’s career increased their probability of finding themselves not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) by around 9 per cent. An analysis of youth in New Zealand further 
revealed that individuals who had been NEET at least once were on average 23 per cent less 
likely to be in employment compared to those who had never been NEET (Samoilenko and 
Carter 2015). These results seem to have been confirmed by a similar UK-based study which 
estimated the difference in the employment probability between both groups at 27.5 
percentage points after 5 years and 20 percentage points after 10 years (Crawford et al. 2011). 
In Mexico, however, the difference was 10 percentage points: less pronounced but still 
significant (Ranzani and Rosati 2013). A NEET spell also diminishes a young person’s quality-
employment choices. A common occupational destination in the UK, for instance, appears to 
be the personal and protective service sector, which accommodates 40 per cent of former 
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NEETs. Jobs in this sector include catering, security, domestic work and childcare and are often 
characterized by temporary employment contracts, low pay, a lack of social protection and 
limited career prospects (Bentley and Gurumurthy 1999). 
In addition to the employment scar, young people are also assumed to sustain an income 
penalty induced by an economic crisis that could turn into a persistent income scar. One of 
the most prominent studies on income scars was based on the British Household Panel Survey 
and identified an inverted u-shaped pattern to the wage scar: in the first year of 
unemployment, workers were attributed an income scar of around 6 per cent, which rose to 
14 per cent in the subsequent three years before dropping to 11 per cent (Arulampalam, Gregg, 
and Gregory 2001). The above-mentioned study by Helbling and Sacchi (2014) further 
demonstrated that when young persons with unemployment spells in their work history 
obtained a job, they suffered a wage scar of 7 per cent. Lupi and Ordine (2002) seemed to 
confirm this finding when they estimated a wage scar of around 8 per cent for Italian workers 
who experienced up to six months of unemployment. A study by Ruhm (1991) showed that 
displaced workers were twice as likely to suffer an income penalty of over 25 per cent 
compared to their non-displaced counterparts. The same study further revealed that while 
the employment scar slowly disappeared over time, the wage scar remained clearly visible. 
The long-lasting nature of wage scars was also confirmed by Gregg and Tominey (2005), who 
claim to have established a causal relationship between male youth unemployment and 
subsequent wage levels in later working life. Their estimates revealed a wage penalty of 13 to 
21 per cent for individuals who experienced multiple spells of unemployment, and a slightly 
lower penalty of 9 to 11 per cent for individuals with only one unemployment experience. For 
both groups, a residual wage scar of around 8 per cent persists, even after 20 years. Cruces et 
al. (2012) estimated a wage penalty of around 11 per cent for Argentinian and Brazilian 
workers. While it tended to disappear quickly for some workers, it was larger and more 
persistent for low-skilled workers.  
5.2.3 Hypothesis and approach 
We are modelling the global financial crisis (GFC) as a shock to the labour market. In line with 
several descriptive assessments of the crisis’ impact on youth labour markets (c.f. Verick 2009; 
O’Higgins 2010; R. Islam 2011; Kelly and McGuinness 2015; Carcillo et al. 2015), we assume that this 
shock will worsen the labour market prospects of new entrants, owing to, among other 
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reasons, greater competition among jobseekers for fewer available jobs. This will make the 
transition into the labour market more difficult. Consequently, the SWT duration of individuals 
is expected to increase, leaving them with an employment scar on their work history. The 
assumed lower productivity of scarred individuals will cause a lower income level, resulting in 
an additional income scar. 
Accordingly, this paper seeks to answer two main research questions (RQ):  
RQ 1: Does an economic crisis such as the global financial crisis affect the school-to-
work transition time of a young person (employment scar)? If so, which youth are 
most affected? 
RQ 2: Does an economic crisis affect future labour incomes (income scar)? If so, who is 
most affected and how persistent are these effects?  
In order to address these employment and income scars, we first need to define the time span 
of the GFC. According to the literature, the GFC began as a US banking crisis in mid-2007 and 
evolved into a global crisis in September 2008 (c.f. Acharya et al. 2009; J. B. Foster and Magdoff 
2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009). The third quarter (Q3) of 2008 is therefore marked as the 
earliest potential starting point of the crisis for the countries in the sample. The quarterly 
growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) is then used to determine the beginning of 
the crisis for each individual country. More precisely, we identify two successive quarters with 
on average the smallest (i.e. most negative) GDP growth rates since Q3 2008.  
The four consecutive quarters from that point onwards define the time span of the crisis in a 
given country. Based on this identification, we can select the treatment and control groups. 
Each person who finished formal education – and thus became available to the labour market 
– during the defined four quarters of the crisis is selected into the treatment group. 
Consequently, the control group comprises all those individuals who finished their formal 
education during the four quarters prior to the beginning of the crisis. In the simplified 
example of equation (i), the term in the middle identifies the treatment group and the term 















                   CONTROL GROUP        TREATMENT GROUP 
(i) 
where Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 denotes the change in real GDP in 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡.  
Table C 2 in Appendix C illustrates this identification strategy graphically. 
In addition, Table C 2 shows the labour force participation rate (LFPR) and the unemployment 
rate for each country and quarter. These complementary indicators confirm the validity of the 
selection process. All countries show either a decrease in the LFPR or an increase in the 
unemployment rate over the four quarters of the treatment group compared to the respective 
quarters of the control group. In fact, most countries even show both. Moreover, these 
indicators reflect the slower labour market response rate in terms of the escalation of the 
crisis and the subsequent recovery. First, although GDP growth had already slowed in the 
quarter prior to the defined start of the crisis, both the LFPR and the unemployment rate 
remained mostly stable. In almost all countries, the situation in the labour market escalated 
in the quarter in which the crisis is determined to have begun. Second, although economic 
growth picked up during the time span for the treatment group in some countries, there 
seems not to have been any significant recovery in the labour market. These time lags are 
well-documented in the literature (c.f. Cazes, Heuer, and Verick 2011; Eichhorst et al. 2010) and 
confirm the inclusion of quarters with positive GDP growth rates following an economic 
recession.  
5.3 Analysis 
5.3.1 Data  
The analysis draws on data from the ILO School-to-Work Transition Surveys (SWTS). These 
largely standardized SWTS were carried out in 33 low- and middle-income countries between 
2012 and 2015. The resulting cross-sectional data set includes retrospective information on 
transitions into and within the labour market of individuals aged 15 to 29 years. The SWTS 
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data has been chosen not only for the detailed activity history since leaving school but also 
the rich information provided on current employment at the time of the survey.  
The scope of the analysis is restricted to middle-income countries for four main reasons: first, 
middle-income countries show comparable levels of poverty coupled with a basic level of 
social protection. Both factors combined give young people more choice when deciding 
whether to take up employment or pursue a different activity after finishing their formal 
education, which, in turn, influences the SWT duration significantly. Second, compared to low-
income counties, the labour market systems in middle-income countries are usually more 
advanced, including when it comes to the support offered by public employment services, 
thus facilitating the transition into employment. Third, there is a large knowledge gap around 
the nature and determinants of the SWT in middle-income countries. Lastly, the selection of 
countries was restricted by the availability of supplementing macroeconomic data (e.g. 
quarterly GDP growth rates) and by inconsistencies in the surveys’ design. This sampling 
strategy resulted in the following 14 middle-income countries being selected: 
 Armenia (2014) 
 Brazil (2013) 
 Dominican Republic (2015) 
 Egypt (2014) 
 El Salvador (2014) 
 Jamaica (2015) 
 Kyrgyzstan (2013) 
 Moldova (2015) 
 North Macedonia (2014) 
 Montenegro (2015) 
 Russian Federation (2015) 
 Serbia (2015) 
 Tunisia (2013) 
 Ukraine (2015)
5.3.2 Descriptive analysis 
Table C 1 in Appendix C contains the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the two sub-
groups (treatment and control): 
# of activities since school is a count variable which measures the number of activities a person 
has pursued since leaving school. These activities are categorized as (i) employment (wage 
work, self-employed, unpaid family work, apprenticeship or internship), (ii) unemployment, 
(iii) further training after formal education, (iv) home duties and caring for family members, 
and (v) inactivity. The values range between zero (i.e. directly transitioned into current job) 
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and 15 activities, with a mean of around 2.5 activities. The variable is mainly used as a 
predictor in the zero-inflated regression models (see 5.3.3).  
Transition time to 1st job is the SWT duration is the first dependent variable to assess the 
employment scar and calculated as the number of months between finishing formal education 
and obtaining a first job, i.e. it is the time a young person spends in categories (ii)–(v) as 
defined above. The descriptive analysis shows that the average transition time in the control 
group (14.97 months) is some 16 per cent higher than in the treatment group (12.9 months). 
In other words, the descriptive analysis suggests that youth entering the labour market during 
the GFC transitioned into a job on average two months faster than a young person entering 
the labour market in the year before the crisis. This is contrary to our expectations, and the 
empirical analysis will demonstrate whether this conclusion holds true.  
Labour income is the dependent variable of the income scar analysis. It is the employee’s 
hourly wage or the self-employed person’s hourly profit, expressed in international dollars 
with purchasing power parity (Int$ PPP). The mean income is at a comparable level in both 
the treatment and control groups; the standard deviation is slightly higher in the treatment 
group. It should be noted that the minimum income is below zero since the negative profits 
(i.e. losses) of the self-employed are included. During the analysis, a constant value is added 
to the income variable which allows for a full log transformation of the data, including of 
negative observations (losses). This analytical constant is removed for all income values 
reported in this paper.   
Finished school during GFC is the treatment dummy and takes the value 1 for young persons 
who finished their formal education during the GFC (treatment group), and the value 0 for 
those who finished a year prior to the crisis (control group). Across the full sample, individuals 
are equally distributed in the treatment and control group.   
Sex is the gender dummy to distinguish between female (0) and male (1) survey respondents. 
Male youth are slightly overrepresented in both the full sample and the sub-samples.  
Age at finishing formal education is the age when a person completed their formal education. 
On average, young people leave school at around 18 years of age. However, the minimum 
(around 10 years of age) shows that some youth obviously did not attend school or at least 
did not graduate (see Highest educational level). Sq. age is the age value, squared.  
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Highest educational level is the educational attainment achieved at the time of the survey, 
defined as a categorical variable. It shows an average of 2.2 for both treatment and control 
groups, indicating that youth in the sample are at about an upper-secondary level. The 
distribution of primary education or less (15%), completed secondary (53%) and completed 
tertiary education (32%) is similar in both treatment and control group.  
Area dummy (urban/rural) is a dummy to differentiate between youth residing in urban or 
rural areas. Around 57 per cent of responses were recorded in urban areas.  
Married is a dummy variable and indicates whether a respondent has ever been married. On 
average, around one third of respondents have been married. The share of married persons 
is slightly higher in the control group.  
Informal employment indicates whether an employee works in a formally registered 
enterprise or whether an entrepreneur has a registered enterprise. About one third of all 
respondents worked in the informal economy.  
One parent has tertiary education is a dummy which takes the value 1 if at least one parent 
has obtained tertiary education, otherwise it is 0. Around one in five mothers or fathers have 
tertiary education, which accrues to a combined rate of about 31 per cent across the sample.  
Distance between GFC and survey measures the number of months between the start of the 
GFC and the date of the survey.  
5.3.3 Empirical strategy 
The dependent variable for RQ1 is the predicted duration of the school-to-work transition. 
The general linear regression model to estimate this duration for an individual 𝑖 
(𝑆𝑊𝑇 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) can be stated as: 
𝑆𝑊𝑇 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽𝑡𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑗  ×  𝑄𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖  
(ii) 
where 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 denotes the treatment dummy taking the value 1 for individuals who finished 
their formal education during the GFC, and 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual 
characteristics; 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 is the interaction between these characteristics and the treatment 
133 
 
dummy; 𝐶𝑗 stands for country dummies;
31 𝑄𝑡 for time dummies (quarters); and 𝐶𝑗  ×  𝑄𝑡 for 
the interaction between countries and time. 𝜖𝑖 is the residual.  
The dependent variable for RQ2 is the logarithmic labour income. The explicit form of the 
linear regression model to estimate the average potential labour income of an individual 𝑖 
(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖) can be expressed as: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽𝑞𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑗  ×  𝑄𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖  
(iii) 
where 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 denotes the treatment dummy; Xi  is a vector of individual characteristics; 𝐷𝑖  is 
the distance between the GFC and the survey date; 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 and 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖  are two-way 
interaction terms between the treatment dummy and the individual characteristics and the 
distance respectively; and 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 is the corresponding three-way interaction. The 
remaining components are the same as in equation (ii). 
We are now turning to the model selection. The starting point of our analysis is an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model for both research questions.  
Employment scar 
If we take a closer look at the distribution of the SWT duration in our sample, we note three 
characteristics. As shown in Figure 5.2, the SWT duration is a count variable, which only takes 
on non-negative values. Since count data is not normally distributed, OLS might not be the 
appropriate regression technique. Second, the outcome variables suffer from an excessive 
number of observations with a transition time of zero months; i.e. around 28 per cent of the 
respondents in our sample transitioned directly from school into employment. And third, we 
note a large variance (σ²) in the distribution, which is several times higher than the mean and 
indicates an over-dispersion of the observations.  
                                                     
31 Throughout the analysis, Tunisia has been selected as a base country because it was least severely affected by 
the crisis in terms of GDP and had fairly constant growth rates during the time span for both the control and 
treatment groups.  
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Figure 5.2. Zero-inflated and dispersed school-to-work transition duration 
 
Source: authors’ compilation. 
Disregarding zero-inflation and over-dispersion can lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased 
estimates of the outcome (Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Long and Freese 2006). One way of dealing 
with an excess number of zero observations is zero-inflation count models. First, we apply our 
data to a zero-inflated Poisson regression (ZIP), which combines a Poisson count model and a 
logit model to predict mass zeros. Then, we estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression (ZINB), which takes both zero-inflation and over-dispersion into account. The 
number of activities since finishing formal education is used as a predictor for zero values. The 
results of a likelihood ratio test indicate that the ZINB model seems to be more appropriate 
to account for both zero-inflation and over-dispersion of the outcome variable. In addition, 
and following Wilson (2015), the results are compared based on the Akaike and the Bayesian 
information criteria (AIC and BIC), which confirm that the ZINB better fits our data. 
Another way to account for the mass of zeros are two-part models (TwoPM). In the first part, 
a binary response model is used to predict the probability of a zero outcome. The second part 
then estimates the outcome based on the predicted non-zero observations of the first part 
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(Belotti et al. 2015; Dow and Norton 2003). We apply our data to the TwoPM in two specifications: 
we use a probit model for both specifications in the first stage; and we test both an OLS and a 
generalized linear model (GLM) in the second stage. After consulting the AIC and BIC criteria 
as well as supplementary goodness-of-fit indicators (e.g. pseudo R²), we select the probit-GLM 
specification.  
To conclude the model selection, the analysis will use an OLS regression to define the baseline 
and then carry out the same estimation with a ZINB and a TwoPM (probit and GLM) to check 
the robustness of the findings. Although the remaining two models (ZIP and TwoPM with 
probit-OLS specification) discussed here are not used directly to derive the quantitative impact 
of the GFC on the SWT duration, their results are reported in the statistical Appendix C (Table 
C 3 and Table C 4) in order to further assess the robustness of the estimates. 
The analysis of the impact of the GFC on the duration of the SWT will be conducted in two 
stages. First, we apply the model and estimate the variation of the SWT duration according to 
a number of key variables. The SWT duration may differ according to a young persons’ 
individual characteristics and to their socio-economic background. In the second step, we are 
therefore analysing the heterogeneity of the average impact of the GFC by introducing 
interaction terms. This allows us to derive marginal effects, i.e. the effect of the GFC on the 
SWT duration for each of the key variables while holding the other covariates as fixed.   
Income scar 
We are now turning to the impact of the GFC on labour incomes. Since both the prevalence of 
the GFC and the expected labour income may be affected by unobserved variables (e.g. the 
general macroeconomic climate or the quality of labour market institutions), the model is 
augmented by an endogenous treatment estimator. We estimate the average change in 
labour incomes using a maximum likelihood linear regression model, as suggested for linear 
regressions with endogenous treatment effects (Terza 1998; Wooldridge 2010). The explanatory 
variables include individual characteristics (age, gender, education, marital status) and 
socioeconomic characteristics (parents’ education, geographic location, informal 
employment). The distance between the start of the GFC and the survey date is used to 
account for a potential discounting effect on the income scar over time.  
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We run the model in three specifications. In the baseline specification (1), we estimate the 
average marginal effects without any interaction of the covariates. The second specification 
(2) introduces a two-way interaction term to allow for a variation of the distance between the 
GFC and the survey by the treatment level. In the last specification (3), a three-way interaction 
term is introduced to assess heterogeneity between key covariates (sex, education and area 
of residence) and the treatment (GFC) over time. 
5.3.4 Results 
We present our results in the following section.  
Employment scar 
Table 5.2 displays the regression results of our main determinates for the three models. The 
coefficients in the first column (1) are the marginal effects on the SWT duration. The 
coefficients of the ZINB (2) and the logistic regression model (3) cannot be interpreted directly. 
We therefore report the exponentiated values of the coefficients (odds ratios). In other words, 
while column 1 demonstrates the marginal effect of the independent variables on the SWT 
duration, columns 2 and 4 show the factorial change on the SWT duration and column 3 
indicates the probability of a longer SWT duration.  
All estimates reveal a similar trend but differ in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. 
Overall, we can predict an average transition duration into any first job of around 14 months. 
The GFC appears to have increased this duration for young persons by several months, but 
none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Overall, the SWT duration is significantly 
shorter for male than for female youth. Models (2) and (3) suggest a reduction by around one 
quarter for male youth, while model (1) quantifies this reduction to a bit more than four 
months. A higher level of education seems to lower the probability of a prolonged SWT (3). 
While young persons who have completed secondary education tend to transition into 
employment about 5 months faster than their counterparts who have no more than primary-
level education, youth with tertiary education see an even larger reduction of more than 8.5 
months in their SWT transition. Moreover, labour markets in urban areas seem to absorb 
young people more quickly than they do in rural areas, with a predicted transition time that is 
around 1.5 months shorter. 
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In conclusion, young men with higher educational attainment residing in urban areas appear 
to have a shorter transition duration than their less educated female counterparts in rural 
areas. 
Table 5.2. Estimated change in the school-to-work transition 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variable: 
SWT duration 
(month) 
OLS ZINB TwoPM 
      Probit GLM 
GFC     
 GFC 6.72 1.49 0.17 1.59 
Sex (5.413) (0.511) (0.313) (0.536) 
 Male -4.15*** 0.72*** -0.12** 0.76*** 
Education (0.743) (0.039) (0.059) (0.039) 
 Secondary -4.86*** 0.67*** -0.53*** 1.11  
(1.468) (0.083) (0.105) (0.116) 
 Tertiary -8.53*** 0.56*** -1.01*** 1.25* 
Area (1.511) (0.085) (0.112) (0.149) 
 Urban -1.46* 0.92 -0.02 0.93  
(0.760) (0.053) (0.059) (0.049) 
 Constant -28.39* 0.30 -6.60*** 218.39*** 
  (14.674) (0.491) (1.126) (346.693) 
Controls       
 Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
 Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Goodness of fit       
 R-squared 0.1412    
 McFadden's R2  0.015   
 Pseudo R²   0.1764  
 AIC 24383.32 18726.59 18555.55 18555.55 
 BIC 24573.53 18934.63 18941.9 18941.9 
Observations 2,819 2,819 2,818 2,818 
Controls included but not reported: Marital status, parents’ tertiary education, age, age² and 
number of activities since finishing formal education (only model (2)). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the second part of the employment scar analysis, we introduce the GFC as the shock and 
explore the heterogeneity of the average impact on the SWT. For this purpose, we allow for a 
two-way interaction of the treatment dummy with the three main independent variables (sex, 
education and area). This enables us to isolate the marginal effect of the GFC on the SWT for 
each of the covariates. We continue with the three models used in the previous analysis and 
apply the same metric for the coefficients.   
138 
 
Table 5.3 reports the estimated average impact of the GFC. Once again, we note that the 
estimates across all models indicate the same general trend, albeit of different magnitudes 
and levels of statistical significance. Since we have introduced interaction terms, the overall 
increase of the GFC on the SWT duration is smaller than in the previous specification, and still 
not significant. However, the derived estimates must be read in conjunction with the 
respective interaction terms. First, we assess whether the impact of the GFC varies by gender. 
The coefficients of the interaction term point unanimously and significantly in the same 
direction and demonstrate that the GFC hit male youth much harder than females. More 
precisely, their SWT duration increases by more than a third (models (2) and (3)), or by almost 
3 months (1). Even so, the gender premium for males is strong enough to offset the impact of 
the GFC, leaving them with an SWT duration that is still shorter than it is for female youth. 
One explanation for the stronger impact of the crisis on young men could be that they were 
overrepresented in the sectors worst affected by the crisis, such as manufacturing and 
construction, which therefore impeded their transition (Verick 2009).  
The impact of the GFC may also differ when it comes to educational attainment. Compared to 
the previous specification, we find that education has an even stronger mitigating effect. In 
times of crisis, however, youth with tertiary education are particularly affected. Their SWT 
duration is projected to increase by an additional 38 per cent (2) compared to youth who have 
no more than a primary education. This is something of a surprise, since most studies suggest 
that a crisis has a bigger impact on lower-skilled youth (EC 2014; Sharma and Winkler 2018). 
However, once we factor in the other components, we find that the SWT duration of women 
and men with tertiary education was shorter by some 3.8 and 6.5 months respectively, 
compared to youth with primary education or less.  
As noted by Islam (2011), the urban economy in low and middle income countries was severely 
affected by the crisis and led to a reversal in rural–urban migration, as many laid-off workers 
began to seek jobs in rural areas. When analysing the variations in how the crisis impacted the 
rural and urban areas used in our sample, we observe a slightly more pronounced effect in 
urban areas, although, statistically speaking, it is not a significant one. 
The findings reported in this section are largely comparable to the estimates derived from the 
zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression and the two-part model with probit-OLS specification 
(see Appendix C, Table C 3 and Table C 4). We do, however, note a considerable variation in 
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terms of the size of the coefficients and their levels of significance across the models. The 
TwoPM probit-OLS model, in particular, estimates the effect of the GFC on the SWT duration 
as being much higher. 
Table 5.3. Estimated impact of the GFC on the school-to-work transition 




(1) (2) (3) 
 OLS ZINB TwoPM 
    Probit GLM 
GFC         
 GFC 1.98 1.24 -0.07 1.43 
Sex (6.124) (0.437) (0.352) (0.504) 
 Male -5.60*** 0.62*** -0.09 0.64*** 
  (1.113) (0.049) (0.081) (0.047) 
 Male X GFC 2.87** 1.33*** -0.07 1.37*** 
Education (1.425) (0.146) (0.113) (0.139) 
 Secondary -6.34*** 0.68*** -0.64*** 1.16 
  (2.123) (0.101) (0.143) (0.156) 
 Tertiary -11.36*** 0.47*** -1.22*** 1.16 
  (2.187) (0.083) (0.152) (0.175) 
 Secondary X GFC 3.08 0.99 0.20 0.94 
  (2.661) (0.182) (0.188) (0.162) 
 Tertiary X GFC 5.61** 1.38* 0.40** 1.15 
Area (2.727) (0.269) (0.194) (0.209) 
 Urban -1.61 0.91 -0.05 0.93 
  (1.134) (0.074) (0.082) (0.068) 
 Urban X GFC 0.18 1.02 0.05 1.00 
  (1.422) (0.114) (0.113) (0.101) 
      
 Constant -27.66* 0.28 -6.52*** 197.32*** 
            
Controls     
 Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
 Time dummies YES YES YES YES 
Goodness of fit         
 R-squared 0.144    
 McFadden's R2  0.016   
 Pseudo R²   0.1782  
 AIC 24381.86 18724.71 20467.29 18550.66 
 BIC 24595.85 18956.54 20901.18 18984.56 
Observations 2,819 2,819 2,818 2,818 
Controls included but not reported: Marital status, parents’ tertiary education, age, age² and number of 
activities since finishing formal education (only model (2)). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In conclusion, these results disprove the finding of the descriptive analysis, namely that of a 
shorter transition time of youth in the treatment group. Instead, we find a significant 
prolongation of the SWT duration, in particular for male youth and for youth with higher 
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educational attainment in urban areas. Despite the stronger increase for men, it should be 
noted that women have a longer average transition time overall (Elder and Kring 2016). The 
same can be said for young people with lower educational attainment. The size of the effect 
suggests that youth finishing their formal education during an economic crisis are not only 
penalized by a longer SWT duration but are indeed scarred.   
Income scar 
We will now assess the impact of the GFC on the potential labour income. We begin with a 
linear regression on the log labour income per hour without interaction terms (1), which 
serves as the baseline. Similar to the analytical frameworks of the employment scar, we then 
model the shock of the crisis as a two-way interaction term between the treatment dummy 
and the three main independent variables (sex, education and area) in model (2). In the third 
specification (3), we allow for a three-way interaction of the treatment dummy with the main 
independent variables and with the distance between the beginning of the GFC and the survey 
date. As a result, we obtain the average treatment effect (ATE) of the GFC in relationship to 
the time elapsed since the crisis. The findings are reported in Table 5.4.  
Across all three specifications, we find a strong and highly significant income penalty caused 
by the GFC. Young persons who finished their formal education during the GFC experience on 
average a 10 per cent reduction in labour income compared to youth who finished their formal 
education in the year prior to the crisis. Young men seem to be slightly worse affected than 
women, although the effect is very small (<0.2 per cent) and statistically not significant. The 
income penalty seems to abate with rising educational attainment. Compared to persons who 
have not obtained anything beyond primary education (baseline), the income penalty is 
around 0.4 per cent lower for those with secondary education. A young person with tertiary 
education suffers an income penalty that is on average almost 2 per cent lower than a person 
who has not completed any formal education. Although not significant, the income penalty is 
slightly more pronounced in urban areas. Whether a young person is employed in the formal 
or informal sector makes a comparably strong difference. The income penalty for workers in 
the informal economy is on average 1.8 per cent higher than for formal workers. This can be 
explained by the fact that informal workers are less protected from (one-sided) wage 
adjustments, and the lack of access to collective bargaining mechanisms is often an obstacle 
to be covered by collective agreements.  
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The distance between the crisis and the survey allows us to further isolate the discount factor 
(marginal effect) over time, and thus to assess whether the income penalty could become an 
income scar. We find that a young person needs around 12.6 years (model (3)) to offset the 
10 per cent income penalty, and that men recover their losses about six times faster than 
women. The strong income penalty in combination with a rather low recovery rate brings us 
to the conclusion that income penalties are indeed income scars due to their persisting nature. 
However, the estimated recovery rate has to be taken with a pinch of salt since the predictor 
variation is large. In model (2), for instance, it is much smaller and derives a total of 22 years 




Table 5.4. Results of the maximum likelihood estimation on labour income  
Dependent variable:  





(𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖) 
(3) 
3-way interaction 
(𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖)     
Overall effect    
GFC -0.101*** -0.103329*** -0.101015***  
(0.0211) (0.021) (0.021) 
Marginal effects 
   
Sex    
   Male -0.000725 -0.000834 -0.001833  
(0.00462) (0.005) (0.004) 
Education 
   
   Secondary 0.00377 0.003842 0.004655  
(0.00496) (0.005) (0.005)  
   
   Tertiary 0.0195*** 0.019611*** 0.018343***  
(0.00576) (0.006) (0.006) 
Area 
   
   Urban -0.00259 -0.002597 -0.002119 
 (0.00408) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Informal employment -0.0182*** -0.018134*** -0.018062*** 
 (0.00534) (0.005) (0.005) 
    
Distance crisis–survey  0.000361 0.000635 
  (0.000572) (0.0006121) 
    
_cons 4.527*** 4.546*** 4.517***  
(0.570) (0.580) (0.578)     
Geographic control YES YES YES 
Time control YES YES YES     
Goodness of fit    
   AIC -1467.5 -1466.3 -1451.9 
   BIC -1271.0 -1264.5 -1172.6 
Observations 1,303 1,303 1,303     
Controls included but not reported: Marital status, parents’ tertiary education, age and age². 





5.3.5 Discussion of findings and further research 
As indicated in the descriptive analysis, the average transition time varies greatly between 
countries. Manacorda et al. (2017), for instance, estimated the average transition duration to 
range from 3.5 to 57 months (a mean of 23 months), using data from the ILO SWTS for 23 low- 
and middle-income countries. A simple comparison of the median transition duration 
confirms our findings of longer transition rates for women. The same study further found 
some (statistically not significant) evidence for a decreasing transition time in countries with 
positive economic growth and for individuals with higher educational attainment. Quintini et 
al. (2007) provided estimates of the expected length of the school-to-work transition derived 
from labour force surveys for selected Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Their estimates ranged from 14.3 to 58 months with a mean 
duration of 29.4 months in 2005. The study also pointed to particular difficulties for young 
people with low educational attainment, which is in line with our findings. Another study 
indicated a faster transition process with a finding that around one third of youth in Serbia 
and two thirds in Ukraine had started their first job within six months of finishing formal 
education (ETF, 2008). Lastly, Guarcello et al. (2005) offered an overview of SWT durations in 
13 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where they ranged from 18 to 80 months.  
In the absence of research with – to our knowledge – a similar analytical framework, the scale 
of the GFC’s impact on the SWT duration and labour incomes is more difficult to compare. 
However, there is some evidence on which the validity of the findings can be approximated. 
First, we can observe changes in certain key labour market indicators. Rising unemployment 
and inactivity rates in the months following the GFC indicate a prolonged transition time for 
youth. Second, the direction of the derived effects is in line both with our own expectations 
and other research findings. Third, the income penalty of around 10 per cent is within the 
penalty range identified by other studies (e.g. Cruces, Ham, and Viollaz 2012; Helbling and Sacchi 
2014; Lupi and Ordine 2002). Lastly, the scale of the prolonged transition duration as well as the 
scale and persistence of income penalty over time suggest an actual scarring effect which 
seems to be supported by other studies (e.g. Gregg and Tominey 2004; Helbling and Sacchi 2014; 
Ruhm 1991).  
However, there are certain limitations to this study. Although we are using the best available 
macroeconomic indicator for this country sample (i.e. quarterly GDP growth rates) in order to 
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determine the beginning of the crisis at the country level, it leaves us with a considerable 
amount of imprecision. In addition, a crisis may not hit all sectors simultaneously and on an 
equal scale. Both factors can cause an overlap of the treatment and the control group and 
dilute the effect size. As with most experimental research, the findings of this study may 
further suffer from a potential endemic selection bias. Although the number of independent 
variables used in the models was kept small, there may be unobserved personal attributes 
which correlate with both the outcome variables and the covariates. Lastly, further robustness 
checks must be carried out to substantiate the validity of the findings. 
In concluding this assessment, we consider the derived effects of the GFC as valid in terms of 
their accuracy and explanatory power. Further research should be carried out on the school-
to-decent-work transition with a focus on policies that facilitate this transition. While the 
commonly applied criteria of a stable and/or satisfactory employment provide a good starting 
point, more dimensions of decent work could be incorporated. In terms of income scars, the 
prevalence of low-pay employment and their possibility to trap certain groups of workers 
should be examined in more detail. Moreover, the role of reservation wages and their possible 
adjustments in times of crisis would add another important puzzle piece to better understand 
the labour supply side. 
5.4 Conclusion  
This paper analysed some key determinates of the school-to-work transition duration as well 
as the potential labour outcome both prior to and during an economic crisis. We used data 
from the ILO’s SWTS for 14 middle-income countries and applied it to different regression 
models.  
We found that the average transition duration into any first job is around 14 months. On 
average, women’s transition time is four months longer than men’s. Overall, the transition 
time is longest for young persons with primary education or less, and decreases with 
increasing educational attainment. The SWT duration is shorter for youth in urban areas.  
The global financial crisis had a very strong impact on both transition duration and projected 
labour income. It caused the average school-to-work transition duration to rise by several 
months and imposed a wage penalty of over 10 per cent on young persons. Although men 
were hit harder by the crisis, women continue to experience longer SWT durations. Similarly, 
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while youth with high levels of education were more affected by the GFC, low-skilled workers 
continue to require the longest transition time. The income penalty was slightly stronger for 
male and urban youth, although it reduced significantly with increasing educational 
attainment. A very low recovery rate (especially for women) suggests a persisting trend in 
terms of income penalty. Although the derived estimates are considerably small (i.e. the 
recovery rate is low) to assume an income scar, we do not find significant empirical support 
to prove it.  
Although at the moment it is not possible to predict the exact scope or duration of the 
economic recession, there are strong indications that the “lockdown generation” will be 
among the worst affected sections of society: in the short-term, because of their generally 
lower employment security; and in the longer-term, because of the employment and income 




Table A 1. Labor intensity for different crops  
Crop Labor intensity (workers 
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Table A 2. Different scenarios and actual areas under contract in hectares 
                                           Final land use   
 
 




Labor intensive (3,188,127) Capital intensive (9,390,727) 
 
 


















2a 2b 2c 2d   
Size under contract (in 
ha) 















agriculture   
1a 1b 1c 1d   
Size under contract (in 
ha) 
1,511,032 154,730 2,075,338 485,182 4,226,282  
Pastoralists   3a 3b 3c 3d   
 Size under contract (in 
ha) 
202,069 2,952 426,773 20,550 652,344  
Forestry   4a 4b 4c 4d   
 Size under contract (in 
ha) 
693,060 10,711 743,480 181,905 1,629,156 
Conservation   5a 5b 5c 5d   
 
Size under contract (in 
ha) 
  37,477 1,939 422,970 51,327 513,713 
    Total 2,784,818 403,309 7,191,445 2,199,282 12,578,854 




















East Asia & Pacific 
1 1 Japan 28.4 1 1 Japan 30.87 1 1 South Korea 38.07 
2 29 Hong Kong 18.2 2 8 Hong Kong 25.84 2 2 Japan 37.69 
3 38 New Zealand 16.37 3 15 South Korea 24.75 3 6 Taiwan 34.99 
4 39 Australia 16.21 4 23 Taiwan 23.37 4 8 Hong Kong 34.68 
5 41 Taiwan 15.85 5 29 Singapore 22.49 5 9 Singapore 33.27 
6 42 South Korea 15.79 6 41 New Zealand 20.54 6 18 Thailand 29.64 
7 55 Singapore 13.35 7 45 Macao 20.25 7 21 Macao 28.91 
8 56 Thailand 12.96 8 48 Thailand 19.61 8 37 China 26.07 
9 61 Macao 11.97 9 50 Australia 19.32 9 54 New Zealand 23.85 
10 62 China 11.97 10 62 China 16.87 10 60 Australia 22.78 
11 67 Guam 10.54 11 66 Guam 14.64 11 65 Fr. Polynesia 21.92 
12 72 New Caledonia 9.7 12 71 Fr. Polynesia 13.44 12 67 Brunei 21.75 
13 74 North Korea 9.35 13 73 New Caledonia 13.38 13 75 New Caledonia 20.49 
14 77 Fr. Polynesia 9.07 14 76 North Korea 12.7 14 76 Vietnam 20.45 
15 87 Vietnam 7.87 15 83 Vietnam 11.95 15 81 North Korea 19.7 
16 95 Malaysia 7.18 16 93 Brunei 10.2 16 82 Guam 19.19 
17 98 Micronesia 6.94 17 97 Micronesia 10.07 17 93 Malaysia 17 
18 104 Indonesia 6.26 18 98 Malaysia 10.03 18 102 Indonesia 15.86 
19 105 Myanmar 6.24 19 101 Indonesia 9.17 19 114 Myanmar 13.18 
20 107 Tonga 5.92 20 106 Myanmar 8.52 20 115 Micronesia 13.13 
21 109 Fiji 5.82 21 107 Fiji 8.13 21 125 Mongolia 12 
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22 111 Brunei 5.57 22 110 Philippines 7.6 22 127 Philippines 11.8 
23 112 Philippines 5.51 23 119 Mongolia 6.86 23 128 Cambodia 11.68 
24 117 Samoa 5.08 24 120 Samoa 6.84 24 129 Fiji 11.16 
25 123 Cambodia 4.85 25 122 Cambodia 6.69 25 133 Laos 10.41 
26 133 Mongolia 4.31 26 123 Tonga 6.68 26 138 Samoa 9.14 
27 134 Timor-Leste 4.28 27 130 Kiribati 6.17 27 139 Tonga 8.93 
28 135 Laos 4.26 28 135 Laos 5.64 28 140 Kiribati 8.72 
29 136 Kiribati 4.21 29 142 Timor-Leste 4.97 29 147 Solomon Is. 7.02 
30 140 Solomon Is. 3.67 30 145 Solomon Is. 4.41 30 150 Papua New Guinea 6.57 
31 141 Vanuatu 3.61 31 146 Papua New Guinea 4.37 31 152 Timor-Leste 6.48 
32 144 Papua New Guinea 3.57 32 148 Vanuatu 4.25 32 153 Vanuatu 6.45 
South Asia 
1 66 Sri Lanka 11.23 1 64 Sri Lanka 15.43 1 62 Sri Lanka 22.58 
2 102 India 6.57 2 104 India 8.57 2 72 Maldives 20.88 
3 106 Bhutan 6.2 3 109 Bhutan 7.82 3 103 Bhutan 15.84 
4 108 Nepal 5.83 4 113 Bangladesh 7.45 4 104 Bangladesh 15.81 
5 115 Bangladesh 5.23 5 116 Nepal 7.07 5 112 India 13.75 
6 132 Pakistan 4.35 6 121 Maldives 6.72 6 118 Nepal 12.85 
7 142 Maldives 3.59 7 139 Pakistan 5.21 7 142 Pakistan 7.87 
8 177 Afghanistan 2.65 8 172 Afghanistan 3.14 8 164 Afghanistan 5.42 
Europe and Central Asia 
1 2 Italy 23.3 1 2 Italy 27.89 1 3 Spain 36.81 
2 3 Portugal 22.77 2 3 Portugal 27.05 2 4 Greece 36.23 
3 4 Finland 22.55 3 4 Greece 26.51 3 5 Italy 36.01 
4 5 Greece 22.28 4 5 Lithuania 26.38 4 7 Portugal 34.81 
5 6 Germany 21.69 5 6 Germany 26.18 5 11 Slovenia 32.14 
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6 7 Bulgaria 21.47 6 7 Finland 25.99 6 12 Poland 31.13 
7 9 Croatia 21.25 7 9 Slovenia 25.46 7 13 Croatia 30.87 
8 11 France 20.75 8 12 Croatia 25.08 8 14 Bosnia and Herz. 30.39 
9 12 Slovenia 20.74 9 13 Spain 25.04 9 16 Germany 30.01 
10 13 Latvia 20.69 10 14 Latvia 24.97 10 19 Austria 29.39 
11 14 Lithuania 20.62 11 16 Netherlands 24.61 11 20 Lithuania 28.98 
12 15 Estonia 20.37 12 17 France 24.13 12 22 Czechia 28.86 
13 16 Sweden 20.33 13 18 Bosnia and Herz. 24.09 13 23 Slovakia 28.86 
14 17 Denmark 20.16 14 19 Austria 23.69 14 24 Estonia 28.73 
15 18 Hungary 20.16 15 20 Estonia 23.55 15 25 Switzerland 28.65 
16 19 Czechia 20.14 16 21 Bulgaria 23.43 16 26 Bulgaria 28.63 
17 20 Netherlands 20.03 17 22 Switzerland 23.39 17 27 Netherlands 28 
18 21 Spain 19.98 18 24 Poland 23.22 18 28 Hungary 28 
19 22 Belgium 19.25 19 25 Belgium 22.97 19 29 France 27.83 
20 23 Romania 19.23 20 28 Denmark 22.6 20 30 Latvia 27.81 
21 24 Austria 19.2 21 30 Czechia 22.22 21 32 Romania 27.67 
22 25 Switzerland 19.1 22 31 Sweden 22.15 22 33 Finland 27.57 
23 26 Serbia 19.06 23 33 Hungary 21.98 23 34 Belgium 26.92 
24 27 Poland 18.74 24 35 United Kingdom 21.52 24 35 Serbia 26.64 
25 28 United Kingdom 18.65 25 36 Serbia 21.18 25 36 Ireland 26.62 
26 31 Bosnia and Herz. 17.92 26 37 Romania 21.04 26 38 Cyprus 26 
27 33 Norway 17.53 27 38 Slovakia 20.99 27 39 Macedonia 25.65 
28 34 Ukraine 16.95 28 40 Albania 20.73 28 40 Ukraine 25.52 
29 36 Slovakia 16.7 29 42 Belarus 20.5 29 41 Albania 25.44 
30 43 Montenegro 15.77 30 43 Norway 20.27 30 42 United Kingdom 25.34 
31 44 Iceland 15.62 31 46 Iceland 20.11 31 43 Iceland 25.17 
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32 45 Belarus 15.58 32 47 Ukraine 20.01 32 47 Sweden 24.58 
33 46 Russia 15.51 33 49 Russia 19.6 33 48 Luxembourg 24.5 
34 47 Georgia 15.25 34 51 Montenegro 19.22 34 50 Denmark 24.23 
35 49 Albania 14.7 35 52 Georgia 18.54 35 52 Belarus 24 
36 51 Ireland 14.58 36 53 Macedonia 18.24 36 53 Norway 23.95 
37 52 Macedonia 14.48 37 54 Cyprus 18.21 37 55 Montenegro 23.78 
38 53 Cyprus 14.41 38 55 Ireland 18.14 38 58 Moldova 23.03 
39 54 Luxembourg 14.39 39 56 Luxembourg 18.04 39 59 Russia 22.86 
40 58 Moldova 12.49 40 60 Moldova 16.96 40 66 Georgia 21.78 
41 63 Armenia 11.8 41 61 Armenia 16.9 41 69 Armenia 21.39 
42 79 Turkey 8.98 42 80 Turkey 12.34 42 73 Turkey 20.86 
43 86 Kazakhstan 7.9 43 85 Azerbaijan 11.78 43 88 Azerbaijan 17.5 
44 101 Azerbaijan 6.74 44 89 Kazakhstan 11.07 44 111 Kazakhstan 14.15 
45 124 Uzbekistan 4.79 45 112 Uzbekistan 7.56 45 123 Uzbekistan 12.18 
46 126 Turkmenistan 4.77 46 114 Kyrgyzstan 7.23 46 131 Turkmenistan 10.6 
47 127 Kyrgyzstan 4.73 47 117 Turkmenistan 7.07 47 134 Kyrgyzstan 10.08 
48 153 Tajikistan 3.18 48 141 Tajikistan 5.06 48 144 Tajikistan 7.5 
Middle East and North Africa 
1 8 Malta 21.32 1 10 Malta 25.32 1 15 Malta 30.37 
2 59 Israel 12.41 2 69 Israel 13.64 2 71 Lebanon 20.94 
3 80 Tunisia 8.87 3 78 Tunisia 12.5 3 77 Tunisia 20.2 
4 90 Morocco 7.61 4 81 Lebanon 11.99 4 78 Iran 20.16 
5 92 Lebanon 7.55 5 88 Morocco 11.16 5 80 Kuwait 19.73 
6 100 Algeria 6.74 6 100 Iran 9.55 6 89 Morocco 17.46 
7 103 Iran 6.56 7 102 Algeria 8.94 7 91 Saudi Arabia 17.24 
8 114 Egypt 5.33 8 111 Kuwait 7.58 8 95 Israel 16.58 
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9 122 Syria 4.87 9 126 Djibouti 6.4 9 96 Libya 16.35 




11 129 Libya 4.53 11 128 Libya 6.33 11 101 Algeria 15.89 
12 138 Jordan 3.95 12 132 Saudi Arabia 6.05 12 110 Qatar 14.17 
13 147 Saudi Arabia 3.5 13 133 Syria 6.05 13 113 Syria 13.5 
14 148 Iraq 3.44 14 136 Bahrain 5.56 14 116 Bahrain 12.95 
15 152 Palestine 3.22 15 138 Jordan 5.55 15 117 Oman 12.86 
16 160 Kuwait 3.04 16 140 
United Arab 
Emirates 
5.14 16 124 Djibouti 12.13 
17 165 Yemen 2.93 17 143 Qatar 4.71 17 126 Jordan 11.84 
18 176 Bahrain 2.65 18 144 Oman 4.44 18 137 Egypt 9.42 
19 182 Oman 2.51 19 152 Palestine 4.14 19 143 Palestine 7.56 




1.26 21 168 Yemen 3.38 21 158 Yemen 5.91 
Latin America and Caribbean 
1 10 Puerto Rico 32.65 1 10 Puerto Rico 20.83 1 11 Puerto Rico 25.16 
2 17 Cuba 29.83 2 32 Curaçao 17.67 2 26 Curaçao 22.88 
3 31 Barbados 27.74 3 35 Barbados 16.7 3 32 Barbados 22.06 
4 45 Chile 24.9 4 40 Cuba 15.89 4 34 Cuba 21.66 
5 46 Curaçao 24.73 5 48 Uruguay 15.09 5 39 Aruba 20.74 
6 51 Saint Lucia 24.06 6 50 Aruba 14.6 6 58 Chile 17.15 




23.05 8 64 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 




9 61 Brazil 22.72 9 65 Argentina 11.37 9 65 Costa Rica 15.11 
10 64 Aruba 22.32 10 68 Saint Lucia 10.3 10 67 Saint Lucia 14.64 
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11 68 Uruguay 21.67 11 69 Costa Rica 10.25 11 68 Antigua and Barb. 13.67 
12 70 Colombia 21.01 12 70 St. Vin. and Gren. 9.91 12 70 Brazil 13.59 
13 74 Antigua and Barb. 20.79 13 71 Grenada 9.79 13 72 St. Vin. and Gren. 13.39 
14 83 St. Vin. and Gren. 18.94 14 73 Brazil 9.59 14 74 Colombia 13.03 
15 84 Peru 18.93 15 75 Antigua and Barb. 9.33 15 75 Argentina 12.74 
16 85 Jamaica 18.47 16 76 Jamaica 9.08 16 79 Grenada 12.45 
17 86 Panama 17.82 17 78 Colombia 9.06 17 82 Jamaica 11.96 
18 87 Bahamas 17.64 18 81 Peru 8.73 18 84 Bahamas 11.79 
19 90 Argentina 17.28 19 82 El Salvador 8.65 19 86 Peru 11.44 
20 92 Mexico 17.03 20 83 Panama 8.54 20 87 Panama 11.3 
21 94 Grenada 16.69 21 85 Venezuela 7.97 21 90 El Salvador 10.65 
22 97 El Salvador 16.27 22 88 Bahamas 7.75 22 91 Guyana 10.31 
23 98 Ecuador 16.19 23 89 Mexico 7.62 23 92 Dominican Rep. 10.24 
24 100 Dominican Rep. 16.02 24 91 Ecuador 7.59 24 94 Mexico 10.2 
25 105 Venezuela 15.33 25 93 Dominican Rep. 7.53 25 95 Venezuela 10.13 
26 106 Nicaragua 14.93 26 94 Bolivia 7.49 26 96 Ecuador 10.1 
27 108 Guyana 14.82 27 96 Suriname 7.14 27 99 Suriname 9.97 
28 109 Suriname 14.37 28 97 Guyana 7 28 103 Bolivia 8.78 
29 119 Honduras 12.84 29 99 Paraguay 6.81 29 105 Paraguay 8.52 
30 120 Paraguay 12.77 30 110 Nicaragua 5.68 30 108 Nicaragua 7.99 
31 121 Belize 12.76 31 116 Haiti 5.17 31 118 Belize 7.06 
32 122 Bolivia 12.72 32 118 Guatemala 5.04 32 125 Honduras 6.66 
33 130 Guatemala 10.95 33 119 Belize 5.01 33 129 Haiti 6.31 
34 135 Haiti 10.08 34 120 Honduras 4.97 34 131 Guatemala 6.12 
North America 




United States of 
America 
16.63 2 44 
United States of 
America 
20.26 2 63 




1 57 Mauritius 12.52 1 57 Mauritius 17.99 1 49 Mauritius 24.46 
2 84 Seychelles 8.07 2 77 Seychelles 12.6 2 79 Seychelles 20.02 
3 113 South Africa 5.51 3 115 Cabo Verde 7.16 3 107 Cabo Verde 14.83 
4 121 Lesotho 4.95 4 124 South Africa 6.68 4 132 South Africa 10.49 
5 125 Cabo Verde 4.79 5 134 Botswana 5.65 5 136 Botswana 9.98 
6 130 Botswana 4.51 6 137 Lesotho 5.55 6 141 Lesotho 8.06 
7 131 Eritrea 4.51 7 147 Rwanda 4.37 7 145 Gabon 7.43 
8 137 eSwatini 4.01 8 149 Eritrea 4.23 8 148 Rwanda 6.91 
9 139 Sudan 3.67 9 150 Sudan 4.2 9 149 Kenya 6.72 
10 143 Namibia 3.59 10 151 Ghana 4.19 10 151 Namibia 6.5 
11 145 Ethiopia 3.54 11 153 Namibia 4.13 11 154 Ghana 6.44 
12 146 Gabon 3.53 12 154 Gabon 3.91 12 155 eSwatini 6.25 
13 149 S. Sudan 3.35 13 155 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
3.9 13 156 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
6.18 
14 150 Liberia 3.32 14 156 eSwatini 3.83 14 157 Ethiopia 6.05 
15 151 Benin 3.28 15 157 Ethiopia 3.83 15 159 Comoros 5.74 
16 154 Mauritania 3.18 16 158 Comoros 3.82 16 160 Sudan 5.68 
17 155 Ghana 3.14 17 160 Liberia 3.78 17 161 Madagascar 5.63 
18 156 Rwanda 3.12 18 161 Madagascar 3.73 18 162 Mauritania 5.56 
19 157 Senegal 3.11 19 162 Mauritania 3.68 19 163 Liberia 5.53 
20 158 Comoros 3.11 20 163 Benin 3.6 20 165 Zimbabwe 5.42 
21 159 Madagascar 3.1 21 164 S. Sudan 3.57 21 166 Eritrea 5.39 
22 161 Dem. Rep. Congo 3.02 22 165 Congo 3.45 22 167 Congo 5.35 




São Tomé and 
Principe 
3.01 24 167 Senegal 3.38 24 169 Togo 5.12 
25 164 Guinea 2.95 25 169 Zimbabwe 3.33 25 170 Sierra Leone 4.92 
26 166 Sierra Leone 2.93 26 170 Togo 3.27 26 171 Benin 4.84 
27 167 Togo 2.91 27 171 Dem. Rep. Congo 3.18 27 172 S. Sudan 4.69 
28 168 Somalia 2.9 28 173 Sierra Leone 3.13 28 173 Malawi 4.59 
29 169 Guinea-Bissau 2.89 29 174 Guinea 3.08 29 174 Tanzania 4.51 
30 170 Côte d'Ivoire 2.88 30 175 Côte d'Ivoire 3.05 30 175 Cameroon 4.51 
31 171 Mozambique 2.86 31 176 Tanzania 3 31 176 Guinea-Bissau 4.45 
32 172 Central African Rep. 2.8 32 177 Guinea-Bissau 2.98 32 177 Zambia 4.17 
33 173 Congo 2.76 33 178 Somalia 2.94 33 178 Burkina Faso 4.1 
34 174 Nigeria 2.74 34 179 Nigeria 2.9 34 179 Dem. Rep. Congo 4.1 
35 175 Cameroon 2.72 35 180 Central African Rep. 2.9 35 180 Uganda 4.03 
36 178 Tanzania 2.64 36 181 Cameroon 2.89 36 181 Côte d'Ivoire 3.98 
37 179 Malawi 2.64 37 182 Burundi 2.88 37 182 Nigeria 3.96 
38 180 Niger 2.6 38 183 Mozambique 2.84 38 183 Burundi 3.94 
39 181 Gambia 2.53 39 184 Malawi 2.83 39 184 Guinea 3.93 
40 183 Kenya 2.51 40 185 Burkina Faso 2.69 40 185 Gambia 3.91 
41 184 Chad 2.5 41 186 Gambia 2.68 41 186 Mozambique 3.88 
42 185 Mali 2.48 42 187 Niger 2.6 42 187 Mali 3.55 
43 186 Burkina Faso 2.41 43 188 Chad 2.55 43 188 Central African Rep. 3.5 
44 187 Eq. Guinea 2.38 44 189 Angola 2.49 44 189 Chad 3.38 
45 188 Burundi 2.38 45 190 Zambia 2.46 45 190 Angola 3.35 
46 189 Angola 2.19 46 191 Mali 2.42 46 191 Eq. Guinea 3.27 
47 190 Zambia 2.13 47 192 Uganda 2.34 47 192 Somalia 3.08 








Table C 1. Descriptive statistics 






Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD. Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Transition time to 
1st job (month) 
3177 13.92 19.45 0 93.8 1616 12.9 17.83 0 78.79 1561 14.97 20.95 0 93.8 
Labour income  
(Int$ PPP) 
2155 4.77 8.69 -7.86 195.2
1 
1119 4.77 8.74 -7.86 161.5
3 
1036 4.76 8.65 -0.96 195.2
1 
# of activities 
since school 
4795 2.57 2.52 0 15 2451 2.53 2.47 0 15 2344 2.6 2.58 0 15 
 Finished school 
during GFC 
4795 0.51 0.5 0 1 2451 1 0 1 1 2344 0 0 0 0 
Sex 4795 0.51 0.5 0 1 2451 0.51 0.5 0 1 2344 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Age at finishing 
formal education 
4771 18.64 2.89 10.04 26.14 2445 18.68 3.04 10.05 26.14 2326 18.59 2.73 10.04 25.06 




















4698 2.18 0.66 1 3 2408 2.19 0.66 1 3 2290 2.17 0.66 1 3 
Married 4794 0.34 0.47 0 1 2451 0.32 
 





2068 0.32 0.47 0 1 1062 0.31 
 
0.46 0 1 1006 0.34 0.47 0 1 
One parent has 
tertiary education 
4300 0.31 0.46 0 1 2203 0.31 0.46 0 1 2097 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Area dummy 
(urban/rural) 
4795 0.43 0.5 0 1 2451 0.43 0.5 0 1 2344 0.43 0.5 0 1 
Distance between 
GFC and survey 
4795 71.74 9.66 52.82 85.28 2451 71.71 9.53 52.82 85.28 2344 71.78 9.8 52.82 85.28 
 





Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 
Armenia 
(Sep-Oct 2014) 
Real GDP 52.9 -1.7 -51.2 56.8 58.7 -19.5 -49.5 30.8 58.0 -4.3 -44.4 
 
LFPR . . 58.9 59.6 61.9 57.8 57.5 56.7 61.9 60.7 58.1  
Unemployment . . 17.7 17.3 15.6 14.7 19.9 19.1 19.3 16.8 18.1 
Brazil 
(Jun 2013) 
Real GDP 2.8 0.5 -1.6 4.6 3.5 -5.1 -4.9 4.8 4.6 1.1 -1.4 
 
LFPR* . 65.7 . . . 65.6 . . . 65.9 .  
Unemployment* . 8.3 . . . 7.3 . . . 8.5 . 
Dominican Rep. 
(Jul-Sep 2015) 
Real GDP 0.8 3.0 1.9 1.8 -6.4 1.4 0.5 2.4 -1.9 6.1 2.2 
 
LFPR  . 57.3 . 57.8 . 57.4 . 55.0 . 55.9 .  
Unemployment  . 5.0 . 4.7 . 4.8 . 5.1 . 5.8 . 
Egypt 
(Nov-Dec 2014) 
Real GDP 0.2 4.9 2.3 4.6 1.7 -2.1 0.1 4.9 1.8 -1.8 0.7 
 




Unemployment 8.9 9.1 9.2 8.1 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.1 8.8 
El Salvador 
(Oct-Dec 2014) 
Real GDP  1.0 7.8 -9.2 5.9 -2.4 4.3 -8.8 5.2 -2.8 5.2 -4.5 
 
LFPR* . 61.9 . . . 61.7 . . . 61.6 .  
Unemployment* . 6.4 . . . 5.9 . . . 7.3 . 
Jamaica 
(Jun-Sep 2015) 
Real GDP -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 1.0 -1.2 -1.2 -2.5 0.4 1.0 -1.6 -1.4 
 
LFPR  . . 65.7 64.9 65.2 65.4 64.1 63.5 63.7 62.9 63.0  
Unemployment 9.7 9.4 10.1 11.7 10.2 10.3 11.1 11.4 11.3 11.6 13.5 
Kyrgyzstan  
(Jul-Sep 2013) 
Real GDP 75.8 -21.6 -34.6 19.3 73.7 -16.5 -43.3 22.0 81.2 -15.9 -36.3 
 
LFPR 67.2 64.7 64.5 64.7 67.3 65.1 63.0 64.5 66.2 63.8 .  
Unemployment 6.3 7.1 11.1 6.9 7.4 7.6 10.9 7.9 6.9 8.0 . 
Moldova 
(Mar 2015) 
Real GDP 25.4 -6.5 -15.1 23.2 17.1 -6.7 -22.3 9.7 16.9 -3.8 -9.1 
 
LFPR 46.5 42.6 41.7 47.5 46.1 41.8 39.9 45.9 44.8 40.4 37.9  
Unemployment 5.1 5.4 5.5 3.0 3.6 3.9 7.7 6.1 5.7 6.2 . 
North Macedonia 
(Jul-Oct 2014) 
Real GDP 7.0 6.1 -11.8 9.1 2.0 3.6 -10.7 4.2 -0.2 9.0 -6.8 
 
LFPR 54.6 54.6 55.1 55.0 55.5 54.8 55.0 55.8 56.1 54.9 55.1  
Unemployment 34.2 34.8 34.8 33.9 33.0 33.5 32.8 31.9 31.7 32.4 33.5 
Montenegro 
(Sep-Oct 2015) 
Real GDP 9.4 0.8 18.1 13.2 7.1 -5.7 9.2 -10.9 -6.7 -10.1 9.9 
 
LFPR* . 48.5 . . . 48.6 . . . 48.5 .  
Unemployment* . 19.4 . . . 17.1 . . . 19.1 . 
Russia 
(Mar 2015) 
Real GDP 8.7 4.9 -12.9 8.7 7.2 -2.7 -19.9 6.4 10.2 3.7 -14.4 
 
LFPR 67.8 67.0 66.8 67.6 68.5 67.8 66.9 67.8 68.7 67.8 66.9  
Unemployment 5.6 5.6 7.1 5.4 5.8 7.0 9.4 8.5 7.8 8.0 8.7 
Serbia 
(Mar-Apr 2015) 
Real GDP 4.7 7.4 . 7.2 3.6 3.1 -14.5 5.7 4.5 3.2 -12.4 
 
LFPR . . . 51.6 . 51.4 . 49.3 . 48.9 .  





Real GDP 1.6 0.6 1.3 0.4 2.4 0.9 -0.9 1.7 1.5 1.7 -0.8 
 
LFPR* . 45.7 . . . 45.9 . . . 45.3 .  
Unemployment* . 12.4 . . . 12.4 . . . 13.3 . 
Ukraine 
(Apr-May 2015) 
Real GDP 17.5 -1.8 -15.6 9.0 15.3 -13.2 -26.3 12.1 17.6 -3.9 -17.5 
 
LFPR 63.9 61.5 63.0 64.0 64.7 61.6 63.2 63.7 64.3 62.1 63.7  
Unemployment 5.4 6.9 7.1 5.4 5.5 7.5 9.5 8.6 7.8 9.4 9.0 
Sources: Real GDP (%): IMF (2020). (1) Statistica Moldovei. (2) Montstat.  
LFPR (%) and Unemployment (%): ILOSTAT (2020b). (*) Annual data. 






Table C 3. Estimated change in the school-to-work transition (full output, model comparison) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Dependent variable: SWT duration (month) 
OLS ZINB ZIP TwoPM TwoPM 
        Probit OLS Probit GLM 
GFC  . .     
 GFC 6.72 1.49 1.46 0.17 12.10** 0.17 1.59 
Sex (5.413) (0.511) (0.347) (0.313) (5.704) (0.313) (0.536) 
 Male -4.15*** 0.72*** 0.79*** -0.12** -4.69*** -0.12** 0.76*** 
Education (0.743) (0.039) (0.035) (0.059) (0.864) (0.059) (0.039) 
 Secondary -4.86*** 0.67*** 1.05 -0.53*** 1.19 -0.53*** 1.11 
  (1.468) (0.083) (0.083) (0.105) (1.735) (0.105) (0.116) 
 Tertiary -8.53*** 0.56*** 1.16 -1.01*** 2.69 -1.01*** 1.25* 
Area (1.511) (0.085) (0.112) (0.112) (1.994) (0.112) (0.149) 
 Urban -1.46* 0.92 0.89** -0.02 -2.45*** -0.02 0.93 
Controls (0.760) (0.053) (0.041) (0.059) (0.888) (0.059) (0.049) 
 Married -0.20 0.99 1.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 1.01 
  (0.850) (0.064) (0.051) (0.069) (0.978) (0.069) (0.059) 
 One parent has tertiary education -0.57 1.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 1.01 
  (0.860) (0.070) (0.058) (0.069) (1.047) (0.069) (0.063) 
 Age at finishing formal education 3.93*** 1.47*** 0.94 0.46*** -2.73 0.46*** 0.90 
  (1.140) (0.205) (0.091) (0.099) (1.970) (0.099) (0.106) 
 Sq. age at finishing formal education -0.11*** 0.99*** 1.00 -0.01*** 0.04 -0.01*** 1.00 
  (0.031) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.052) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
 Constant -28.39* 0.30 134.67*** -6.60*** 80.44*** -6.60*** 218.39*** 
  (14.674) (0.491) (122.768) (1.126) (26.566) (1.126) (346.693) 
Inflate        
 Number of activities since school  1.62*** 1.13***     
   (0.127) (0.024)     
Controls               
 Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Goodness of fit               
 R-squared 0.1412    0.1914   
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 McFadden's R2  0.015 0.156     
 Pseudo R²    0.1764  0.1764  
 AIC 24383.32 18726.59 45416.27 20468.11 20468.11 18555.55 18555.55 
 BIC 24573.53 18934.63 45618.37 20854.45 20854.45 18941.9 18941.9 
Observations 2,819 2,819 2,819 2,818 2,818 2,818 2,818 
GLM: log link and gamma distribution. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table C 4. Estimated impact of the GFC (full output, model comparison) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variable:  
SWT duration (month) 
OLS ZINB ZIP TwoPM TwoPM 
     Probit OLS Probit GLM 
GFC               
 GFC 1.98 1.24 1.27 -0.07 8.11 -0.07 1.43 
Sex (6.124) (0.437) (0.323) (0.352) (6.016) (0.352) (0.504) 
 Male -5.60*** 0.62*** 0.71*** -0.09 -7.24*** -0.09 0.64*** 
  (1.113) (0.049) (0.044) (0.081) (1.219) (0.081) (0.047) 
 Male X GFC 2.87** 1.33*** 1.24** -0.07 4.92*** -0.07 1.37*** 
Education (1.425) (0.146) (0.104) (0.113) (1.678) (0.113) (0.139) 
 Secondary -6.34*** 0.68*** 1.02 -0.64*** -0.06 -0.64*** 1.16 
  (2.123) (0.101) (0.098) (0.143) (2.183) (0.143) (0.156) 
 Tertiary -11.36*** 0.47*** 1.07 -1.22*** 0.21 -1.22*** 1.16 
  (2.187) (0.083) (0.122) (0.152) (2.466) (0.152) (0.175) 
 Secondary X GFC 3.08 0.99 1.09 0.20 2.71 0.20 0.94 
  (2.661) (0.182) (0.143) (0.188) (2.856) (0.188) (0.162) 
 Tertiary X GFC 5.61** 1.38* 1.20 0.40** 4.87 0.40** 1.15 
Area (2.727) (0.269) (0.172) (0.194) (3.018) (0.194) (0.209) 
 Urban -1.61 0.91 0.88** -0.05 -2.74** -0.05 0.93 
  (1.134) (0.074) (0.056) (0.082) (1.239) (0.082) (0.068) 
 Urban X GFC 0.18 1.02 1.03 0.05 0.40 0.05 1.00 
Controls (1.422) (0.114) (0.089) (0.113) (1.693) (0.113) (0.101) 
 Married -0.19 0.98 1.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 1.00 
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  (0.848) (0.063) (0.051) (0.069) (0.977) (0.069) (0.059) 
 One parent has tertiary education -0.54 1.01 1.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 1.03 
  (0.857) (0.071) (0.058) (0.070) (1.047) (0.070) (0.064) 
 Age at finishing formal education 4.08*** 1.48*** 0.94 0.47*** -2.79 0.47*** 0.90 
  (1.147) (0.206) (0.092) (0.099) (1.971) (0.099) (0.106) 
 Squared age at finishing formal education -0.11*** 0.99*** 1.00 -0.01*** 0.04 -0.01*** 1.00 
  (0.031) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.052) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
 Constant -27.66* 0.28 127.80*** -6.52*** 80.66*** -6.52*** 197.32*** 
Inflate (14.597) (0.448) (117.196) (1.131) (26.573) (1.131) (312.585) 
 Number of activities since school  1.615*** 1.132***     
   (-0.128) (-0.024)     
 _cons  0.007*** 0.286***     
   (-0.006) (-0.02)     
 /        
 lnalpha  2.476***      
      (-0.106)           
 Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Goodness of fit               
 R-squared 0.144    0.1957   
 McFadden's R2  0.016 0.159     
 Pseudo R²    0.1782  0.1782  
 AIC 24381.862 18724.71 45290.68 20467.29 20467.29 18550.66 18550.66 
 BIC 24595.851 18956.54 45516.56 20901.18 20901.18 18984.56 18984.56 
Observations 2,819 2,819 2,819 2,818 2,818 2,818 2,818 
GLM: log link and gamma distribution. 
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